Shark Finning – How Municipal Laws in Canada are Saving Sharks & Setting an International Example

15 04 2012

Shark Finning – How Municipal Laws in Canada are Saving Sharks & Setting an International Example

By: Ryan Venables
2012 April 13

 

Introduction

Arguably, for the first time since the dinosaurs disappeared, humans are driving animals and plants to extinction faster than new species can evolve, one of the world’s experts on biodiversity has warned.[1] Additionally, conservation experts have already signaled that the world is in the grip of the ‘sixth great extinction’ of species, driven by the destruction of natural habitats, hunting, the spread of alien predators and disease, and climate change.[2]

As time passes and we continue to march into the future, it is easy to see that unless more is done to protect vulnerable species, the list of near threatened, endangered, critically endangered, extinct in the wild, and extinct species will continue to grow.[3]  Considering Earth’s oceans span approximately 361,419,000 square kilometers or just under 71% of the global surface, I would suggest particular importance should to be given to ensure this resource is protected for the benefit of all who utilize its resources.[4]  I would further suggest, at the top of the list for protection are the various species of sharks.[5]

Globally, sharks have been under attack for approximately the last 20 years,[6] for the value of their fins.  Estimates reveal that between 70 and 100 million sharks are killed annually for their fins, which can be valued at up to $300 USD per pound.[7]  However, despite the systematic targeting of sharks for their fins, all is not lost.  Awareness is being raised, and a global cause to save the sharks, and to protect their fins is growing. 

As a result, the focus of this paper will examine many new municipal laws that have recently been enacted which are not only protecting the sharks, but also leading to an outright ban on shark fin products.  I would suggest these municipalities are leading a global crusade and are setting an international example on the importance of sharks, and how Earth’s oceans are dependent on sharks as apex predators.[8]  I would further suggest Canadian federal laws follow suit and adopt laws which not only outlaw the finning of sharks, but place a wholesale ban on the importation on shark fins.  For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the following issues surrounding shark finning,

  1. The global relevance of shark finning
  2. What is the current state of laws surrounding shark finning domestically and globally.
  3. How domestic implementation of laws is having, or has the potential for having international law implications.

 

Although it remains to be seen what the future holds for the sharks of today and tomorrow, what can be established is that if the reduction of shark numbers continues, this will not be a problem in need of discussing as sharks will take their place among species such as the golden toad (1989), west African black rhinoceros (2006), Javan tiger (1979), and the Spix’s macaw (2004) all of which are extinct.[9]

The Global Relevance of Sharks and Shark Finning

Sharks of various sorts, shapes, and sizes have been swimming in Earth’s oceans for the last 400 million years,[10] and it was only 18 million of years ago that school bus sized sharks were swimming freely in Earth’s oceans.[11]  Commonly known as Megalodon, this 18-meter giant dwarfs the largest great white sharks which are approximately 6-7 meters long.[12]  Despite the concerns raised by conservationists like Rob Stewart and Randall Arauz, there are many misconceptions about sharks, and many believe sharks are evil, soulless, man-eating machines that deserve to be eradicated for our safety and protection.  The following is but a few of the more common misconceptions about sharks.  First, “all sharks are the same.  There actually is no typical shark. The nearly 400 species of sharks vary widely in habitat, size, features, diet and lifestyle… [and] more than 80 percent are under five feet. And they range from shallow to deep water and from the Arctic to the Tropics.”[13]  Second,

while sharks are primarily meat eaters, different species consume different kinds of food. Teeth often give clues to what sharks eat.  Sharks with serrated edges on their teeth rip their prey, while sharks with pavement-like teeth eat mollusks and crustaceans. Sharks eat much less than many people believe; many may go for days or even weeks between feedings.  For example, Great White sharks feed on seals during the winter months and consume primarily fish during the summer months.  They have extremely slow digestive tracts, thus if they eat something less than optimal it slows down their digestion for days, prohibiting them from eating other things.  This makes them selective about what they eat, according to experts.[14]

 

Third,

 

shark attacks are common and your chances of getting attacked during water activities are high.  The chances of being attacked by a shark are very slim…  For perspective, people are 250 times more likely to be killed by lightning than by a shark… Within the period of 1999-2009 an average of fewer than 5 people died from shark attacks, each year worldwide.  Falling coconuts, elephant stampedes, and dog bites also kill more people per year than shark attacks.  Crocodiles killed more people last year than sharks have in the last 100 years, and they have protected status.[15]

 

Thus, because of the misconceptions and stereotypes, it is easy to simply turn a blind eye to the persecution of sharks.  It begs the question of why should sharks be protected?  As mentioned previously, sharks are an apex or top predator in many of their environments.  “As apex predators, sharks feed on the animals below them in the food web, helping to regulate and maintain the balance of marine ecosystems. Apex predators directly limit the populations of their prey, which in turn affects the prey species of those animals, and so on.”[16]  For example, as mentioned above great white sharks feed on seals in the winter months, and feed on fish, rays, and other sharks in the summer months.  I would suggest this is significant, because when great white sharks are feeding on seals, chances are that they are not taking the healthy, vibrant, and young seals from their population.  These sharks are, in essence, providing a form of natural selection to their prey by removing old, slow, or sick specimens.   

Therefore, when the apex predator is greatly reduced or eliminated from the ecosystem, is throws everything below it out of balance.  A team of Canadian and US researchers has concluded that overfishing of sharks in the Northwest Atlantic Ocean in the last 35 years has had devastating effects to the ecosystem.[17] 

With fewer large predators in the sea, the number of rays, skates and small shark species has exploded, and these species are decimating such shellfish populations as North Carolina bay scallops and the Chesapeake Bay’s American oysters… Professor Charles H. Peterson and his colleagues calculated that between 1970 and 2005, the number of scalloped hammerhead and tiger sharks may have declined by more than 97 percent along the East Coast and bull, dusky and smooth hammerhead sharks have dropped by more than 99 percent.[18]

This all culminated in 2004, when the reduction of shellfish populations reached such a point that the century old fisheries were forced out of business.[19]  Thus, it is an example such as this that points to the importance and prevalence of sharks in their natural ecosystem.

Despite the examples of impacts that have been attributed to declining shark numbers, the numbers keep declining.  Therefore, it begs the question of, what is happening globally to sharks have such impacts on their numbers?  “Around 60 million sharks are caught every year in the global oceans, and most are for the fin markets in places like Hong Kong and Taiwan.”[20]  Sharks are being targeted by various fishing organizations, but they are also suffering dramatic losses because they happen to be by-catch of another target.  By-catch is when fishing vessels are targeting another species of fish but because sharks are in the area, and are often hunting the intended prey, such as tuna, they either take the intended bait or become ensnared in the fishing line.  However, whether the sharks are specifically targeted or they are caught by chance, the result is the same, death.  Fishing vessels are then seizing the opportunity and removing the fins of live sharks and dumping the sharks, often still alive and writhing in pain, into the ocean to either drown, bleed to death, or be eaten by other animals.[21]  The main reason sharks are finned while at sea is because the whole shark constitutes approximately 95% of its mass, and shark meat is worth very little in comparison to the value of the fins.[22]  Therefore, fishing operations using a simple economics can make the most profits if their hauls are fin only. 

When the vessels return to port, as mentioned previously, the demand for the fins is within Asia.  Specifically,

customs data shows that more than 100 countries are involved in the business of trading in shark fins. Most are exporters while the main consumer nations are mainland China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The United States and the European Union also import significant quantities to local Chinese communities.[23]

After the fins are processed and sold at market, they most often end up in an ancient Chinese delicacy known as shark fin soup.  Affectionately called “extinction in a bowl”[24] by conservationists, shark fin soup’s history dates back several hundred years to the Ming Dynasty where emperors and royalty enjoyed it.[25]  Now with the Chinese economy consistently growing, so too is their middle-class.  As the middle-class grows, so too does their desire for status symbols, like shark fin soup.[26] “…[S]hark fin soup is now eaten at weddings, corporate celebrations and high-falutin’ business lunches to demonstrate a host’s good fortune. ‘It’s like champagne… [y]ou don’t open a bottle of Coke to celebrate. It’s a ritual.’”[27]  Perhaps the most ironic thing about shark fin soup is the fact the shark fin is tasteless and adds only texture to the broth.[28]  However, texture is not the only thing shark fins add to the soup.  In a 1997 US Environmental Protection Agency study on mercury levels in fish, the levels of mercury in sharks were the highest among all fish tested.[29]

Sharks have more mercury than other fish because they are at the top of the food chain, can live for 50 years or more, eat many fish during that lifetime, and continue to store mercury in their bodies during that time. When we eat shark fin soup, a lifetime’s accumulation of mercury is absorbed into our body.  Mercury in fish cannot be trimmed off or destroyed by cooking.[30]

 

Therefore, how does this translate for human consumption?

The legal limit for consumption of methyl-mercury, set by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, is 0.1 microgram per kilogram of body weight. Studies have shown shark meat contains as much as 1,400 micrograms of methyl-mercury in one kilogram. A person weighing 155 lbs would therefore get 50 times the legal amount in one single portion of shark steak.

Studies conducted by Hong Kong Baptist University and WildAid indicate ¼ of shark fins analyzed had mercury levels higher than the highest allowable standards set by the World Health Organization for fishery products.[31]

 

To sum up, shark fin soup is tasteless, it is expensive, and it offers significant health risks to those who consume it.  Yet, not only are shark fins continuing to be utilized for soup dishes, the demand for shark fins on the rise.  It is this demand that is decimating the shark populations worldwide.  As previously indicated, estimates reveal that between 70 and 100 million sharks are killed annually.  Perhaps figures such as these would not be so staggering, if it were the fact that sharks had short reproductive cycles and that those cycles produced many offspring.  However, just the opposite is true.

Sharks populations can’t withstand commercial fishing the way more fecund marine species can. Unlike other fish harvested from the wild, sharks grow slowly.  They don’t reach sexual maturity until later in life — the female great white, for example, at 12 to 14 years — and when they do, they have comparatively few offspring at a time, unlike, say, big tunas, which release millions of eggs when they spawn… As a result, the sharks that are netted are either adolescents that have not had a chance to reproduce or are among the few adults capable of adding new pups to the mix…[32]

 

Although estimates vary, conservationist Shawn Heinrichs indicates that “greater than 90% of most large shark species, and in some cases greater than 99% of certain large species have been depleted from oceans.”[33]  As a result, if sharks continue to be removed from the oceans at such a torrent pace, it is without a doubt that they too, like the Javan tiger or Spix’s macaw, will face extinction.

How Laws are Effecting Shark Finning Globally

Sharks have historically been portrayed as villains, creatures to be feared, and man-eaters.  Nothing epitomises this more than the 1975 Steven Spielberg movie Jaws.  The movie was box office sensation, had arguably one of the more recognizable soundtrack themes in recent movie history, and spawned three sequels.  This movie made it acceptable and reaffirmed the popular misconception that sharks are nothing more than mindless killers.  As a result, I would suggest the current state of shark finning laws is as a direct result of misconceptions such as these. 

This notion is in direct contrast to laws that encompass seals and koalas.  Seals and koalas are known as charismatic megafauna, which are “relatively large animal species, typically mammals or birds, that have symbolic value…  Because many of these species are endangered, their plight receives great media attention, and their management is well-funded, both by private and governmental agencies.”[34]  The toothy grin of a sand tiger shark, or the seal shredding hunting tactics of great white sharks traditionally do not fit into public’s perception of cute and cuddly charismatic megafauna.  However, change is underway, but in order to fully comprehend how far laws must come, an examination of the varying levels must be examined.  It is through this examination that I submit recent municipal laws in Canada, and specifically in municipalities across Ontario, are leading the way to tougher regulation and changes in the shark finning industry.

Municipal Laws

Looking at the vast interest various regions around the world have for protecting sharks, it was Brantford, Ontario which was the first city in North America to restrict shark fin products.[35]  With a population of just over 90,000, the land locked city in Southern Ontario,[36] appears to have no seeming connection with the shark fin trade.  However, the revelation that former Brantford Progressive Conservative Member of Provincial Parliament Phil Gillies spearheaded the ban will come to no surprise to conservationists.[37]  After leaving pubic office, Gillies has been working as a consultant with WildAid to implement a nationwide ban on shark fin products.[38]  Backed by the Mayor Chris Friel, Brantford city council passed the vote unanimously on 2011 May 24 which would see the prohibition of the sale of shark fins.[39]  The minutes of the council meeting read as follows:

WHEREAS sharks world-wide are being slaughtered at the rate of 75-80 million a year to satisfy the market for shark fin soup and other shark fin products; and 


WHEREAS sharks could be extinct in 10-15 years if the slaughter continues throwing the ecosystem of Oceans in to turmoil affecting bio-diversity; and 


WHEREAS the practice of “shark finning” is a wasteful and brutal type of fishing that has been banned in Canadian waters since 1994; and 


WHEREAS “shark finning” is a cruel practice that is contrary to the good morals of the citizens of Brantford; and 


WHEREAS the consumption of shark fins and related food products by humans may cause serious health risks, including mercury and toxic poisoning, and

WHEREAS the City of Brantford, being a small city far from the Oceans, appreciates the important role that sharks play in the ecosystem around the world;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT Staff be directed to prepare a By- law for Council’s consideration to ban the possession, sale and consumption of shark fin and related food products.[40]

Although the meeting has indicated a by-law will be prepared to outline the “ban on the possession, sale, and consumption of shark fin and related food products”[41] as of April 2012, no such by-law has come into force.  Following the passing of this resolution, other municipalities such as Mississauga, Oakville, Toronto, and London have all passed such resolutions.[42]

In London, Ontario, they have taken the resolution one step further by enacting a by-law against shark fin products.[43]  In this the Shark Fin By-Law restricts the following,

3.1       No person shall possess, purchase, consume, sell, offer for sale, trade or distribute any Shark Fin with in the Municipality.

3.2       No person shall prepare for consumption, or cause to be prepared for consumption, any Shark Fin within the Municipality.

3.3       No person shall process, or cause to be processed, any Shark Fin within the Municipality.

3.4       No person shall possess, purchase, sell, offer for sale, trade or distribute anything within the Municipality that is described as containing Shark Fin, or that is described as made from Shark Fin, including, without limitation, shark fin soup.[44]

In addition to the by-law, the City of London has outlined steep fines for those caught in contravention of the Shark Fin By-Law.  Section 5 outlines the penalties for contravention as,

        5.1       (1) Every person who contravenes any provision of this By-law is guilty of an offence.

(2) A director or officer of a corporation who knowingly concurs in the contravention of this By-law is guilty of an offence.

 

        5.2       Any person convicted under this By-law is liable:


            (a) upon a first conviction, to a maximum fine of $15,000;


            (b) upon a subsequent conviction, to a maximum fine of $30,000.

 

        5.3       Despite section 5.2, where the person convicted is a corporation, the corporation is liable

(a) upon a first conviction, to a maximum fine of $30,000;


(b) upon a second conviction, to a maximum fine of $75,000.[45]

 

In order to enforce the Shark Fin By-Law the City of London, has added in s. 4.1 which, when used in conjunction with s. 4.1 of the Inspections By-Law A-30 provides that

[a]n Officer, and anyone under the Officer’s direction, may enter on land at any reasonable time for the purpose of carrying out an inspection to determine whether the following are being complied with:

            (a) a by-law passed under the Municipal Act;

(b) a direction or order of the City made under the Municipal Act or made under a by- 
law of the City passed under the Municipal Act;

(c) a condition of a licence issued under a by-law of the City passed under the 
Municipal Act;

            (d) an order made under section section 431 of the Municipal Act.[46]

 

However, it should be noted that inspection rights to not provide for entry on to land that is being used as a dwelling unless consent or a warrant is obtained prior to entry.[47]  For the purpose of the Inspections By-Law and the Shark Fin By-Law an officer is defined as “means an employee, officer or agent of the City whose duties include conducting inspections and/or enforcing the City’s by-laws, and a police officer with London Police Services.”[48]  In addition to the right of entry onto land an officer may,

(a)  require the production for inspection of documents relevant to the inspection;

(b)  inspect and remove documents or things relevant to the inspection for the purpose of making copies or extracts;

(c)  require information from any person concerning a matter related to the inspection; and,

(d)  alone or in conjunction with a person possessing special or expert knowledge, make examinations or take tests, samples or photographs necessary for the purposes of the inspection.[49]

 

Therefore, not only does the Shark Fin By-Law have the power to impose penalty upon conviction, they have the necessary means to carry out the enforcement.  However, despite the enactment of the Shark Fin By-Law on 2012 January 31, the City of London has outlined that it will grant an exemption for a period of 180 days in order to allow for any citizens of corporations currently in possession of shark fin products to come into compliance with PH-17.[50]  As a result of the Shark Fin By-Law and the accompanying fines, I would suggest that London, Ontario has firmly established itself as a world leader in the protection of sharks.

Although municipalities like London and Toronto[51] have enacted shark fin by-laws, there is resistance coming from other Ontario communities.  The Towns of Richmond Hill and Markham, which are both located just north of Toronto in the Region of York, both have publically stated they are opposed to any such shark fin product ban.[52]  In fact, while the proposed by-law was being passed in Toronto, two town councilors from Markham, Joe Li and Alan Ho, defiantly dined on individual bowls of shark fin soup as their means of protest.[53]  In the months that have followed the shark fin ban in Toronto, both the towns of Markham and Richmond Hill have deferred the issue to the federal government, indicating that it is ultra vires for them to pass such a ban.  I would suggest this is nothing more than a smoke screen in an attempt to delay making any kind of a concrete decision on the issue of shark fins.  Why would these two towns do this?  I would suggest that politics played a role in the decision.  In the 2006 census, Markham’s Chinese community comprised 34% of the total population, where as in Richmond Hill, the Chinese community comprised of 21% of the total population.[54]  This is in comparison to Toronto, where the statistics are equate to 11% Chinese, and London where the Chinese community is 1%.[55]

However, despite the ethnic demographics of Richmond Hill and Markham, the argument that proposing such a shark fin ban as being ultra vires the municipal council needs to be explored further.  Through an examination of s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867[56] it is revealed the federal government has granted the provinces the authority with respect to “the administration of justice in the Province,”[57] “the imposition of punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relations to any matter coming within any of the classes or subjects,”[58] and “generally all maters of a merely local or private nature in the province.”[59]  Therefore, it can accurately be stated the power to enact such laws is intra vires the provinces, however, does the province of Ontario grant this to municipalities?  The Ontario Municipal Act[60] outlines at s. 10(1) that “[a] single-tier municipality may provide any service or thing that the municipality considers necessary or desirable for the public.”[61]  Furthermore, at s. 10(2) the MA indicates,

A single-tier municipality may pass by-laws respecting the following matters:

5. Economic, social and environmental well-being of the municipality.

6. Health, safety and well-being of persons.

8. Protection of persons and property, including consumer protection.

9. Animals.[62]

 

Looking at ss. (1) and (2), the use of the word single-tier may be called into question.  The definitions section of the MA has defined single-tier as “means a municipality, other than an upper-tier municipality, that does not form part of an upper-tier municipality for municipal purposes.”[63]  Additionally, an upper-tier municipality “means a municipality of which two or more lower-tier municipalities form part for municipal purposes.”[64]  Both Markham and Richmond Hill are single-tier entities in an upper-tier municipality, with the upper-tier being the Region of York.  However, neither Richmond Hill nor Markham is alone considered upper-tier municipalities. 

Furthermore, should any ambiguity arise within the scope or nature of the law enacted by the municipality, s. 8 confers deference to be paid to the municipality for which the law has been enacted.

(1) The powers of a municipality under this or any other Act shall be interpreted broadly so as to confer broad authority on the municipality to enable the municipality to govern its affairs as it considers appropriate and to enhance the municipality’s ability to respond to municipal issues.

(2) In the event of ambiguity in whether or not a municipality has the authority under this or any other Act to pass a by-law or to take any other action, the ambiguity shall be resolved so as to include, rather than exclude, powers the municipality had on the day before this Act came into force.[65]

As a combined result of the reading of the various sections of the MA, I would suggest the MA confers the necessary authority on municipalities to produce and enforce laws with respect to shark fins and their products.  Consequently, through an examination of the Shark Fin By-Law in London, Ontario and others of a similar nature, the power granted to municipalities in Ontario with respect to creating laws is leading the wave for change, and is setting an example for the international stage.

Municipal Versus Federal Laws

Despite the recent trend toward tough municipal by-laws in Ontario, federal regulations have been present in Canada since 1994 with respect to shark finning.[66]  Despite the nearly 20-year-old regulations, it is the new municipal laws I would suggest, are going to truly make a difference.  The 1994 regulation established by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”) outlines that

…the practice of removing the fins and discarding the remainder of the carcass while at sea, was banned in Canada in June 1994. The ban applies to Canadian fisheries waters and Canadian licensed vessels fishing outside of the EEZ.  Moreover, the trade and sale of fins must be in appropriate proportion to the quantity of carcasses landed (five per cent of dressed carcass weight).[67]

The proportions of carcass to fin ratio are as follows,

worldwide, the most widely adopted management measure is a 5 percent ratio rule, allowing the landings of a maximum of 5 percent fins relative to the weight of landed carcasses. In Canada, this practice was adopted in 1994 and extended to all Canadian-licensed fishing vessels outside of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[68]

Although Canada has followed suit and established ratio limitations and regulation with respect to the removal of fins at sea, I would suggest this has done little to stem the tied of shark fins flowing into its borders.  Canada is not considered among of the top shark finning nations, nor is it among the top shark fin product consumers.[69]

Despite Canada not being among the top consumers or exporters of shark fins, Canada does have strict regulation with respect to finning.  When examining the regulations established by the DFO, Canada has complimented them through an extremely strict set of laws surrounding certain wild animals and plants with respect to the interprovincial and international trade of said species.  Known as the Wild Animal and Plan Protection and Regulations of International and Interprovincial Trade Act[70] section 4 of the WAPPA outlines that “[t]he purpose of this Act is to protect certain species of animals and plants, particularly by implementing the Convention and regulating international and interprovincial trade in animals and plants.”  It should be noted that the Convention referred to in s. 4  “means the Convention on international trade in endangered species [“CITES”] of wild fauna and flora, made on March 3, 1973 in Washington, D.C., United States and ratified by Canada on April 10, 1975, as amended from time to time, to the extent that the amendment is binding on Canada.”[71]  The list of species encompassed in WAPPA is listed in the Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations,[72] and of all the species listed only five sharks are present.  These include, basking shark, great white shark, whale shark, and two varieties of sawfishes.  In an enforcement standpoint, the WAPPA has a great range of penalties as outlined in s. 22 that includes,

      (1) Every person who contravenes a provision of this Act or the regulations

(a) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable

(i) in the case of a person that is a corporation, to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, and

(ii) in the case of a person other than a person referred to in subparagraph (i), to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both; or

(b) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable

(i) in the case of a person that is a corporation, to a fine not exceeding three hundred thousand dollars, and

(ii) in the case of a person other than a person referred to in subparagraph (i), to a fine not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to both.[73]

Furthermore, in the event that a subsequent offence is recorded, the penalty can be doubled upon conviction.[74]  Subsection (3) outlines that a person or corporation may be charged for every violation under the act.[75]  Therefore, if it is determined that vessel has brought in 500 shark fins; the possibility exists for 500 charges under the act.  Additionally, “[w]here an offence under this Act is committed or continued on more than one day, it shall be deemed to be a separate offence for each day on which the offence is committed or continued.”[76]  Apart from monetary fines with respect to the contravention of the act, the WAPPA also provides for the possibility that an offender forfeit any proceeds they may have received from the benefit of contravening the act.[77]  As can be seen, the WAPPA has extremely strict regulation with respect to endangered animals, however, as previously mentioned, there are over 400 species of sharks and this act covers five.  I would further suggest although the penalties associated with s. 22 of the WAPPA are of a great deterrent, the simple fact that they only encompass endangered or species as listed by CITES does not go far enough to protect sharks.

On 2012 December 08, Member of Parliament for New Westminster-Coquitlam Fin Donnelly brought forth Bill C-380, a private member’s bill, which is aimed directly at the shark finning industry.[78]  In addressing the House of Commons, MP Donnelly stated, “[t]he best way to curb illegal finning is to stop the international trade in shark fins. Canada can become a world leader in shark conservation and ocean stewardship by adopting legislation to protect sharks.”[79]  This bill seeks to amend the s. 3 of the Fish Inspection Act[80] by adding the following,

 

3.1(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), it is prohibited to import or attempt to import shark fins that are not attached to the rest of the shark carcass

 

(2) A person may import shark fins that are not attached to the rest of the shark carcass only if the Minister has issued a permit to that person authorizing such an importation

 

(3) The permit referred to in subsection (2) may be issued only if the Ministers is of the opinion that

(a) the importation supports scientific research relating to shark conservation and conducted by qualified persons; and

(b) the activity benefits the survival of the shark species or is required to enhance their chance of survival in the wild

 

(4) The Minister may, after consultation with the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, make regulations respecting the issuance of the permit referred to in subsection (2) and the renewal, revocation, and amendment and suspension of such a permit.[81]

 

The bill also seeks to amend s. 32 of the Fisheries Act[82] by adding the following,

            32.1(1) No person shall engage in the practice of shark finning.

 

(2) In this section, “shark finning” means the practice of removing the fins from sharks and discarding the remainder of the sharks while still at sea.[83]

 

Although Bill C-380 is in its infancy, I would suggest it lacks the teeth the municipal by-laws of London have for two specific reasons.  First, the Shark Fin By-Law brings capabilities for enforcement on the possession of shark fin products.  I would suggest this is a monumental increase over Bill C-380.  Those investigating the finning industry have found that many countries have adopted regulations that prohibit the landing of shark carcasses without the fins attached.[84]  However, I would suggest these laws do not go far enough.  For example, in Costa Rica after intense international pressure, they too enacted regulation to prohibit vessels from finning the sharks while at sea.[85]  In order to avoid detection many of the vessels began docking at private docks far away from government oversight and enforcement.[86]  Costa Rica then prohibited fishing vessels from coming into private ports, and again in a seemingly endless cat and mouse game, the vessels moved to neighbouring Nicaragua where there are no such laws.[87]  It is then suspected that the fins are driven over the Costa Rican border and exported to places in Asian such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China.[88]

The second reason I would suggest that Bill C-380 lacks the necessary enhanced regulation is because it not bringing anything new to Canada with respect to shark finning regulations.  Although the 2011 proposed Bill is attempting to bring laws domestically to Canada, I would suggest Canada has a long history of shark finning laws.  In March 2007, Canada adopted the International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (“IPOA-Sharks”) into the Canada National Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (“NPOA-Sharks”).[89]  The IPOA-Sharks was created in 1999 as a response to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”) concerns about expanding shark fisheries and negative impacts on shark populations globally.[90] 

The IPOA-Sharks is voluntary. It has been elaborated within the framework of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries as envisaged by Article 2 (d). The provisions of Article 3 of the Code of Conduct apply to the interpretation and application of the IPOA-Sharks and its relationship with other international instruments. All concerned States are encouraged to implement it.

The IPOA-Sharks is not a full strategic plan for the world, rather it prescribes a process whereby individual States, relevant sub-regional arrangements through bilateral and multilateral agreements, and relevant regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO), identify national, sub-regional and regional issues and then appropriately develop national, sub-regional and regional ‘Shark Plans’ to address the issues.[91]

 

Canada has adopted a regional Shark Plan under NPOA-Sharks and is following the suggested Articles of Code of Conduct.[92]  Although IPOA-Sharks indicates it is of a voluntary nature, Article 2(1)(a)-(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[93] indicate that when a States accepts a treaty (or by other name) they intend to be bound on an international plane to that treaty.[94]  As such, should any disputes arise regarding shark finning practices they would be resolved in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”)[95].  Although there are established routes for conflict resolution at the international level through ITLOS, Bill C-380 is attempting bring domestic regulation into Canada with respect to shark finning.  Prior to IPOA-Sharks and NPOA-Sharks, Canada adopted shark-finning laws in 1994 through their Integrated Fisheries Management Plan (“IFMP”) after adopting the recommendations of the International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (“ICCAT”).  Going forward under the DFO, the restriction was encompassed under s. 22 of the FA, Fishery General Regulations[96] which prohibited the removal of fins while at sea.

In the end, although Bill C-380 is a very positive step forward in bringing Canada, I would suggest the municipal laws are more direct in targeting what the nature of shark finning by addressing the possession of shark fin products and not stopping at the importation of shark fins.

           

International Laws

While looking at the decline of sharks over the last number of decades, I would suggest that it is directly attributable to the lack of international laws regulating the shark fin industry.  Although there are a number of national and international bodies that oversee various state and non-governmental organizations (“NGO”), for the purpose of this paper I will restrict my examination of international laws to that of CITES and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”). 

CITES “is an international agreement between governments. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.”[97]  Adopted at a 1963 meeting of the IUCN, CITES falls under the umbrella of the United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”) and now boasts 175 member states and is governed by a legally binding Convention.[98]  The Convention focuses around three Appendices which are outlined in Article II indicating the following,

1. Appendix I shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances.

 

2. Appendix II shall include:

(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and

(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought under effective control.

 

3. Appendix III shall include all species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade.

4. The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III except in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.[99]

 

In order for a species to be added or removed from the Appendices a member state must follow the procedures outlined in Article XV.[100]  For example,

species may be added to or removed from Appendix I and II, or moved between them, only by the Conference of the Parties, either at its regular meetings or by postal procedures.  But species may be added to or removed from Appendix III at any time and by any Party unilaterally (although the Conference of the Parties has recommended that changes be timed to coincide with amendments to Appendices I and II).[101]

 

An examination of the Appendices I, II, and III reveals that only five species of sharks are protected under the Convention; these include two sawfishes, basking, great white, and whale sharks.[102]  Although, there are only a fraction of shark species on CITES, Costa Rica has recently moved to add the scalloped hammerhead shark to Appendix III.[103]

In addition to the international oversight of the UN sponsored CITES, is the much larger IUCN.  The IUCN encompasses not only member nations, but also government agencies, NGO’s, international non-governmental organizations, and affiliates.[104]  The IUCN was founded in 1948 as the world’s first global environmental organization, and today it has more than 1,200 members globally.[105]  Although the IUCN focuses on environmental issues on a larger scale, in order to conduct a proper comparison with CITES, I will examine the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (“Red List”).  The goal of the Red List is “to provide information and analyses on the status, trends and threats to species in order to inform and catalyze action for biodiversity conservation.”[106]  In order for a specific species to be submitted for acceptance on to the Red List, it would first undergo a rigorous process, where a number of factors are checked in accordance with the available data on the species at the time.[107]  Following this, categories for species on the Red List include, least concern, near threatened, vulnerable, endangered, critically endangered, extinct in the wild, and extinct.[108]  According to the IUCN Shark Specialist Group of the 468 species of actual sharks, 143 types of shark fall within the critically endangered to near threatened categories.[109]  Of all of the types of sharks, none are reported to be increasing in numbers.[110]  The numbers the Red List is bringing forward is in stark contrast to CITES.  Therefore, how do you reconcile the discrepancies between the two organizations?  In a recent interview with CITES committee member Dr. Giam Choo-Hoo, he indicates the “IUCN and its Red List, probably the world’s most respected inventory of wildlife endangered by man, is not to be trusted he says, because it is at heart an NGO.”[111]  For some context, Dr. Choo-Hoo is a committee member that advises nations on whether or not to control, or in some cases ban, the trade in endangered species.[112]  When discussing the specifics of conflicts of interest CITES indicates, members of the Animals Committee do not represent their own region, but can be selected as individual experts.[113]  Therefore, Dr. Choo-Hoo representing the Asian region is promoting shark finning and is campaigning against any new regulations despite what the Red List says.[114]  For an organization that purports to protect the wellbeing of animals globally, the ironic nature encompasses the fact that CITES does not nor has any plans on implementing a conflict of interest policy for its committee members.[115]

Municipal Laws Versus CITES

After examining the IUCN and CITES, it is known that only CITES has a contravention that is legally binding on the international sphere.  However,

[t]he effectiveness of CITES in a particular member country and as a whole is almost entirely dependent upon each country enacting legislation that is sufficient to implement at least the basic tenets of the treaty. Even though member states are technically bound by the terms of CITES, specific implementation legislation is still needed for CITES to be effective.

By March 2002, approximately fifty percent of CITES member states either had not provided for any of these basic requirements in their national laws or had enacted legislation that provided for only some of the basic requirements.72 Such dismal compliance rates significantly reduce the effectiveness of CITES on a global level.[116]

Despite this, in order to examine how the municipal laws of Ontario are exceeding CITES, I would suggest the enforcement Article(s) of CITES must be examined.  Article VIII of the Convention outlines the measures that may or shall be taken by any party.  Paragraph 1 indicates,

The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include measures:

 

(a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and

(b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.[117]

 

Additionally, Article I defines the term party as “means a State for which the present Convention has entered into force.”[118]  As such, according to the Convention, it appears as if the Canadian government is responsible for enforcement of the Convention Articles under WAPPA.  As was outlined earlier, the enforcement arm of WAPPA falls under s. 22 with penalties ranging from fines to confiscation of items contrary to the act, as well as forfeiture of proceeds obtained through the offence.  Furthermore, it was also mentioned that the Shark Fin By-Law, as I would submit, also had significantly more powerful laws when it came to the protection of sharks.  Therefore, I would submit that the new municipal by-laws of cities such as London and Toronto, Ontario have the potential to have a much stronger impact on shark finning than does CITES in its current form.

International Law Implications

After an examination of the municipal, federal, and international laws surrounding shark finning and their products, the focus must be shifted to examine what the international law implications would be should Canada adopt stronger laws similar to those of the Shark Fin By-Law.

Economic

The largest international body governing cooperative states is the United Nations (“UN”), which governs the overwhelming majority of the world’s countries.  Currently, 193 member nations hold status at the UN.[119]  Founded in 1945 after Second World War, the UN has four primary objectives, one of which is to maintain peace and security of member states through promoting social justice, better living standards and human rights.[120]  Although much of what can be seen on the nightly news is UN Peacekeepers with their distinctive light blue helmets, the breadth of UN function goes much deeper.  Under the umbrella for the Office of Legal Affairs (“OLA”) is the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (“DOALOS”).  DOALOS has a number of core functions, which includes,

Providing to States and intergovernmental organizations a range of legal and technical services, such as information, advice and assistance as well as conducting research and preparing studies, relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS and the Agreement for the implementation of UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) with a view to promoting a better understanding of UNCLOS and the implementing Agreements, their wider acceptance, uniform and consistent application and effective implementation;

 

 

Conducting monitoring and research activities and maintaining a comprehensive information system and research library on the Convention and on the law of the sea and ocean affairs.[121]

 

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)[122] was established in 1982 in Jamaica with more than 150 countries globally.  UNCLOS “lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole.”[123]  Briefly, there are four ocean zones under UNCLOS.  First, territorial sea which ranges from shore to 12nm; second, contiguous zone which extends from 12 to 24nm; third, the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) which extends from 12nm to 200nm; and finally, the high seas which begin at 200nm.[124]  However, should Canada adopt a strategy such as the Shark Fin By-Law I would suggest that such laws would not translate into having a dramatic economic fallout of shark finning nations as a result of the loss of the industry.  For example, in Costa Rica, although much of the world’s most highly publicized shark finning operations occur in the eastern Pacific Ocean, I would suggest that it is not the legitimate and law abiding local industry that is profiting.[125]  When

INCOPESCA [Costa Rican Institute of Fishing and Agriculture] allowed foreign vessels to sidestep fishery’s controls by docking at private docks before landing at the public dock. This was only stopped when a group of Puntarenas fisher folk threatened to block the arrival of a cruise ship if INCOPESCA didn’t mandate foreign vessels to land their entire cargo at public docks before continuing on to their private facilities.[126]

 

The significance of the private docks is that it is away from government oversight, CITES and local regulations.  It has been suggested that Taiwanese organized crime factions control much of the shark finning industry.[127]  In fact in two separate documentaries Sharkwater: The Truth Will Surface and Gordon Ramsay: Shark Bait both Rob Stewart and Gordon Ramsay were threatened with physical violence and death should they continue to investigate the Costa Rican shark fin industry.[128]  However, I would suggest that because of the heavily influenced shark finning industry, local and honest fishermen would remain relatively unaffected by the implementation of such laws in Canada.

Cultural

As previously mentioned, when Toronto passed its shark fin by-law in 2011, Markham town councillors enjoyed a bowl of shark fin soup out of protest for the expansion of the new law by-law.  They indicated that their reason was steeped in tradition and that to otherwise ban shark fin and its accompanying soup is affront on Chinese culture.[129]  Additionally, CITES committee member Dr. Choo-Hoo has publically stated that “shark fin soup is discriminatory.”[130]  Therefore, with the possibility such sweeping bans on shark fin products are discriminatory, we must examine federal laws to determine its validity.  Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms[131] outlines that “[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”[132]  In order to begin the s. 15 tests under the Charter we must outline what needs to be examined under s. 15.  If the governmental burden is discharged under the section 15(2) test, there is no need to examine s. 15(1).  In examining s. 15(2), in R v Kapp[133] the Supreme Court of Canada outlined that a program does not violate the s. 15 guarantee if the government can demonstrate that “(1) the program has an ameliorative or remedial purpose; and (2) the program targets a disadvantaged group identified by the enumerated or analogous grounds.”[134]  In addressing the first point, I would suggest that a government law akin to the Shark Fin By-Law would have achieved an ameliorative or remedial purpose by enacting laws to protect not only sharks but also all global resources in the oceans connected to them.  Secondly, I would suggest the new laws would not target a disadvantaged group and would therefore fail the second part of the Kapp test.

As a result, we must undertake on an examination of s. 15(1) of the Charter.  The s. 15(1) can be found in Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).[135]  The test that outlines s. 15(1) is indicated as,

 

The approach adopted and regularly applied by this Court to the interpretation of s. 15(1) focuses upon three central issues:

 

(A) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others, in purpose or effect;

(B) whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are the basis for the differential treatment; and

(C) whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee.[136]

 

In examining the first step of the test, I would suggest that although shark fin soup is traditionally an Asian dish enjoyed primarily by those from Chinese ancestry, the law does not impose differential treatment either in purpose or effect.  Second, the enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination as would potentially be alleged by any defendants would not be one which would violate an enumerated ground, however, I would suggest although traditionally shark fin soup has been associated with the Chinese and other Asian cultures, therefore, it would encompass an enumerated ground.  Third, the law in question does not have a purpose that is discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee.  I would suggest a reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of any potential claimant would find the potential legislation that imposes differential treatment does not have an effect in demeaning their rights.  Therefore, I would submit any proposed shark fin product ban as enacted by the federal government, would withstand Charter scrutiny and be upheld by the courts.

Political

A further international law implication of a Canada adopting similar laws to that of the Shark Finning By-Law is the political for tensions between Canada and other countries should they view Canada’s laws as having issues relating to extraterritoriality and sovereignty infringement.

With respect to shark finning, I would suggest extraterritoriality is most commonly seen in the instances where in foreign vessels are flying the flags of countries from other jurisdictions.  In United States v Approximately 64 695 Pounds of Shark Fins[137] the US government boarded and seized a quantity of shark fins from the King Diamond II (“KDII”) in accordance with the Shark Finning Prohibition Act.[138]  The claimant, Tai-Loong Hong Marine Products, Ltd (“TLH”) “a Hong Kong company, had chartered the KD II and ordered it to meet foreign fishing vessels on the high seas, purchase shark fins from those vessels, transport the fins to Guatemala, and deliver them to TLH.”[139]  The disposition of the case resulted in the claimants being acquitted of the charges because the KDII was not considered a fishing vessel.  TLH were able to exploit a loophole in the SFPA by hiring a US vessel to meet them at sea, transport the fins to the vessel in order to avoid culpability of the SFPA.

 

As is routinely seen in countries such as Costa Rica, Asian vessels are flying the flags of local countries in order to avoid prosecution and international treaties.[140]  For example, in a recent case in Costa Rica, a Taiwanese vessel was spotted flying a Belize flag while at a Nicaraguan port off loading an unknown quantity of shark fins.   This is being done because foreign vessels are able to sidestep laws in their home country in order to reduce operating costs and sanctions.[141]  In a lawsuit filed by PRETOMA in 2006, laws were enacted to force vessels that were flying flags of convenience to land their catches at public docks as opposed to privately docking the ships away from regulatory oversight.[142]

Furthermore, should Canada adopt a new regulation which would incorporate administrative as well as criminal sanction to the possession of shark fin products, I would submit that Canada would be able to assert jurisdiction over those caught in contravention to the act while abroad.  The issue of extraterritoriality of offences committed on the sea through the s. 271.1 Canadian Environmental Protection Act[143] which indicates,

 

(2) An act or omission that is committed in the course of enforcement of this Act and that would be an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed in Canada, is deemed to have been committed in Canada if it is committed

                        (a) in an area of the sea referred to in paragraph 122(2)(c); or

(b) in an area of the sea referred to in paragraph 122(2)(g) in the course of hot pursuit that commenced while a ship was in an area of the sea referred to in any paragraphs 122(2)(a) to (e).[144]

 

Therefore, although the new regulations like the Shark Finning By-Law are intended to be limited to a municipal or domestic scope, I would suggest should the Canadian government see fit to implement such laws, the possibility exists to enforce those who seek to avoid laws by utilizing extraterritoriality.  However, I would submit this is not only the most difficult part of getting a cap on the shark finning trade; it is also the most volatile.  With numerous countries, with varying levels of participation and domestic regulation in accordance with CITES, it would be extremely difficult for Canadian legislators to make any kind of an impact in an industry that has little to do with Canadians.  I would further suggest, political pressure exerted on those countries that find themselves at the epicentre of the shark finning debate would likely result in greater change.  Additionally, it is those instances that have found that closing loopholes such as was found in the SFPA and that challenged by PRETOMA that will help deal with some of the issues surrounding extraterritoriality in conjunction with shark finning laws in the future.

Conclusion

The days when man-eating sharks on movie screens have been left in the 1970’s, and we have now moved to a period where unless we do something, there is a very real possibility of the extinction of sharks within the next 10 to 15 years.[145]  The courageous move by a number of municipalities in Ontario, Canada is leading the way not only on a domestic scale, but as I would suggest on an international level.  The slaughter of sharks is ongoing and persistent.  Estimates indicate that three sharks is killed every second globally.[146]

Canada has participated in a shark fin ban since 1994; however, it is not until 2011 when municipalities such as Brantford, London, Toronto, Oakville, and Mississauga have stepped forward to say that their communities will go one step further than the Canadian government.  The City of London, Ontario has come forward with the Shark Fin By-Law and has stated unequivocally that the possession of shark fins and their products will be illegal in their jurisdiction, and I would submit, rightfully so.

The municipal laws are even being found to go beyond UN sponsored programs such as CITES.  Although CITES has been setup to protect endangered species worldwide, I would suggest it does not go far enough.  Problems have been revealed with respect to conflicts of interest, and the amount of enforcement capabilities it actually has.  I would suggest the report that only 50% of the participating countries actually have the legislative and enforcement capabilities suggests that CITES is more appearance than substance.  This is in addition to the outright dismissal of other, and arguably more respected organizations, such as the IUCN Red List.

Although the newly adopted municipal laws within Ontario appear to have the necessary tools to make a difference in the shark finning industry, their greatest challenge will be for widespread implementation.  The international law implications if such laws were made federal could be extremely positive.  Although there will be economic, cultural, and extraterritorial implications, I would suggest that a federal implementation of the Shark Fin By-Law is appropriate considering the plight that Earth’s sharks are facing.

Consequently, I would submit that some of the most successful and well known movements have started by a small select few individuals who were looking not only to make a change but a difference.  Although sharks are not the cute and cuddly picture of traditional charismatic megafauna, they have an important ecological role to play in our oceans, and with the loss of sharks, so too would the loss of countless other species.


[1] Juliette Jowit, “Humans Driving Extinction Faster than Species can Evolve, say Experts”, The Guardian (07 March 2010) online: The Guardian < http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/mar/07/extinction-species-evolve&gt;.

[2] Ibid.

[3] IUCN Red List, The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, online: IUCN Red List < http://www.iucnredlist.org/&gt; [Red List].

[4] World Atlas, Oceans, online: WorldAtlas.com < http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/oceans.htm&gt;.

[5] Note, for the purpose of this essay sharks will include traditional sharks such as Great White and Hammerhead, but also encompass rays, for example Southern Stingrays and Manta Rays, as well skates, for example the thorny skate.

[6] Sharkwater, Education – Shark Finning Facts, online: Sharkwater < http://www.sharkwater.com/education.htm&gt;.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Oceana, Essay Release, “Predators as Prey: Why Healthy Oceans Need Sharks” (July 2008) online: Oceana < http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/o/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/Sharks/Predators_as_Prey_FINAL_FINAL.pdf&gt; [Oceana].

[9] Julie Gerstein, “Extinct in Our Lifetime – 11 Species we’ve Lost Forever” The Daily Green, online: The Daily Green < http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/recently-extinct-animals-list-470209&gt;.

[10] Shark Foundation, Shark or Fish?  online: Shark Foundation < http://www.shark.ch/Information/Evolution/index.html&gt;.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Rome Neal, “Sharks: Facts and Fish Tales”, CBS News (11 February 2009) online: CBSNews < http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500175_162-551403.html&gt;.

[14] Ibid; Noreen, “Shark Facts and Fish Tales: 5 Biggest Misconceptions About Sharks” AquaViews Online Scuba Magazine (22 September 2010) online: Aquaviews.net < http://aquaviews.net/explore-the-blue/shark-myths-facts-infographic/#&gt;.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Oceana, supra note 8 at 1.

[17] Juliet Eilperin, “Decline of Big Sharks Lets Small Predators Decimate Shellfish”, The Washington Post (30 March 2007) online: Washingtonpost.com < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/29/AR2007032901963.html&gt;.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Tamara Jones, “Shark fin Soup to Blame for Blue Shark Decline”, Planet Earth Online (09 March 2012) online: PlanetEarthOnline < http://planetearth.nerc.ac.uk/news/story.aspx?id=1179&gt;.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Paul Hilton, “Shark-Fin Soup and the Conservation Challenge”, Time Magazine (09 August 2010) online: Time Magazine < http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2021071,00.html&gt; [Hilton].

[25] Maryanne Bird, “Man Bites Shark”, Time Magazine (26 February 2001) online: Time Magazine < http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,100660,00.html?iid=fb_share&gt; [Bird].

[26] Ibid.

[27] Hilton, supra note 24.

[28] Ibid.

[29] US, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Mercury Study Report to Congress Volume IV: An Assessment of Exposure to Mercury in the United States (EPA-452/R-97-006) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997) at 64.

[30] Shark Savers, Shark Fin Soup is not Healthy.  It can be Toxic., online: Shark Savers < http://www.sharksavers.org/en/learn-more/shark-fin-soup-is-not-healthy.html&gt;.

[31] Bird, supra note 25.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Interview of Shawn Heinrichs by Dan Rather [nd] on HDNet News, online: HDNet News < http://blip.tv/hdnet-news-and-documentaries/dan-rather-reports-shark-fin-clip-4-5895207&gt; [Rather].

[34] Donald G. Kaufman & Cecilia M. Franz, Biosphere 2000… Protecting our Global Environment (USA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2000) at 42.

[35] Wency Leung, “Brantford first city in Canada to ban shark fin”, The Globe and Mail (12 October 2011) online: The Globe and Mail < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/food-and-wine/trends/trends-features/brantford-first-city-in-canada-to-ban-shark-fin/article2025124/&gt;.

[36] City of Brantford, Demographics & Statistics, online: City of Brantford < http://www.brantford.ca/business/InvestInBrantford/Pages/DemographicsStatistics.aspx&gt;.

[37] CTVToronto.ca, “Brantford is first city to ban shark fin” CTV News (04 June 2011), online: CTV News < http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20110604/shark-fin-soup-ban-110604?hub=TorontoNewHome&gt;.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Brantford, City Council, “By-law to Ban the Possession, Sale and Consumption of Shark Fin and Related Food Products” by Chris Friel in City Council Minutes (24 May 2011) at 26 [Brantford].

[41] Ibid.

[42] AM980 News, “London’s ‘Anti-Shark Fin’ By-Law Includes Fines of $15,000” AM980News (31 January 2012), online: AM980News < http://www.am980.ca/channels/news/local/story.aspx?ID=1647247&gt;.

[43] Unrevised, City of London, by-law PH-17 Shark Fin By-Law (31 January 2012) [Shark Fin By-Law].

[44] Ibid at s. 3.1-3.4.

[45] Ibid at s. 5.1-5.4

[46] Unrevised, City of London, by-law A.-30 Inspections By-law (03 May 2010) at s. 4.1.

[47] Ibid at s. 7.1

[48] Ibid at s. 2.1

[49] Ibid at s. 4.2(a)-(d).

[50] Ibid at s. 6.1

[51] Unrevised, City of Toronto, by-law No 1247-2011, To Prohibit the possession, sale and consumption of shark fin and shark fin food products, (25 October 2011).

[52] “Toronto shark fin ban studied in other communities”, CBC News (26 October 2011) online: CBCNews < http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2011/10/26/toronto-shark-fin.html&gt; [Markham].

[53] Ibid.

[54] 2006 Community Profiles – Markham, online: Statistics Canada < http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/92-591/details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=3519036&Geo2=PR&Code2=35&Data=Count&SearchText=markham&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&Custom=&gt;; 2006 Community Profiles – Richmond Hill, online: Statistics Canada < http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/prof/92-591/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=3519038&Geo2=PR&Code2=35&Data=Count&SearchText=richmond%20Hill&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&Custom=&gt;; Although the 2011 census has been complete and information is available, information with respect to community ethnic statistics are not yet available.

[56] 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 [CA, 1867].

[57] Ibid at s. 92(14).

[58] Ibid at s. 92(15).

[59] Ibid at s. 92(16).

[60] SO 2001, c 25 [MA].

[61] Ibid at s. 10(1).

[62] Ibid at s. 10(2).

[63] Ibid at s. 1(1).

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid at s. 8

[66] B. Worm & Godin A Cosandey, “Keeping the lead: how to strengthen shark conservation and management in policies in Canada” (2010) 34 Marine Policy 995 at 998 [Worm].

[67] Fisheries and Oceans Canada, National Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (March 2007), online: Fisheries and Oceans Canada < http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/npoa-pan/npoa-pan/npoa-sharks-eng.htm#1.3&gt;.

[68] Worm, supra note 66 at 998.

[69] Suzanne Goldenberg, “Shark conversation is gaining momentum – but are we doing enough?” The Guardian (27 October 2011) online: The Guardian < http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/27/shark-conservation-gaining-momentum&gt;.

[70] SC 1992, c 52 [WAPPA].

[71] Ibid at s. 2.

[72] Canada SOR/1996-263.

[73] WAPPA, supra note 70 at s. 22(1).

[74] Ibid at s. 22(2).

[75] Ibid at s. 22(3).

[76] Ibid at s. 22(4).

[77] Ibid at s. 22(5).

[78] Canada Bill C-380, An Act to amend the Fish Inspection Act and the Fisheries Act (importation of shark fins, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (first reading 08 December 2011) [Bill C-380].

[79] Bill C-380, online: Openparliament.ca < http://openparliament.ca/bills/41-1/C-380/&gt;.

[80] RSC 1985, c F-12 [FIA].

[81] Bill C-380, supra note 78 at s. 3.1(1)-(4).

[82] RSC 1985, c F-14 [FA].

[83] Bill C-380, supra note 78 at s. 32.1(1)-(2).

[84] Rather, supra note 33.

[85] Mike McDonald, “New Costa Rican rule cracks down on illegal shark finning”, Tico Times (30 November 2010) online: TicoTimes.net < http://www.ticotimes.net/Current-Edition/News-Briefs/New-Costa-Rican-rule-cracks-down-on-illegal-shark-finning_Tuesday-November-30-2010&gt;.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Pretoma, News Release, “From Costa Rica to Nicaragua: Foreign fleet now lands shark fins in Nicaragua” (17 May 2011) online: Pretoma < http://www.pretoma.org/from-costa-rica-to-nicaragua-foreign-fleet-now-lands-shark-fins-in-nicaragua/&gt;.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, National Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks (Ottawa: Communications Branch Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2007) [NPOA-Sharks].

[90] FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries, FAO, No 4 Suppl. 1 Rome, FAO. 2000 (2000) [Code of Conduct].

[91] Ibid.

[92] Code of Conduct, supra note 89 at Article 5.

[93] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155 [Vienna]

[94] Ibid at Article 2(1)(a)-(b).

[95] To date no such cases have been brought before ITLOS.

[96] SOR/93-53, at s. 22; NPOA-Sharks, supra note 89.

[97] CITES, What is CITES? online: CITES < http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php&gt;.

[98] Ibid; United Nations Environmental Programme, CITES National Legislation Project, online: UNEP < http://www.unep.org/dec/onlinemanual/Enforcement/NationalLawsRegulations/Resource/tabid/780/Default.aspx&gt;.

[99] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 03 March 1979, UNEP Res 8.4, UNEP at Article II [Convention].

[100] Ibid at Article XV.

[101] CITES, The CITES Appendices, online: CITES < http://www.cites.org/eng/app/index.php&gt;.

[102] Convention, supra 99 at Appendix II.

[103] Helmut Nickel, “Costa Rica: Proposal to list Hammerhead Sharks in CITES Appendix III”, Shark Year Magazine (14 March 2012) online: Shark Year Magazine < http://sharkyear.com/2012/costa-rica-proposal-to-list-hammerhead-sharks-in-cites-appendix-iii.html#.T2G1w9Q511A.facebook&gt;.

[104] IUCN, Who are our Members?, online: IUCN < http://www.iucn.org/about/union/members/who_members/&gt;.

[105] IUCN, About IUCN, online: IUCN < http://www.iucn.org/about/&gt;.

[106] IUCN Red List, Red List Overview, online: IUCN Red List < http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/red-list-overview&gt; [Red List].

[107] IUCN Red List, Assessment Process, online: IUCN Red List < http://www.iucnredlist.org/technical-documents/assessment-process&gt;.

[108] Red List, supra note 106.

[109] Shark Specialist Group, Shark 101, online: Shark Specialist Group < http://www.iucnssg.org/index.php/faqreader/items/shark-101&gt;.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Interview of Dr. Giam Choo-Hoo by Frank Pope (15 March 2012) The Times.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid; Juliet Eilperin, “Is the shark fin ban culturally biased?”, The Washington Post (22 February 2012) online: The Washington Post < http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/is-the-shark-fin-ban-culturally-biased/2012/02/21/gIQAbIj9SR_blog.html&gt; [Eilperin].

[115] Ibid.

[116] Mara E. Zimmerman, The Black Market for Wildlife: Combating Transnational Organized Crime in the Illegal Wildlife Trade (2003) 36 Vand J Trans’l L 1657 at 1665-1666.

 

[117] Convention, supra not 99 at Article VIII para 1.

[118] Ibid at Article I.

[119] United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, online: United Nations < http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml&gt;.

[120] United Nations, UN at a Glance, online: United Nations < http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml&gt;.

[121] United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, online: United Nations < http://untreaty.un.org/ola/div_doalos.aspx?section=doalos&gt;.

[122] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, DOLAS.

[123] United Nations, Oceans and Law of the Sea, online: United Nations < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm&gt;.

[124] John H. Currie, Craig Forcese, & Valerie Oosterveld, International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 357.

[125] “Costa Rica: Fishermen protest President’s office over lack of control of international shark finning vessels” Underwater Times (16 June 2011), online: UnderwaterTimes.com < http://www.underwatertimes.com/news.php?article_id=23471895010&gt;.

[126] “Editorial: shark finning continues in Costa Rica as regulators turn a blind eye” Underwater Times (01 August 2011), online: UnderwaterTimes.com < http://www.underwatertimes.com/news.php?article_id=61520947381&gt;.

[127] Sharkwater, Education – Sharkwater Production Notes, online: Sharkwater < http://www.sharkwater.com/sharkwaterProductionNotes.htm&gt;.

[128] Ibid; Aida Ekberg, “Gordon Ramsay held at gunpoint for doing something nice”, Yahoo (04 January 2011), online: Yahoo < http://voices.yahoo.com/gordon-ramsay-held-gunpoint-7525798.html&gt;.

[129] Markham, supra note 53.

[130] Eilperin, supra note 114.

[131] Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c11 [Charter].

[132] Ibid at s. 15.

[133] 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483.

[134] Ibid at 41.

[135] [1999] 1 SCR 497.

[136] Ibid at 88.

[137] 520 F 3d 976 (USCA 2008) [KDII].

[138] US, HR 5461, Shark Finning Prohibition Act, 106th Cong, 2000 [SFPA].

[139] KDII, supra note 137.

[140] Pretoma, Vessel seen landing shark fins in Nicaragua fins then imported into Costa Rica (20 July 2011), online: Pretoma < http://www.pretoma.org/vessel-seen-landing-shark-fins-in-nicaragua-fins-then-imported-into-costa-rica/&gt;.

[141] Pretoma, News Release, “Profile Research: Research, conservation, and management of sharks in Costa Rica” (nd) online: Pretoma < http://www.pretoma.org/downloads/pdf/sharks-profile.pdf&gt;.

[142] Ibid.

[143] SC 1999, c 33 [CEPA].

[144] Ibid at s. 271.1(2).

[145] Brantford, supra note 40.

[146] Stop Shark Finning, What you can do to stop shark finning, online: Stop Shark Finning < http://www.stopsharkfinning.net/help-sharks.htm&gt;.





Should Mediation be Mandatory in Ontario?

15 04 2012

Should Mediation be Mandatory in Ontario?

 By: Ryan Venables

2012 April 11

 
Introduction

 

The business community and private individual litigants have now seized upon Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”), almost with passionate abandon, as a mechanism to achieve more expeditious and less costly dispute resolutions.  It is also now used, in one form or another, by judges in Ontario at both the trial and appellate levels, to assist in achieving consensual compromise in select cases. Its important place within our civil justice system as an alternative to traditional court processes is now assured.[1]

 

By making the methods of ADR, which include various forms of mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and dispute resolution, more accessible I would suggest this is expediting matters through the court system, but also increasing the access to justice for all Ontarians.  Looking forward, “although court-connected mediation services are not new to Canada…they are likely to play a more substantial role in the future as governments seek to reduce the costs of access to justice…  Consequently, there will be a growing demand for [mediation in] private and community services.”[2] 

With these increased demands for ADR, it raises the question of whether the various forms should be mandatory?  For the purposes of this paper, I will suggest that mediation should be mandatory in Ontario, and I will focus specifically on, first, the benefits of mandatory mediation, and second, how Ontario has implemented mandatory mediation in family law.

Benefits of Increased Access to Justice in Ontario

 

There appears to have been a large upswing in the popularity of access to justice in Ontario over the last number of years.  Since 2003, the provincial government has pushed a mandate of access to justice through the creations of acts, regulatory bodies, and through increases to Legal Aid Ontario.[3]  Additionally, the Faculty of Law at the University of Windsor has explicit criteria, which addresses the faculty’s desire to focus on access to justice issues.  “Access to justice is not just an admission policy at Windsor Law, but a central academic focus. In addition to taking foundational courses… students delve deeper into key access to justice issues through courses like… Alternative Dispute Resolution…”[4]  These examples are leading the Ontario legal community to change, and as a result, some of the traditional barriers, such as costs, delay, and participant satisfaction which once prevented people from fulfilling their legal requirements are now being overcome through the use of mandatory mediation. 

Costs

For the injured victim, the wrongfully terminated employee, or the separated spouse I would suggest a great deal of the decision to proceed with litigation rests on finances.  When complex legal matters are presented before the court in trial with numerous witnesses, documents, and the potential for experts, the surmounting legal fees can be oppressive.  When Ontario introduced mandatory mediation for civil, non-family actions in 1999 they did so on a test basis that became permanent in 2001.[5]  In the accompanying government sponsored report, which studied the test period of mandatory mediation, it was revealed that in all but one area of law there were increased disposal of cases when litigants used a mandatory mediation structure as opposed to the traditional route of litigation within the first six months of the filing of first defence.[6]  However, it must be pointed out that the use of mandatory mediation as opposed to progressing to a trial is only but one factor that may reduce the costs for litigants.  It is equally important to point out there are costs associated with mandatory mediation.  In an examination of Toronto lawyers participating in the test of mandatory mediation, they reported cost increases of approximately $3,000 to $5,000 per case when litigants engaged in mediation.[7]  Despite the increase of costs due to mediation, it was determined that

lawyers estimates of the amount of savings in legal costs to litigants suggested that in over a third of the cases (38%), the cost savings were in excess of $10,000 (including 8% estimated at over $30,000).  In another third (34%), savings were estimated at $5,000 or less. The remaining 28% fell in between.[8]

A discussion of the costs of mandatory mediation would not be complete without examining the potential consequences should litigants not participate in the required mediation.  An examination of Rule 24.1.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reveals the following with respect to non-compliance of mandatory mediation,

(1) When a certificate of non-compliance is filed, the mediation co-ordinator shall refer the matter to a judge or case management master. O. Reg. 453/98, s. 1; O. Reg. 438/08, s. 23 (1).

(2)The judge or case management master may convene a case conference under rule 77.08, and may,

(a) establish a timetable for the action;

(b) strike out any document filed by a party;

(c) dismiss the action, if the non-complying party is a plaintiff, or strike out the statement of defence, if that party is a defendant;

(d) order a party to pay costs;

(e) make any other order that is just.[9]

As a result, it is within the power of a judge or master to take a number of actions against a party who does not comply with the mandatory mediation rules as indicated in the ROCP.  In Meelunie America Inc. v Can Am Ingredients Inc.[10] the Superior Court of Ontario was examining the issue of three non-compliance rulings by the mediator against the plaintiff.  In his ruling Master Muir indicated, “in my view, the circumstances surrounding the cancelled mediation sessions do not warrant the drastic relief of striking a defence or dismissing an action. Both the plaintiff and the defendant have provided reasonable explanations for their respective non-compliance.”[11]  Thus as is indicated by (2) of Rule 24.1.13 there is no positive duty on either a judge or master with respect to sanctions to be imposed on a party who has been held to be in non-compliance.  Master Muir continued by indicating, “there is no evidence that either party has suffered any prejudice as a result of this non-compliance.  I have therefore concluded that it is not just in these circumstances to impose any form of sanction on either party.”[12]  As a result, it would appear as if a determining factor for imposing a sanction is whether any of the parties has endured prejudice at the hands of the non-compliance.

When examining the costs of mandatory mediation in civil litigation, I would suggest although the requirement of Rule 24.1 for mediation has the strong likelihood of saving parties a significant amount of money as opposed to conducting a trial, there is the possibility that when the rules are not complied with it may result in consequences imposed by a judge or master which offset any benefits.  However, despite the possibility of consequences, I would suggest the savings are of a tremendous benefit for potential litigants by increasing the access to the civil justice system in Ontario.

Time

In addition to the cost considerations parties need to take into account when commencing an action, is the fact that there is a very real possibility the action can take years before a result is obtained.  At the end of the test period for mandatory mediation in 2001, it was heralded as a resounding success as over 50% of the test areas had resolved their disputes within 12 months.[13]  Furthermore, in the control group that was not subject to mandatory mediation, none of the dispute areas reached a 50% resolution rate.[14]  Not surprisingly, cases before the courts for periods extending past 18 and 24 months had a much lower resolution rates despite repeated attempts at mediation.[15]

An examination of the ROCP mandatory mediation under Rule 24.1.09 indicates,

(1) A mediation session shall take place within 180 days after the first defence has been filed, unless the court orders otherwise.

(2) In considering whether to exercise the power conferred by subrule (1), the court shall take into account all the circumstances, including,

(a) the number of parties, the state of the pleadings and the complexity of the issues in the action;

 (d) whether, given the nature of the case or the circumstances of the parties, the mediation will be more likely to succeed if the 180-day period is extended or abridged.[16]

As a result of making mediation mandatory within the first six months, it is hoped it will give lawyers enough time to evaluate their case, ascertain a possible path to resolution with their client, meet with the opposing counsel to discuss this, and to conduct the mediation.  The ultimate goal is for the parties to meet, have their issue mediated, and to follow the recommendations as provided by the neutral mediator.[17]

Additionally, when mediation was mandatory, over half of the test cases had their resolution meetings within the first 90 days of filing of first defence.[18]  I would suggest this is an important statistic because it shows how the requirement of mediation is expediting the cases that it encompasses.  In this vein, the mandatory mediation is a much more forward-looking resolution tool, in comparison to the control groups which could often see trial dates being set, confirmed, and then resolved the morning of.  In addition, in a survey of lawyers in the two test cities of Toronto and Ottawa, when asked their opinion on whether mandatory mediation should be required at the onset of an action or later in the proceeding, both groups overwhelmingly said that it would be the most beneficial the earlier mediation was commenced.[19]  Additionally, lawyers also indicated that mediation could have a harmful effect on the participants if done at the later stages of the proceeding.[20]

In an examination of the timing with respect to access to justice for participants, I would suggest the data revealed in the Final Report is a strong reason as to the mandatory nature of mediation in Ontario.  With the data revealing that majority of cases are mediated in the first 90 days,[21] I would suggest this could have a strong impact on whether person would decide to commence a claim.  For example, if an employee has been wrongfully dismissed by their former employer, under the non-mandatory regime the potential exists for the suit to continue for an extended period of time.  With mandatory mediation, there are a number of advantages to the plaintiff.  First, in the instance of wrongful dismissal cases there was a 13% better resolution rate in the first 12 months as opposed to the control group.  Second, the likeliness of a more expedient resolution can encourage those with legitimate actions to commence them because there is an increased resolution rate.  Oppositely, opponents have argued that mandatory mediation has caused a decline in the guarantee of litigant’s procedural rights because of the expedited nature of mandatory mediation.

Some of the essential requirements of civil justice such as openness, transparency and accountability are simply lacking in a system without litigation and their prevalence diminishes with a shift away from litigation.

Most seriously, the general privatisation of dispute resolution sacrifices the openness and transparency requirements and creates ‘second-class justice.’ Whilst most other problems of mediation can be mitigated using exceptions, procedure and mediator training, this flaw cannot.[22]

Despite the arguments against mandatory mediation, I would suggest the creation of legislation encompassing the required nature of mediation in the civil justice system has addressed concerns surrounding openness, transparency, and accountability.  Rule 24.1.14 outlines that “all communications at a mediation session and the mediator’s notes and records shall be deemed to be without prejudice settlement discussions.”[23]  At first glance this appears to reinforce the argument of the lack of openness in mediation, however, I would suggest that if one of the parties has a concern surrounding the openness of the proceeding, they would have the option to opt-out of mediation through Rule 24.1.05.  Additionally, I would suggest the very nature of a less open forum to discuss issues is a significant advantage for some participants as it can avoid personal issues from becoming a part of public record.  In addressing the argument that mandatory mediation diminishes accountability through the creation of a second tier justice system, I would agree that a second and more viable justice system is created through mediation.  It is this second, and as I would submit, more accessible system that has allowed many who historically have not been able to access the traditional justice system to have an opportunity to assert their rights.  Lastly, accountability is an ambiguous word.  Are they referring to accountability of the participants, or the mediator?  Although there is no formal regulatory body for mediators in Ontario, the rules outlines that the governing area shall keep a list of approved mediators for use in the civil system in Ontario.[24]  Additionally, the Ministry of the Attorney General clearly lists criteria for applicants wishing to obtain a position on the local mediation list.

In an attempt to assist Local Mediation Committees with their responsibilities, the Ministry has developed a set of provincial standards. The guidelines will aid Committees when assessing the qualifications of candidates who seek placement on the roster. The selection guidelines identify the following criteria for assessing individual applicants: Experience as mediator, training in mediation, educational background, familiarity with the civil justice system, and references.[25]

When examining the accountability provisions with respect to the participants, the rules and options for mediators to file non-compliance certificates, have quite clearly indicated a range of consequences for participants who do not follow the mediation scheme.[26] 

In the end, I would suggest that mandatory mediation has paid particular attention to access to justice by expediting the resolution period of actions, thus providing greater access to potential plaintiffs in comparison to the control group.  In situations where there is incentive on all parties to resolve the dispute in an accelerated manner, I would submit that the benefits far outweigh any negatives opponents may have against an expedited process.

Satisfaction of Participants

In addition to the procedural benefits of reduced delay is the consideration of participant satisfaction.  Although this may not be a traditional consideration for legislators, I would submit that it is an important consideration for those contemplating commencing an action as well as the participating lawyers.  In the Final Report, well over half of the participating lawyers indicated they were at least satisfied with the mandatory mediation process.[27]  Additionally, the Final Report also outlined that approximately 75% of litigants in the test cities were at least satisfied with the results of the mandatory mediation experience.[28]  I would suggest the most important question the survey posed to the participating lawyers revolved around whether they believed they were able to obtain a better result for their client because of the mandatory mediation.  In their response, Toronto and Ottawa lawyers both indicated that 88% were able to either obtain a better or identical result utilizing mediation as opposed to traditional methods.[29]  However, when asked the same question in both Toronto and Ottawa, litigants responded with lower numbers than what the lawyers provided.  Although the Final Report does not make any hypothesis toward the discrepancies, I would suggest this could be due to a traditional disconnect in what the litigant believe their case was worth as opposed to what the lawyer viewed the case as.  A tradition example of this is when homeowners are interviewing real estate agents for the listing rights of their property.  The homeowners may have a figure in mind as to what their house is worth, however, when asking the real estate agent, I would suggest it is not uncommon for the agent to suggest a price that is lower than what the homeowners viewed their property as being worth.  The disconnect between the real estate agents and homeowners much like between litigants and lawyers may be due to a number of reasons.  First, homeowners are invested in their property and have viewed the investment in a personal level.  Second, the homeowners are not professionals in the field and may not consider factors that may affect the price of the residence.  Comparatively, a litigant who has been wrongfully dismissed may feel that they are owed aggravated and punitive damages for their troubles, when in reality they may only be entitled to a modest severance.  Thus, it is the reality that when litigants sit down to explore the options of mandatory mediation, their expectations may be not realistic to how the lawyer’s views their action. 

Additionally, it would be naïve to think that satisfaction rates were not directly correlated with the outcome of the mediation.  In the end, both sides generally make concessions, and it is only human nature to feel slightly dissatisfied when you concede an issue or costs to your opponent.  However, the most telling statistic with respect to the level of satisfaction of the litigants and lawyers is whether they would participate in mandatory mediation again.  The overwhelming majority of litigants and lawyers in both Ottawa and Toronto agreed, that they would use mandatory mediation again in the future to resolve similar disputes.[30]

As a result, through an examination of the requirement of mediation, I would suggest that there has been a positive increase to the access of justice within Ontario because of the mandatory mediation framework.  I would suggest that through decreasing costs, reducing time and delay, and through the high levels of satisfaction of litigant and lawyers that this required scheme is producing positive results which are benefitting the Ontario civil justice system.

How has Ontario Dealt with Mandatory Mediation?

 

As has been examined above, “in 1999, Ontario introduced mandatory mediation for civil, non-family actions, with a provision for the parties to opt-out of filing a motion.”[31]  However, I would suggest that despite the enactment of Rule 24.1, the potential for the greatest effect of mandatory mediation lies in family law.  Since 2001, Canada has averaged over 70,000 divorces per year,[32] and some of those divorces can be extremely contentious often utilizing court time simply for spite or emotion and not legal issues.  However, in December 2010 (then) Attorney General Chris Bentley outlined that Ontario was attempting to reform some of the issues facing the family law system.  Affectionately known as the four pillars, the reforms were focused on the following areas.

  1. Mandatory Information Program – The program provides information about the effects of separation on children and options other than court that are available to resolve disputes, often faster and for less cost.
  2. Dispute Resolution Officers – … officers meet with parties in cases involving motions to change final orders and help identify, narrow or resolve challenges in a case. If a settlement cannot be reached, they will ensure all paperwork is in order so that cases can proceed to a meaningful appearance before a judge.
  3. Information and Referral Coordinators – …they… connect potential litigants to services in the community that assist with family breakdown, including counselling and support services and alternatives to litigation.
  4. Family Mediation Services – …these services provide family law clients across the province with quick resolution to a number of challenges…[33]

It was hoped the four pillars will allow the family court system in Ontario to be more efficient, faster, more cost effective, and less confrontational to allow families to solve their challenges quickly and with better access.[34]  As the test project was concluded, and deemed a success, it was expanded so that it will be available in many more jurisdictions covering over half of the population in Ontario.[35]

In addition to the creation of the four pillars, Ontario family law is also guided by the Family Law Rules.[36]  Rule 17 of the FLR is similar to Rule 24.1 of the ROCP in that it mandates at least one meeting between the litigants with a neutral party, although exceptions can apply.[37]  Rule 17 mandates that the parties meet either as part of a case conference or a settlement conference.  Case conferences “encourage parties to consider settlement options in a way that will not bind them later on if the litigation continues.”[38]  Alternatively,

settlement conferences are conducted in a similar manner to Case Conferences, but there is one important distinction.  Parties are required to make an offer to settle in their Settlement Conference briefs.  The offer made in the briefs may be influential after the trial in the consideration of costs.[39] 

 

As a result of examining settlement and case conferences, I would suggest Ontario is taking a step to further reducing the issues in the justice system by promoting a more expedient and mutually beneficial outcome.

In addition to Rule 17 of the FLR, there are the sections encompassed in the federal Divorce Act[40] that also discuss mediation.  Section 9(2) of the DA indicates,

(2) It is the duty of every barrister, solicitor, lawyer or advocate who undertakes to act on behalf of a spouse in a divorce proceeding to discuss with the spouse the advisability of negotiating the matters that may be the subject of a support order or a custody order and to inform the spouse of the mediation facilities known to him or her that might be able to assist the spouses in negotiating those matters.[41]

 

Thus, the requirement of lawyers starts and stops with informing their clients of the availability of mediation in divorce situations.  However, for lawyers representing clients in Ontario there would be the added requirement as per the FLR

However, as mandatory mediation in family law expands, it will not come without challenges.  After examining the rules for the FLR, I would suggest there is an instance where mandatory mediation could be inappropriate.  The overarching theme in separation and child custody cases involving children is the best interest of the child.  However, there is little to no mention of a spouse who has been a victim of abuse.  Opponents of mediation where there have been instances of domestic violence have indicated,

mediation is never appropriate for cases involving domestic violence, the more common approach is to assess power issues on a case-by-case basis paying particular attention to: duration, severity, frequency, onset, abuse of alcohol or drugs, psychiatric disorder, and other family dysfunction.[42] 

 

In my experiences, [43] I would strongly agree that mediation, where violence has been present, should be dealt with on an individual or case-by-case basis.  

Additionally, I would suggest violence is not limited to the scope of physical violence, but extends to the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project or the Duluth Model.[44]  I would suggest there are three significant problems with making mediation mandatory where violence is or has been present.  First, it has been firmly adopted that when examining instances of domestic violence the root cause often surrounds power and control.[45]  Thus, forcing a couple that has had domestic violence in their relationship can significantly alter the power dynamic during the mediation.  Although the mediator is present and acting as a neutral party, I would suggest regardless of what level of authority the mediator brings, in mandatory settings where cases are not looked at individually, there is a strong possibility of a power imbalance.  Second, is the instance where a couple has entered into mandatory mediation and the domestic violence is unknown to anybody outside of the relationship.  I would suggest when it is known violence is present, these factors can be taken into consideration.  However, when the violence is unknown, it could have a devastating effect on power and potentially place the victim in danger.  Third, are instances of when violence is present without having physical violence.  From my experiences, I would suggest emotional or psychological abuse is the most damaging to victims over the duration of the relationship.  Furthermore, although emotional or psychological abuse can be a ground for divorce,[46] it is not criminally culpable and therefore may not be taken into consideration prior to mandatory mediation. 

As a result, there have been a number of suggestions put forth to avoid situations where there may be a power imbalance in mediating instances where domestic violence may be present.  First, allow the victim to decide whether to mediate; second, never allow mediation in cases of domestic violence; third, grant the court the authority to authorize mediation; fourth, train mediators to screen couples for abuse; and fifth, judges, psychologists, and mediators should collaborate and recommend a proper course for the victim.[47]

Despite the possibility of instances of domestic violence as factors in relationship breakdowns of couples who are seeking mediation, I would suggest with the proper checks and balances that the positive effects of mandatory mediation in Ontario’s family law system outweigh the negative possibilities of domestic violence.  As a result, I would suggest Ontario has taken a very positive step forward in attempting to fix what is often been described as an ailing system.[48]  Additionally, I would agree with Ontario Chief Justice Warren Winkler, who once indicated that a paradigm shift was necessary to bring the Ontario family law system up to date by mandating mediation between hard cases as they are more cost effective, less time consuming, and less stressful for all involved.[49]

Conclusion

 

“…Only in the event that the alternative dispute resolution process is unsuccessful would access to the costly, time-consuming, adversarial and sometimes acrimonious court process be available to litigants.”[50]  This is the opinion of Ontario’s current Chief Justice with respect to the mandatory nature of mediation in the province.  I would suggest his opinion is the correct one.  Rules have been implemented in the civil justice system as well as the family law system, with hopes that the requirement for mediation will bring about change to the issues that currently affect each of them.  I would suggest that the increased access to justice in Ontario’s civil justice system by mandating mediation have been effective by reducing costs, decreasing the time it takes for a matter to be resolved, and through increased satisfaction of the participants.  Additionally, the Attorney General has implemented change in Ontario’s family law system through the four pillars plan on reform.  The new plan by the Ontario government is in addition to the already established practices of the FLR and DA.

Despite concerns of the required state of mediation in Ontario in the civil and family systems, I would suggest the benefits outweigh the risks.  So long as the risks, especially in the family system, can be appropriately countered, I would suggest the reduced costs, increased resolution rates, and satisfaction of participants are all important reasons as to why mediation should be mandatory in Ontario.  Consequently, it is the required nature of mediation that is helping to bring Ontario’s courts to a level where they are accessible for all.


[1] Justice Eleanore A. Cronk, “Professionalism and Barriers to Justice” (Lecture delivered at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law, 03 March 2005), [http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/fourthcolloquiumkeynoteaddress.pdf].

[2] Berend Hovius & Mary-Jo Maur, “Hovius on Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2009) [Hovius].

[3] Access to Justice, online: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/getting_results/access_to_justice.asp&gt;.

[4] Access to Justice, online University of Windsor: <http://www.uwindsor.ca/law/access-to-justice&gt;.

[5] Dorcas Quek, “Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron?  Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program” (2010) 11 Cardozo CR 500  (http://cojcr.org/vol11no2/479-510.pdf) [Quek].

[6] Ontario, Civil Rules Committee: Evaluation Committee for the Mandatory Mediation Pilot Project, Evaluation of
the Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program (Rule 24.1):
Final Report — The First 23 Months, (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2001) [Final Report]. The one area of law that did not see a decrease was in Trusts and Fiduciary duties, however, the difference was negligible.  Prior to mandatory mediation there was a resolution rate of 8%, and during the test period the resolution rate was 6%.

[7] Ibid at 57.

[8] Ibid at 10.

[9] RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 24.1.13(1)-(2) [ROCP].

[10] 2011 ONSC 6814, [2011] OJ No 5105 [Can Am].

[11] Ibid at 13.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Final Report, supra note 6 at 39.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] ROCP, supra note 9 at 24.1.09(1)-(2).

[17] Ibid at 24.1.15.

[18] Final Report, supra note 6 at 46.

[19] Ibid at 50-52.

[20] Ibid at 52.

[21] Ibid at 46.

[22] Will Hardy, Mandatory Mediation, (2008), online: Will Hardy <http://willhardy.com.au/legal-essays/mandatory-mediation/view/&gt;.

[23] ROCP, supra note 9 at 24.1.14.

[24] Ibid at 24.1.08.

[25] Local Mediation Committee Guidelines for Selecting Mediators – Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program, online: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/manmed/guidelines.asp&gt;.

[26] ROCP, supra note 9 at 24.1.13

[27] Final Report, supra note 6 at 97.

[28] Ibid at 98.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Final Report, supra note 6 at 99.

[31] Quek, supra note 5 at 500.

[32] Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Updated: Ontario Changes Divorce Protocol”, The National Post (28 July 2011) online: The National Post <http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/07/18/ontario-changes-divorce-protocol/&gt;.

[33] Family Law Reform in Ontario (09 December 2010), online:  Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2010/20101209-family-bg.asp&gt;.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Cristin Schmitz, “Top Judge Proposes Free Court Based Mediation, AG says ‘No Money’”, The Lawyer’s Weekly (08 October 2010)  online The Lawyer’s Weekly <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1264&gt; [Lawyer’s Weekly].

[36] O Reg 114/99 [FLR].

[37] Ibid at 17(1).

[38] Hovius, supra note 2 at 37

[39] Ibid at 41.

[40] RSC, 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) [DA].

[41] Ibid at s. 9(2).

[42] Alexandria Zylstra, “Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators” (2001) 253 J. Disp Resol at 260-261.

[43] It should be noted that the author’s experiences surrounding domestic violence come as a sworn Ontario Police Constable with York Regional Police and as a provincially certified domestic violence investigator; as a Co-facilitator if the Changing Ways; as a Volunteer Probation Officer for youth and adults; and as a Team Leader for Victim Services of Middlesex County.

[44] Power and Control Wheel, online: The Duluth Model  <http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PowerandControl.pdf&gt;.

[45] Ibid.

[46] DA, supra note 41 at s. 8(2)(b)(ii).

[47] Aimee Davis, “Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution or Setback?” (2006) 8 Cardozo CR at 273-278 (http://cojcr.org/vol8no1/CAC101.pdf).

[48] Glenn Kauth, “Family Law Reforms Rollout Across Ontario Today”, Canadian Lawyer Magazine (18 July 2011) online: Canadian Lawyer Mag <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/352/Family-law-reforms-roll-out-across-Ontario-today.html&gt;.

[49] Lawyer’s Weekly, supra note 36.

[50] Tracey Tyler, “Chief Justice Seeks Compulsory Mediation in Family Cases”  The Toronto Star (15 September 2010) online: TheStar.com <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/article/861258–chief-justice-seeks-compulsory-mediation-in-family-cases&gt;.





A Critical Examination of Zero Tolerance Legislation in the Regulated Health Professions Act of Ontario

7 02 2012

A Critical Examination of Zero Tolerance Legislation in the Regulated Health Professions Act of Ontario

Ryan Venables
2012 January 25

Introduction

In Alabama, it is illegal for a driver to be blindfolded while operating a car; in Montana, it is against the law to be alone with a sheep in the cab of your truck; in Maine, it is illegal to have Christmas decorations up after January 14th; and in Missouri, it is illegal to drive with an uncaged bear in your car.[1]

If one was to ask regulated medical professionals in Ontario about “stupid dumb laws,” they are likely to respond with the law labels them as a sexual abuser if they treated their spouse as a patient.[2]  In Ontario, the Health Professions Procedural Code, being Schedule 2 of the Regulated Health Professions Act[3] governs the twenty-one health regulatory colleges which fall under its umbrella.  From the usual suspects of dentists, physicians, and psychologists, to fields such as dental technologists, dietitians, and midwives; all of these professions fall within in the scope of the RHPA and its provisions on sexual abuse.[4]

In the time since The Final Report of the Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients[5] was published in 1991 and the RHPA was changed to reflect the Task Force’s recommendations in 1994, there has been a zero tolerance approach with respect to the sexual abuse of patients by medical professionals.[6]  In the 2000 follow up to the 1991 Report, a Special Task Force on the Sexual Abuse of Patients commented on the zero tolerance approach to sexual abuse[7] by indicating, “the philosophy of Zero Tolerance of sexual abuse of patients must remain the guiding principle for the development, implementation, and evaluation of all policies and practices designed to stop sexual abuse by health professionals.”[8]  With respect to the authors of the 1991 Report and the 2000 Report, I would submit a zero tolerance approach is not the correct approach.  I would suggest although it appears as though the law was designed to extinguish sexual abuse of patients by practitioners, the all-encompassing nature of the law is also ensnaring well-intentioned practitioners.  This paper will critically focus on the following areas of sexual abuse legislation in Ontario that deal with the notion of zero tolerance,

  1. The history of the legislation as well as its current state while examining jurisprudence surrounding sexual abuse cases with a specific focus on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Leering v College of Chiropractors of Ontario.[9]
  2. A statutory interpretation of the legislation.
  3. Whether the decision in Leering was correct in law?
  4. Should the law be reformed?

Although it remains to be seen where the law will go and how it will evolve, I submit by examining the above areas of sexual abuse legislation as encompassed in the RHPA, this paper will prove the legislation, as it currently stands, has drifted away from its drafted intention and is in need of reform.

History

It is with little doubt that almost everybody would agree with the fact that even one case of sexual abuse of a patient by a doctor is too many.  Unfortunately, history has proven sexual abuse is present in all facets of life.  For the purpose of this paper, it will be sufficient to begin the examination of the historical state of sexual abuse of patients at the commencement of the 1991 Report.

The Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients

Prior to examining the current state of legislation surrounding sexual abuse, regulated health professionals were governed by the Health Discipline Act.[10]  Despite the fact that at the release of the 1991 Report it was anticipated the RHPA would be released in short order, the sexual abuse of patients by practitioners was not a new phenomenon.  Earliest mention of a sexual relationship between patient and doctor is likely attributed to the Hippocratic Oath which states, “[i]n every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men, be they free or slave.”[11]  Furthermore, it was also Hippocrates who indicated doctors and patients often work very close together, and it is essential the doctors maintain a level of self-control in order to further the relationship with patients.[12]

Although the roots of the appropriateness in the doctor/patient relationship date back almost 2,500 years, it was the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (“CPSO”) that commissioned the Task Force as it identified the sexual abuse of patients as a serious problem which needed to be addressed.[13]  This was determined because 150 reports of doctors sexually abusing their patients were registered with the CPSO between 1987-1990.[14]  During the seven-month collection period (February–August 1991) of the Task Force, there were 303 reports of sexual abuse by doctors on their patients.[15]  When the 1991 Report was published on November 25th, of the sixty recommendations presented to the CPSO, I would suggest one of the most controversial has been the assertion of zero tolerance.

The philosophy of the Task Force with respect to zero tolerance has been seen as “the only appropriate philosophy regarding sexual abuse of patients…”[16]  The philosophy of zero tolerance was adopted by both the CPSO as well as the Ministry when the Honourable Frances Lankin (as she was then) stated it was her goal to enact a law that will appropriately deter sexual abuse, bring abusers to justice, and to treat the victims with the level of dignity and respect they deserve.[17]  As such, the principles of zero tolerance have been in place since the publication of the 1991 Report.

Bill 100 – RHPA

Following the publication of the 1991 Report, the Ontario government underwent a hearing process in which many of the regulatory bodies, professional colleges, and professional associations met with Members of Provincial Parliament (“MPP”) in a Standing Committee on Social Development to determine the scope of the RHPA.  Officially introduced as Bill 100, the Committee drafting the new legislation also heard from victims as well as victim advocates.  It was hoped the new legislation would correct for some of the mistakes of the past.  The Honourable Larry O’Connor indicated the Colleges have not always had the victims interest in mind when rendering disciplinary decisions on sexual abuse allegations, and it was this past practice that was one of the reasons the Committee had been assembled.[18]  It was further hoped the hearings would allow the legislators the opportunity to draft the best possible legislation in order to protect victims as well as to make the legislation clear for practitioners in the future.[19]

When enacted in 1994, the RHPA brought with it the zero tolerance sexual abuse rules recommended by the 1991 Report.  The RHPA stated,

A panel shall find that a member has committed an act of professional misconduct if,

(b.1) the member has sexually abused a patient.[20]

The definition of sexual abuse is defined as,

(3) In this Code,

“sexual abuse” of a patient by a member means,

(a) sexual intercourse or other forms of physical sexual relations between the member and the patient,

(b) touching, of a sexual nature, of the patient by the member, or

(c) behaviour or remarks of a sexual nature by the member towards the patient.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3),

“sexual nature” does not include touching, behaviour or remarks of a clinical nature appropriate to the service provided.[21]

Upon the conclusion of the determination on whether sexual abuse had occurred,

If a panel finds a member has committed an act of professional misconduct by sexually abusing a patient, the panel shall do the following in addition to anything else the panel may do under subsection (2):

1. Reprimand the member.

2. Revoke the member’s certificate of registration if the sexual abuse consisted of, or included, any of the following,

i. sexual intercourse,

ii. genital to genital, genital to anal, oral to genital, or oral to anal contact,

iii. masturbation of the member by, or in the presence of, the patient,

iv. masturbation of the patient by the member,

v. encouragement of the patient by the member to masturbate in the presence of the member.[22]

Following the revocation of the member’s certificate, the following was the prescribed course of action with respect to punishment,

A person whose certificate of registration has been revoked or suspended as a result of disciplinary or incapacity proceedings may apply in writing to the Registrar to have a new certificate issued or the suspension removed.

An application under subsection (1), in relation to a revocation for sexual abuse of a patient, shall not be made earlier than,

(a) five years after the date on which the certificate of registration was revoked; or

(b) six months after a decision has been made in a previous application under subsection (1).

73(5.1) A panel may not make an order directing that the Registrar issue a new certificate of registration to an applicant whose certificate had been revoked for sexual abuse of a patient unless the prescribed conditions are met.[23]

Despite the unforgiving nature surrounding the definition of sexual abuse following its proclamation, there were some in the committee who believed more time was needed to properly focus the draft legislation.  Dr. John Gray of the Ontario Medical Association (“OMA”) indicated concern over only having just over a month to examine the legislation, solicit responses from the membership, and draft a response.[24]  He further outlined that with such important legislation the OMA believes many of the effected parties have been denied due process and this denial will lead to flaws in the legislation.  He further suggested this would cause the legislation to not achieve the objectives the government.[25]  Despite his, and others concerns,[26] about the amount of time spent on developing and flushing out the issues, Bill 100 was proclaimed into force on December 31, 1993.

Jurisprudence

Since the proclamation of the RHPA, there have been a number of sexual abuse cases for which the leading jurisprudence is available.  This paper will encompass the most relevant trilogy of sexual abuse cases in Ontario, which include Mussani v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,[27] Rosenberg v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,[28] and the aforementioned decision of Leering.  Of these Leering is the most recent, and perhaps the most controversial.[29]

On 1994 January 01 zero tolerance was the new bright line, and there was little to no doubt of what encompassed sexual abuse.  In early 2005, soon after Dr. Vincent Leering[30] met the victim, known as AM, they began sexual relationship.  At the commencement of their relationship, AM was using the services of another chiropractor.  Shortly, after their involvement, she sought treatment with Dr. Leering, who in turn was compensated for his services through AM’s insurance company.[31]  This continued until approximately 2005 October 17 when their relationship ended.  Their relationship deteriorated to the point where Dr. Leering sent an outstanding balance of almost $600.00 to a collection agency.  AM in turn filed a complaint with the College of Chiropractors of Ontario (“CCO”) to deal with the financial practices of Dr. Leering.  The CCO, upon the completion of its investigation, charged Dr. Leering with a number of professional misconducts, including sexual abuse.[32]  Dr. Leering acknowledged the concurrence of the sexual and patient doctor relationships, but argued he had not committed any wrong because of a “…loved one exemption to the statutory definition of sexual misconduct…”[33] Although the exemption was considered, it was ultimately rejected by the Committee who cited the decisions of Mussani and Rosenberg, as well as indicating the spirit of the 1991 Report focuses on zero tolerance.[34]

It was successfully appealed when the Ontario Superior Court held that the chiropractic treatment rose from a pre-existing relationship and the doctor patient relationship was incident to the personal relationship.[35]  As a result of the Committee not taking this into account, it was held that their decision was unreasonable.[36]

The CCO appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal, who restored the Committee’s decision and penalty.  In their decision, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Superior Court’s reasoning, and simply relied on the letter of the statute.  They indicated the RHPA was clear and if a doctor carried on a sexual and professional relationship with a patient simultaneously, they were guilty of the offence.[37]  In the end, the doctor had a choice on whether or not to treat their partner.

As a result of the Court of Appeals decision in Leering the high watermark has been affirmed by upholding the zero tolerance legislation and associated prescribed penalties by law should a doctor be found guilty of sexual abuse on a patient.

Analysis

The analysis of this paper will focus on a legislative comparison of the provisions surrounding the statutory interpretation of sexual abuse, whether the Leering decision was correct in law, and potential avenues for legislative reform.

Legislative Comparison

When the Ontario government, through Bill 100, adopted the Task Force’s suggestions of a zero tolerance approach to sexual abuse in the 1991 Report nearly every person, group, association, and professional regulatory college was on board with the approach.[38]  The 1991 Report was considered ground breaking due to the number of sexual abuse allegations it uncovered, and because it was the largest study on sexual abuse of patients by doctors anywhere in North America.[39] However, almost twenty years later, I would suggest the provisions that brought notoriety to the RHPA are now impeding it from properly achieving its mandate.

Ontario has maintained a strong line in the fight against sexual abuse, however it seems they are alone with respect to zero tolerance.  In British Columbia, sexual misconduct is viewed as professional misconduct under s. 26 of the Health Professions Act.[40]  As a result, there are ranges of penalties available to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (“CPSBC”).  In the cases of Hay v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia,[41] Fine v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia,[42] and Theocharous v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia,[43] all three were convicted of varying degrees of professional misconduct of a sexual nature.  The misconduct ranged from conversations, to hugging and kissing, to sexual touching and pursuit of an intimate relationship.[44]  The penalties by the CPSBC ranged from a fine, three-month suspension, to a permanent revocation of the certificate.[45]  All of the actions of the aforementioned doctors would be considered sexual abuse in Ontario and according to the RHPA and subject to the five-year mandatory revocation.  Additionally, there have been calls in Ontario for enhanced action for medical students as they too may fall victim to incidents of sexual abuse.[46]  Despite being found guilty of inappropriate sexual contact with medical students, the CPSBC in the case of Dhawan v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia[47] set forth a number of disciplinary actions, which included a formal reprimand, restricting his practice, and an apology letter.[48]

Notwithstanding the CPSBC’s sliding scale approach to disciplining doctors in instances of inappropriate sexual relations with a patient, they do have a very clear resource manual on how to deal with the doctor/patient relationship.  These guidelines indicate “[s]exualized behaviour in the physician/patient relationship is never acceptable.”[49]  Despite the wording of the resource manual, discipline is considered on a case-by-case basis and it appears the more egregious the misconduct the more severe the penalty will be.

Moving across the country, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland & Labrador all have legislation dealing with professional misconduct of doctors; but none of these provinces specifically mention sexual abuse the way it is listed in Ontario.  Since the cases are factually different it is often difficult to ascertain a range of punishment for offences.[50]  In addition, there are instances when the accused doctor is facing more than the sexual abuse and misconduct charge.  What appears to be apparent is the lack of zero tolerance legislation in any of these provinces.

I would suggest an examination of the legislation in Eastern Canada reveals the greatest discrepancies in legislation.  Section 59.1 of Quebec’s Professional Code[51] specifically lists an offence that is analogous to sexual abuse,

The fact of a professional taking advantage of his professional relationship with a person to whom he is providing services, during that relationship, to have sexual relations with that person or to make improper gestures or remarks of a sexual nature, constitutes an act derogatory to the dignity of his profession.

No professional may engage in an act derogatory to the honour or dignity of his profession or to the discipline of the members of the order, or practise a profession, carry on a trade, enterprise or business or hold an office or function that is inconsistent with the honour, dignity or practice of his profession.[52]

As with all of the other provinces examined thus far, Quebec also relies on a sliding scale of punishment.

It is not until an examination of the legislation in New Brunswick that another definition of sexual abuse can be located.  In fact, the Medical Act[53] definition of sexual abuse is exactly the same as in the RHPA.[54]  However, like all of the other provinces, New Brunswick does not prescribe a penalty of zero tolerance.

Although the legislation in Nova Scotia is similar to that of the Western provinces, the most recent case of an inappropriate relationship with a patient is of a female doctor.[55]  In Hawes v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia,[56] despite admitting to violating the patient/doctor boundaries with a patient between 2007 and 2009, the College did not mention the relationship in the agreed disposition.  This begs the question of whether the accused was held to a different standard because of her sex?

Finally, I would suggest the most comprehensive and modern language appears in the Medical Act[57] of Prince Edward Island.  Like New Brunswick, the PEIMA also defines sexual abuse, however they take it one step further by outlining the following,

(3) Sexual conduct is not considered to be sexual abuse where

(a) the patient and member are spouses;

(b) the member has provided a medical service on the basis of urgency or other isolated-instance necessity to a person who is not normally a patient of the member and who has an already established sexual relationship with the member; or

(c) the doctor-patient relationship has been formally terminated and there is no expectation that any further medical care will be provided by the member to the other person.

(4) Notwithstanding clause (3)(c) and notwithstanding the termination of care by the member, sexual conduct toward or with a former patient

(a) is considered to be sexual abuse, where the former patient was, during the member’s care, or is currently, a minor; or

(b) may be considered to be sexual abuse where the former patient

(i) was, during the member’s care, or is currently, suffering from a judgement-impairing disorder; or (ii) received psychotherapy or psychiatric counselling from the member [The emphasis is my own].[58]

With the exceptions the PEIMA has adopted, I would suggest it is attempting to capture the spirit of what was included in the 1991 Report, which is to set forth a message that relationships between doctors and patients will be treated with the utmost severity when they fall outside the scope of the legislation.  Furthermore, in addition to listing the exceptions to sexual abuse, they also prescribe to zero tolerance outside of the exceptions.  Section 38.3 outlines similar punishments to the RHPA by indicating if a member is found guilty of sexual abuse, the Council shall revoke the license of the member for a period of not less than five-years.[59]

Returning focus to the RHPA and the 1991 Report, the Task Force outlines that sexual activity between a doctor and patient will always constitute sexual abuse, despite any exceptions, excuses, or beliefs the doctor may have.[60]  Although the 1991 Report was considered to be a step forward in protecting patient rights, and I would submit the more telling story is that every other Canadian province did not adopt the zero tolerance recommendation.

Dr. Randy Lang’s, albeit very one-sided article, captures the plight of Ontario dentists in his article Dumb Stupid Laws when he offers ways to avoid the zero tolerance laws of Ontario.  “Relocate to another province where dentists don’t have to live in fear of losing their licenses for doing a simple composite on their spouse.”[61]  I would submit this could be a very real possibility for some doctors in Ontario, which would only add to an existing problem.  Ontario is currently facing a physician shortage.  Ontario is now a province that is short over 2,000 physicians, and thousands do not have access to a family physician.[62]  Although the zero tolerance legislation is not listed one of the main reasons why Ontario is short on doctors, I would suggest it might have played a role in more than one departure.[63]

The 2000 Report, which was a follow-up to the 1991 Report, affirmed the findings of its predecessor by indicating zero tolerance is the only way to properly deal with sexual abuse, and other colleges should follow the CPSO’s lead by adopting a zero tolerance approach to dealing with sexual abuse.[64]  However, through an examination of the remaining nine provinces, the principles of zero tolerance seem to have little traction.  An analogous argument is taking place currently on the federal landscape, as Bill C-10 is fast tracked through the House of Commons.[65]  The controversial crime bill will deal with many issues, and among them is the issue of mandatory minimum sentences for various offences.  Unlike like the zero tolerance approach that the RHPA brings, Bill C-10 has been wrought with controversy from its inception.  It is interesting to note during the Committee phase of the drafting of Bill 100, the Canadian Bar Association of Ontario (“CBAO”), supported the zero tolerance legislation, yet they publically denounced the mandatory minimum sentencing put forth by Bill C-10.  The CBAO implies the government was approaching mandatory minimums with dirty hands because it was their willingness to imprison offenders that was the cause of mandatory minimum.[66]  Although it could be argued Bill 100 and Bill C-10 are vastly different, I would suggest they are attempting to accomplish the same goal.  Bill 100 was drafted because it was viewed that there was a problem with doctors sexually abusing patients.  In order to quell the public’s concern and to ensure patients were protected, the Task Force was created with the goal of producing the 1991 Report.  Likewise, when Canada granted Prime Minister Harper’s Conservatives a full majority in the 2011 election, it was well known the Conservative Party was much tougher on crime than the opposing left-leaning parties.  As such, it should be of no surprise that Bill C-10 was introduced.  The Conservatives have traditionally been tough on crime, and mandatory minimums are nothing new.  Like Bill 100, Bill C-10 aims to protect society from its most dangerous members by setting forth mandatory sentences for prescribed offences.  However, where the irony lies, is in the CBAO’s support for Bill 100 but opposition for Bill C-10.  As I previously alluded to, Bill 100 and Bill C-10 may be a comparison of apples and oranges, but I would suggest mandatory minimums should play a greater role in the realm of criminal law than it does in administrative law.  By precluding the option of a doctor to present a very viable option to treat a spouse, Bill 100, in my opinion steps beyond proactive approach the spirit of the legislation intended, and moves into strictly a reactive approach with a focus on punitive measures.

In the end, when looking at the zero tolerance provisions of the RHPA in comparison with the other provinces attempts to legislate the sexual abuse of patients, I would suggest although not all of them specifically define sexual abuse or prescribe to a zero tolerance mandate, they all accomplish the goal of protecting patients without punishing doctors who are not seeking to victimize patients.

Statutory Interpretation

In all three of the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Mussani, Rosenberg, and Leering the cases were hinged on how the court would interpret the RHPA in comparison with the facts presented.  I would suggest the sexual abuse legislation encompassing the RHPA is open to interpretation on the areas of patient and sexual abuse.

Patient

A thorough examination of the RHPA will reveal that although the term patient is used frequently, it is not defined.  I would suggest this ambiguity could lead to confusion under the act.  Questions such as the following are all relevant questions to determine the scope of what a patient is under the RHPA.

-       When is a person considered a patient?

-       When does a person cease to be a patient?

-       Do they have to be treated on a regular basis to be considered a patient?

-       Can a spouse be a patient?

-       If the provider does not bill for services, is the person still a patient?

-       Is a person a patient or a client?

In the Committee discussions during the consultation period prior to the enactment of Bill 100, the Honourable Karen Haslam (as she was then) and Ms. Susan Vella of the Out of Patients Advocacy Network had a exchange that goes to the very heart of the legislative intent of what the Committee viewed as the definition of patient.  In their discussion of when a patient is considered current or past Ms. Vella indicated,

With respect, there is certainly precedent, lots of case law jurisprudence to define ambiguous terms such as “recent.” I think it would be incumbent upon the college’s prosecuting counsel to bring that case law to the attention of the tribunal, to show where the case law would be relevant and to make that determination at that time.[67]

In her response the Honourable Karen Haslam indicated the response was satisfactory to the question at hand.[68]  I would suggest this exchange captured in the Committee discussion process is poignant to establishing what the legislative intent was prior to enactment.  I would further suggest, it was the intent of the legislators to leave the definition of patient open for interpretation.

Since a specific definition is lacking, many of the above questions need to be answered through an interpretation embarked on by the courts.  The specific question of what patient entails was raised in all three of the trilogy cases.  In Mussani, the Court of Appeal adopted the lower court reasoning of Then J., by outlining that the word patient is not unconstitutionally vague.[69]  Additionally, in Leering, the court adopted the decision of Rosenberg indicating the “zero tolerance/mandatory revocation provisions must be interpreted and applied in the context of specific cases as they arise.”[70]  I would respectfully submit the courts have sufficiently established that the determination of whether a person is a patient has can be established based on the facts before the court.

Following the establishment of when a person becomes a patient is when a person ceases to be a patient.  This issue was addressed in the 2000 Report when it indicated a member shall not have any sexual contact with a patient for a period of two years following the last date of professional contact.[71] Although this provision is only a recommendation, it should be noted that it was not adopted by the RHPA.  Although the 2000 Report, recommends two-year prohibition, it stopped short of stating when a person ceases to be a patient.  An examination of various legislation regulating doctors throughout the provinces in Canada also lacks a definition for patient as well as when a person ceases to be a patient.  I would suggest this is troubling.  In the spirit of compliance with the sexual abuse legislation, it would then be possible for a doctor to discontinue treating a patient in order to engage in a sexual relationship.  I would further suggest that so long as the patient was not abandoned and left without the services of a doctor, this would escape any professional misconduct associated with sexual abuse.[72]  In provinces such as Ontario, where there are a lack of family doctors, and where the legislation regulating doctors was drafted specifically to prevent sexual abuse of patients, the lack of a definition for when a patient is no longer considered such is a gaping hole in the legislation.  There would be little to prevent a dentist, massage therapist, or other regulated health professional where there is an abundance of practitioners to commence a relationship with a patient and prior to it becoming sexual, referring the patient to another provider.  If a doctor abruptly referred a patient to another provider it may be considered unethical, and in some instances it may qualify for professional misconduct.  Although this practice may be in bad taste, it could happen in Ontario in order to avoid capture by the sexual abuse provisions of the RHPA.  In a critical examination of the 1991 Report, Sandra Rodgers tackles this very issue,

The penalties imposed by the Discipline Committee where the doctor terminated the treatment relationship and immediately entered into a sexual relationship with the patient have been minimal. This is true even though the dynamics of the abuse are virtually identical and would require mandatory license revocation had they occurred within the doctor-patient relationship…Abrupt termination of the doctor-patient relationship specifically to evade the legislation has been sufficient to avoid license revocation, even where the relationship was one of psychotherapy.  Even when hasty termination of the doctor-patient relationship is for ulterior motives and violates CPSO directives and guidelines on doctor-patient termination, the penalties imposed are modest.[73]

As a result, it appears as if case law has already been established that would affirm the loophole in the legislation that prevents doctors from being charged with sexual abuse.  In the end, I would suggest by including a definition of patient in the RHPA, legislators could prevent potential predatory behaviour by closing the ambiguity in the legislation.

Further to the discussion on when a patient ceases to be, are the questions that surround the frequency of treatment for a person to be considered a patient.  As per the RHPA the following scenarios will be considered sexual abuse.  First, a patient visits the dentist; they have an established professional relationship with a certain dental hygienist and request to only be seen by them.  When they arrive for their appointment, the regular hygienist is not available, but a temporary hygienist brought in to cover the shift is available.  The patient agrees to see the temporary hygienist and has treatment.    The temporary hygienist who has never worked in the office preceding or following the treatment then obtains full time employment in another practice.  One month later, in a random sequence of events, the hygienist and patient meet and a sexual relationship follows.  Since the RHPA is clear, the hygienist has committed sexual abuse.  Second, a dental technologist receives an order from a dentist to prepare a crown for a patient.  The patient is not new to the practice and has common birth and surnames.  After the crown is placed the patient and dental technologist meet by chance.  A sexual relationship ensues and it is only after the sexual relationship has commenced that it becomes known the dental technologist prepared the crown for the patient.  Under the zero tolerance legislation of the RHPA, which does not allow for exceptions, the dental technologist has committed sexual abuse and is subject to the five-year mandatory licence revocation.  This issue was discussed during the Committee when Ms. Christina Langlois representing the Ontario College of Pharmacists (“OCP”) requests clarification on when a person is a patient and when a relationship with that person would be inappropriate.[74]  The response was that the College would look at the circumstances surrounding the allegation and make a determination from that point.[75]  However, this point was never clarified when the RHPA was enacted, and the zero tolerance legislation would effectively handcuff the decision makers.

Although the above scenarios are extreme, they fall within the scope of the legislation.  Since the Ministry adopted the zero tolerance recommendation put forth by the 1991 Report and the definitions surrounding patient were not included, I would suggest these sorts of troubling incidents could occur.  The 1991 Report clearly outlines, “sexual activity between a patient and a doctor ALWAYS represents sexual abuse…”[76]  In the above two scenarios, it begs the questions of how much time has to pass before these situations are not considered sexual abuse, and is it sexual abuse if the practitioner does not realize that the person they are involved with is or was a patient?  There is no mention of good faith exceptions, because after all, zero tolerance does not permit exceptions.

The above example of the dental technologist also raises another interesting argument.  Since s. 1(3) of the RPHA outlines the abuse of patients, do dental technologists have patients or do they have clients?  They are accepting work on behalf of the dentist, who I would submit is their client.  If they have clients, does the definition of sexual abuse in the legislation capture the meaning behind client?  The Oxford Canadian Dictionary of Current English defines client as “a person using the services of a professional person; any customer.”[77]  The Oxford Canadian Thesaurus of Current English lists synonyms to client as, “customer, buyer, purchaser, shopper, consumer, user; patient; patron, regular.”[78]  Furthermore, the College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario (“CDHO”) also refers to patients as clients in their comprehensive guidelines on sexual abuse.[79]  As a result of the above definition, list of synonyms, and use of client to describe patients by the CDHO, I would suggest patient and client could be used interchangeably.  In the end, I would also suggest any argument surrounding whether one of the regulated disciplines can be excluded from the sexual abuse provision based on the fact that they serve clients and not patients would fail.

Sexual Abuse

By examining the RHPA, Committee’s consultations, and the 1991 Report it can be seen that the legislation’s directive was to eliminate abuse of patients by doctors.  However, in doing so, I would suggest the legislation, in its current form, not only captures all predatory motives of doctors toward physicians, but also include actions that are not predatory in nature.  I would further suggest the all-encompassing nature of the legislation strays from its original intent which was to prevent abuse.

Sexual abuse of patients can take many forms.  It can involve rape, the physician’s use of power to gain sexual access, and the development of personal sexual relationships to meet the needs of the physician.[80]  The relationship between doctor and patient is one in which the patient is particularly vulnerable to abuse because the dynamics put the physician in a greater position of power.[81] During the Committee’s consultations many of the groups that went before the Committee raised concerns as to the definition of sexual abuse.  However, it was the Chiropractic Association of Ontario (“CAO”), who I would submit, correctly submitted that the intention of the legislation in its current form went too far and that various aspects of Bill 100 were unfair to health professionals.[82]

Despite the objections of the various groups that spoke before the Committee, I would suggest the 1991 Report had the greatest influence on the definition of sexual abuse.  In it, the Task Force indicates the 303 respondents who alleged sexual abuse was the largest sample ever taken in North America.[83]  This number was cited as reason there was a growing concern about doctor patient sexual abuse, and by speaking to the victims of the abuse the Task Force was able to construct the 1991 Report.  However, although I empathize with the plight of every victim of sexual abuse, I would respectfully submit the Task Force was playing a shell game with its figures.  It is no secret that the Task Force was created because the CPSO had identified that sexual abuse was a serious problem.[84]  However, there was no evidence put forth by the Task Force to suggest the problem of sexual abuse of patients was on the rise.  I would further suggest the number of reports of sexual abuse, tragic as they are, misled the Committee because historical sexual abuse cases were considered.  In the 1991 Report, there are allegations of sexual abuse which date back, ten, fifteen, and even over twenty years.[85]  I would further submit including the historical sexual abuse cases they, in part, led to the creation of the definition of sexual abuse as it currently stands.  It was this very issue that was raised in the Leering decision.  When discussing the aspects of zero tolerance Feldman, JA quoted the Panel’s decision by indicating “the legislation is there to address a growing problem of sexual abuse of patients by some health care professionals.”[86]  However, the problem with the Court of Appeal and Panel decisions is that there were no statistics mentioned to support the proliferation of sexual abuse by doctors on patients is still continuing to grow despite the zero tolerance legislation.[87]  Perhaps the CCO in their submissions mentioned statistics, but if they did, the court did not refer to them this in their reasons.  I would suggest this weakens the decisions of the Panel and subsequently of the Court of Appeal.  I would respectfully submit, by failing to mention any evidence of an increase in sexual abuse, it tantamount to fear mongering in order to maintain the rationale for zero tolerance.

Moving forward, another issue when examining whether actions are sexual abuse is whether to concentrate on sexual abuse or abuse alone.  Although the analysis encompasses the sexual element, what the analysis is trying to uncover is abuse.  I would submit by accepting the zero tolerance provisions in their blanket form, the Ministry and the Committee may have been attempting to correct wrongs in the past, however, in doing so they have effectively swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.  Although the language of the RHPA is clear, I would suggest is misconstrues what the RHPA is attempting to cover.  The Oxford Dictionary defines sexual abuse as “forcing a person, especially a child to engage in sexual activity or relations.”[88]  Furthermore, the Criminal Code of Canada[89] deals with sexual assault, which I would submit is an analogous term to sexual abuse.  Section 271 of the Criminal Code outlines the punishment for sexual assault, however does not define it.  In order to determine the definition of sexual assault one must look at the definition of assault that is found at s. 265.

(1) A person commits an assault when

(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly;

(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or

(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs.

(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual assault.[90]

Despite the definition of assault, and the inclusion of ss. (2) which outlines that the sexual assaults are included in the realm of assaults, we are left a gap to what constitutes a sexual assault.  I would suggest a sexual assault is one where an assault has occurred and that assault has sexual overtones, connotations, or implications.[91]  Thus, by examining the definitions provided by the Oxford Dictionary, the Criminal Code, and through my professional experiences, I would suggest sexual abuse is an experience where there is unwillingness on the part of the victim.  This notion is further enhanced through the victim’s reports in the 1991 Report.  Victims described their experiences as sexual abuse, sexual impropriety, sexual assault, rape, and sexually demeaning behaviour.[92]  All of these accounts, I would suggest, are consistent with unwillingness either physically or mentally by the victim.  It was this point that was focused on by the representatives of Women’s Health in Women’s Hands.  In her presentation, Ms. Vuyisuva Keyi, outlined one of the problems with the definition of sexual abuse as proposed by Bill 100 was the fact that it “should be defined solely on the impact as experienced by the victim regardless of whether there has been any sexual pleasure experienced by the perpetrator.”[93]  This furthers the notion that sex has little to do with the abuse.  The 1991 Report has a section where it outlined a number of first hand accounts in the words of victims.[94]  The stories are touching, chilling, and very real.  They all have one thing in common, victimization.  Some of the women consented, where as many did not.  But in all of the stories portrayed, the 1991 Report does not reveal any instances where a victim had called in to report their legal or common law spouse.  I would suggest this is because they do not view themselves as victims of sexual abuse, yet the legislation as it was then and now, classifies them as victims.  In a Toronto Star article examining the frustration of dentists over the Leering decision, “Lynn Tomkins, president of the Ontario Dental Association, says the possibility that a dentist doing a filling for a spouse could be ‘considered the same as a predatory sexual deviant’ is extremely troubling.”[95]  As a result, I would suggest the zero tolerance legislation in the RHPA is artificially creating instances of sexual abuse.

In the time since the publication of the 1991 Report and the enactment of the RHPA there has been much growth and advancements in the law.  Rights have become more clearly defined, and older laws are starting to be looked at from a modern lens.  The earliest notion of this approach, known as the living tree approach to the law, is quite possibly from Sir Robert Borden who suggested all written constitutions the British North America Act has been subject to development through usage and convention.[96]  This concept has been remembered and is used repeatedly by all levels of Canadian courts.  Referring back to s. 1(3) of the RHPA, although the legislative intent was zero tolerance, I would suggest by applying the living tree approach to modernize the legislation that Leering and Rosenberg may have been decided differently.

By examining the RHPA and the regulated professions that encompass it from another angle begs the question as to whether the risk of sexual abuse is equally distributed in all of the twenty-one regulated professions?  I would suggest some of the regulated professions have a much higher risk of sexual abuse than others, and should be legislated accordingly.  It would not be hard to believe that professions such as psychologists and psychiatrists would have a higher propensity for sexual abuse in comparison to a dental technologist, midwife, or even a dentist.  I would suggest this is because of the intimate nature of the professions that deal with thoughts and emotion, as opposed to the latter who often work either away from the patient or with other parties present.  It has been established in the 1991 Report as well as through jurisprudence that the main reasons for the legislating sexual abuse as a zero tolerance policy are through the following,

(a)  the general vulnerability of patients in such relationships;

(b)  the power imbalance that almost invariably exists in favour of the practitioner, thus facilitating easy invasion of the patient’s sexual boundaries;

(c)  the privileged position of doctors in society, based on their education, status and access to resources;

(d)  the breach of trust entailed in such conduct by physicians;

(e)  the serious, long-term injury to the victim, both physical and emotional, that results from sexual 
abuse, including the harmful effects on future care caused by the victim’s inability to place her 
trust in other doctors and caregivers;

(f)  the fact that sexual abuse tarnishes public trust in the entire profession;

(g)  the results of an historical review by the Task Force of sanctioning decisions by the College’s 
Discipline Committee and the Divisional Court, which demonstrated a leniency that reflected “a 
profound non-appreciation of the harm done to victims”; and,

(h)  the significant risk of recidivism by abusers, enhanced by the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation 
measures and previous restrictions on doctors’ practices in providing protection against the re-occurrence of abuse.[97]

Many of the above reasons for zero tolerance deal specifically with power and control.  Through an examination of analogous professions, I would suggest the professions regulated by the RHPA are held to a higher standard.  First, law enforcement could arguably yield the highest level of power over another.  Police officers have the ability to remove a person from society and initiate the events that could find a person incarcerated.  The legislation that govern the actions of police officers in Ontario are found in the regulations of the Police Services Act.[98]  While examining the Code of Conduct encompassed in the PSA, there is nothing that specifically prohibits relationships between police officers and witnesses or victims of crime.  The final subsection of the offence of discreditable conduct would be the only applicable section preventing such actions.  Section 2(1)(xi) states, “if a police officer acts in a disorderly manner or in a manner prejudicial to discipline or likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the police force of which the officer is a member.”[99]  In Armstrong v Peel Regional Police Service,[100] a police officer had a sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl which allegedly included intercourse.  After the relationship came to light and the details were examined, the Crown decided not to pursue criminal charges, however, he was charged with under s. 2(1)(xi) of the PSA.[101] Constable Armstrong was found guilty and invited to resign.[102]  In another case, a police officer received a demotion after being found guilty of making sexually suggestive comments to five women contrary to the PSA.[103]

Another profession where there is an expectation of trust is with lawyers.  The Law Society of Upper Canada (“LSUC”) in the Rules of Professional Conduct,[104] has outlined rules with respect to lawyer/client relationships.  The ROPC indicates, “[a] lawyer shall not act or continue to act in a matter when there is or is likely to be a conflicting interest unless, after disclosure adequate to make an informed decision, the client or prospective client consents.”[105] Should a lawyer be found guilty of breaching Rule 2.04(3) they would face discipline from Convocation which unlike the RHPA have a wide range of penalties available.

Although the police officer and lawyers wield a significant amount of trust and power over the people they come across in their professional lives, I would suggest the most potentially powerful relationship a person may have over another is a parental relationship.  The relationship between parent and child is one which can have the parent be the primary and only decision maker for the child when they are too young to make their own decisions.  On the other end of the spectrum is when a child is caring for an elderly parent who has little capacity to make decisions in their best interest.  Despite the power these relationships exude, they are not covered by the RHPA.  Although the fear of sexual abuse of one’s own child is relatively low, it is not the fear of sexual abuse which is cause for concern, it is the power and control relationship conveys.  Although this area is not covered by the RHPA it is covered by the CPSO.  In it they recommend that doctors should not treat family members.[106]  However, when looking at the wording of the guidelines, I would submit it raises issues of ambiguity.  In his book on statutory interpretation, Randal Graham outlines the principles of ambiguity.  “A statute may be referred to as ‘ambiguous’ where it support two or more constructions that are different and specific.”[107]  In the wording of the CPSO guidelines on the treatment of family members, they indicate that one should not treat a family member.  I would suggest the word should is similar to may or probably, but differs from the words shall or must.  Although the guideline does outline the treatment of a spouse, there is no specific prohibition on treating family members.

Consequently, although the RHPA was enacted to prevent sexual abuse in the patient/doctor relationship, I would submit a zero tolerance approach to sexual abuse is no longer feasible.  Through the lack of tangible statistics to show an increase in sexual abuse, the lack of a zero tolerance mandate by analogous profession’s regulatory schemes, and the growth of the law which requires a living tree approach; the law currently stands, it has strayed away from its purpose and is labeling loving spouses as sexual abusers.

Is the Leering Decision Correct in Law?

When the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision in Leering, it ruffled a few feathers.  I would suggest the dental community, aside from Dr. Leering himself, was most affected by the decision.

In 1995, after successful lobbying by dentists, the then health minister sent a letter to the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, giving them permission to treat spouses and romantic partners, something they had a long history of doing.  But last year’s Court of Appeal decision overrides that exemption, leaving the dentists in limbo.”[108]

As a result, I would submit it is important to examine the judicial review process that led to the decision in Leering.  Whether it was through a statutory right of administrative law, or on perceived violations of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms[109] all of the trilogy cases found their way to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Administrative Law

In the most recent case of the trilogy, the court had to answer the question about the mandatory zero tolerance laws in the 2010 decision of Leering.  The CCO was appealing the decision of the Ontario Superior Court who had overturned the decision of the Panel because they felt as if the decision of the Panel was unreasonable.[110]  The result was that the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Superior Court and affirmed the decision of the Panel.  Thus in order to evaluate the correctness of the decision, I would submit a substantive review of the decision is appropriate.

To begin this process we must determine whether we are going to be examining Leering through a question of fact, a question of law, or a question of mixed fact and law.[111]  Since Dr. Leering admitted to the doctor/patient relationship, I would suggest going forward, the test to determine deference will be based solely on a question of law.  In order to answer a question of law we must examine the appropriate level of deference to give a tribunal or panel.  The seminal case of Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)[112] outlines a four-step test to determine the level of deference to give to the court.

First is whether there is a privative clause, and if there is one, how strong is it?  Section 70(1) and 72(1) of the RHPA read together outline that there is no statutory right of appeal for cases of sexual abuse.[113]  When there is no statutory right to appeal, we can infer the Panel wants deference over the matter.  However, because the wording of the section is weak, we can infer that this is a good indicator that less deference should be paid to this section as opposed to a section that had a much stronger wording.

Second, is through analyzing the expertise of the Panel in the legislated area.  I would suggest the level of expertise of the Panel is this field is extremely high.  The Panel is made up of doctors who deal with issues surrounding health law.  The questions most commonly dealt with by the tribunal are questions that go to the specialization of the RHPA.  Furthermore, I would suggest when the courts are examining the decisions of the Panel that the level of expertise the court brings is less than that of the Panel.  Since the level of expertise of the Panel is high, it suggests deference be afforded to the Panel.

Third, is what is the purpose of the act as a whole?  What needs to be examined in this part of the test is to determine if the Panel has addressed the question that goes to the heart or core of the legislation.  I would suggest the Panel sufficiently dealt with the question of zero tolerance as well as the spousal exception in their decision.  They adequately outlined the reasons for zero tolerance as well as making mention of why a spousal exception fails.[114]  Since their decision goes to the heart of the act as a whole, I would suggest this lends support for deference to the Panel’s decision.

Fourth, is to ask what the nature of the question is.  However, because this has already been established, we know the question that is being reviewed is that of a question of law.  Since they were reviewing their own statutes through a question of law, I would suggest the Panel be afforded deference with respect to this decision.

As a result, I would indicate the level of deference afforded to the Panel is that of reasonableness.  When deference falls into the realm of reasonableness, the reviewing court is not to overturn the decision unless they find the decision to be unreasonable.  However, in the case of Leering, because the decision was reasonable and the penalty was within the range of appropriate penalties for sexual abuse, the Court of Appeal must side with the Panel.  Additionally, I would further concur with the decision of the Court of Appeal to reverse the decision of the Superior Court.

Charter

Of the trilogy of cases, only the decision involving the Charter is of Dr. Mussani.  In his appeal, he argued under sections 2, 7, and 12.  Although Dr. Leering did not attempt a Charter argument with respect to the spousal exception, I will examine possible arguments and render a conclusion on the potential outcomes.

To begin the Charter analysis we must first determine if the Charter is applicable to disciplinary hearings under administrative law.  In Bell v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission); Cooper v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),[115] the Supreme Court of Canada held, “if Parliament confers on the tribunal the power to decide questions of law, that power must, in the absence of counter-indications, be taken to extend to the Charter, and to the question of whether the Charter renders portions of its enabling statute unconstitutional.”[116]  I would suggest that Cooper establishes the right for the Panel to interpret Charter arguments in the realm of administrative law.

When examining potential arguments under the Charter, I would suggest Dr. Leering’s strongest arguments lies in his right to life and liberty as entrenched by s. 7 of the Charter, as well as the freedom of association that is entrenched by s. 2(d) of the Charter.  I will begin by examining s. 2(d) of the Charter, and I would distinguish this case from that of Mussani v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.[117]  In Mussani ONSC, it was argued that s. 2(d) does not guarantee a freedom of association for sexual purposes.[118]  The facts in Mussani are much different than in Leering.  I would suggest Dr. Mussani’s actions were of a predatory and abusive nature, unlike Dr. Leering’s relationship, the professional relationship preceded the personal one.  I am not indicating there was a lack of consent between Dr. Mussani and AK, however I would suggest because Dr. Mussani treated AK in both a physical and psychological realm, this would effectively vitiate any consent that could have been afforded to him.  In the case of Dr. Leering, it was the personal relationship that preceded the professional one.  I would suggest this albeit small distinction could result change the outcome of a legal analysis.

The Superior Court of Ontario in Mussani ONSC indicated, “there is no Canadian jurisprudence which has held that the guaranteed of freedom of association extends to the right to have intimate personal relationships.”[119] However, because Dr. Leering’s personal relationship preceded the professional one, I would suggest that this argument becomes moot.  The question to ask is whether there is jurisprudence that would preclude the right to have an intimate personal relationship?  This question is quickly answered by R v M.S.[120] and Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v S.(T.).[121]  In the decision of CCA, the court indicates with MS affirming that

[t]he freedoms of assembly and association are necessarily collective and so mostly public. Our constitutional concerns have not been with assemblies within families or associations between family members. Rather, the protections we have been concerned with are for those assemblies and associations that take us outside the intimate circle of our families. The family is a collective, but the desire of one family member to associate with another is not so much for the purpose of pursuing goals in common, nor even pursing activities in common.[122]

The decisions of M.S. and CCA effectively halt any further analysis into a s. 2(d) analysis, and I would suggest had Dr. Leering brought forward an argument based on s. 2(d) of the Charter he would have been unsuccessful.

In examining s. 7 of the Charter I would suggest two of Dr. Leering’s s. 7 rights were potentially violated.  I would adopt the decision in Mussani ONSC which outlined that s. 7 can be used outside of the criminal realm.[123]  First, in examining the right to life, I would suggest an argument could be made outlining the provisions surrounding zero tolerance could engage s. 7 when a patient and doctor are spouses and the provision prevents them from initiating a sexual relationship.  This denial, under the right factual circumstances, effectively denies them the opportunity to conceive a child.  However, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with an analogous legal argument in Tremblay v Daigle,[124] where they held that the rights of a foetus or potential father do not exist.[125]  As a result, I would conclude that a s. 7 argument under the right to life would fail.

Moving forward to examine the right to liberty, I would suggest the key difference between Dr. Mussani and Dr. Leering is the fact that Dr. Leering had a pre-existing relationship.  In Fancy v Shephard[126] the court indicated, “the decision to marry or cohabit is a fundamental right and by forcing a person to choose to not marry or cohabit because she will lose her maintenance, denies her the right to freely choose who she will live with.”[127]  Yet in Mussani ONSC the court distinguished it from Fancy because Dr. Mussani was not in a relationship, and indicated there is no guaranteed right to enter into a sexual relationship.[128]  Further support for Dr. Leering’s potential argument has also found that mandatory provisions that prohibit sexual relations violate the right to liberty because what occurred in one’s home is essentially a private matter.[129]

In order to find that Dr. Leering’s s. 7 right to liberty was violated the court must have found that there was an infringement to the principles of fundamental justice.  First, I would suggest the legislation is overly vague.  Although the court ruled for the CPSO in Rosenberg, I would submit the Minister’s decision to provide for an exception for dentists to practice on their spouse opens the door for further examination as to whether the law is vague because it does not deal with spouses.  Second, I would suggest the laws are overly broad to achieve its necessary goal.  As mentioned above, the goal of the 1991 Report and subsequent RHPA was to eliminate the sexual abuse of patients.  I would submit the legislation could continue to successfully achieve its goal if it provided for a spousal exception.  As a result of this analysis, I would conclude that Dr. Leering’s s. 7 right to liberty has been violated.

The final step of the test comes by way of s. 1.  The test, as outlined by jurisprudence, will establish whether the Charter violation can be upheld.  Step one looks at a pressing and substantive objective.  Is the government objective in limiting the Charter protected right a pressing and substantive objective according to the values of a free and democratic society?  I would suggest although eliminating sexual abuse is a pressing and substantive objective, I submit that limiting pre-existing spousal relationships are not.  Step two has three subsections.  First, does the legislation’s limitation of the Charter right have a rationale connection to Parliament’s objective?  I would suggest that in 1991 there was a rationale connection to the objective, but as time passed and the Ontario government has provided for exceptions, the means to achieve the objectives of the government are now arbitrary and unfair.  Second, is whether the legislative means to achieve the objectives impair the Charter protected rights in question as minimally as possible?  I would submit the means to reduce and eliminate sexual abuse in a doctor/patient relationship could better be analyzed and targeted if a spousal exception was permitted by law.  In this sense, it would eliminate cases such as Leering and Rosenberg where there was no obvious intent to influence, coerce, or abuse their partners.  Third, are the measures responsible for limiting the Charter right proportional to the objective?  I would suggest the benefit derived from having a zero tolerance mandate does not outweigh the seriousness of the penalty that can be imposed on a doctor who treats their spouse.  The mandatory five-year licence suspension is one that can effectively end a doctor’s career.  Furthermore, the RHPA can work equally as well with a spousal exception, and I would submit this is the turning factor in the analysis.  Thus, I would submit the overly severe consequences that would be applicable to doctors who treat their spouses would result in an unjustifiable impairment to their s. 7 rights.

As a result of the above analysis, I would submit in the fact scenario presented in Leering, had Dr. Leering initiated a s. 7 argument it would have been deemed there was a violation of his right to liberty and s. 1 would not have upheld the violation.

Through an examination of the administrative and Charter reviews of Leering, I would suggest the law is quite clear when examining the zero tolerance policy of the RHPA in administrative law, but there is room for a Charter argument if the proper set of facts were presented to the court.  I would further submit that unless parliament revokes or changes the law as it currently stands, any further cases that attempt to test zero tolerance laws will likely fail.

Legislative Reform of the RHPA

As it currently stands, the sexual abuse provisions of the RHPA are firmly established.  There is only one exception that encompasses a specific circumstance where a doctor may treat their spouse, known as incidental treatment.  Incidental treatment has been held to be reasonable for a doctor to afford treatment to their sexual partner in circumstances such as accidents, emergencies, or to provide immediate relief.[130]  I suggest there is a need for a second exception, a spousal exception.

I would submit there are two strong arguments for the adoption of a spousal exception to the zero tolerance provision of the RHPA.  First, the original intent of the RHPA has evolved.  Second, geographic remoteness or lack of additional service providers can force a doctor to see their spouse.

Although Leering effectively put an end to the debate surrounding spousal exceptions, the inclusion of a spousal exception is something that is not new to the RHPA.  Shortly after the RHPA was proclaimed, lobbying by the Ontario Dental Association (“ODA”) resulted in an exception for dentists to perform services to their spouses.[131]  However, after the Court of Appeal decision in Leering, it has been suggested the zero tolerance rule for dentists is alive and well.  During the Committee meetings, Dr. Wendy Graham of the OMA indicated the proposed legislation was attempting to root out practitioners who are abusive and exploit their position of power and trust.[132] Furthermore, Ms. Linda Samek with the ODA suggested to the Committee that the legislation was not focused enough and there was cause for concern because there were no clear guidelines for when the doctor/patient relationship ended.[133]  Additionally, there was no distinction between an exploitive, abusive, or consensual relationship.[134]  As the facts revealed in Leering and Rosenberg, there was no malicious intent toward their partners.  The only reason they are labelled a victim or abuser is because of the legislation.  I would suggest in these instances, it is the doctor themselves who are the victims.  I would however, suggest there should not be a blanket exception to the zero tolerance.  In the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council has indicated doctors will be exempt from punishment if the personal relationship with the patient preceded the professional one.[135]  One also need not look any further than Prince Edward Island to find an example of a spousal exception aimed directly at medical professionals.[136]  I respectfully submit what was once a strong and cutting edge piece of legislation, has fallen from its legislative intent and is now in desperate need of reform.

The second argument, which I believe is cause for a spousal exemption has its roots in remoteness of the situation.  The RHPA is a provincial statute that is in force and effect for even the most remote locations in Ontario.  What are spouses and doctors supposed to do in fly-in communities when there is only one doctor, or one dentist?  Although the courts have outlined incidental treatment would not incur sanction, however what if a patient had an on going medical issue that required regular and consistent treatment and the only service provider was their spouse?  The RHPA and subsequent decisions of the court must find the spouse guilty of sexual abuse because of the wording in the RHPA.[137]  I would suggest situations such as the one described do occur yet doctors turn a blind eye to them.[138]

It appears as if the attention the Leering decision brought has caused the Ministry to take a second look at the necessity of zero tolerance provisions.  On 2011 June 24, the Honourable Deb Matthews asked the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (“HPRAC”) to investigate and advise on the issue of spousal treatment by health care professionals.[139]  Despite this, the Minister maintains the government has not changed its position on the zero tolerance mandate.  It is however, looking for information on a spousal exception.[140]  On January 10, 2012 the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (“RCDSO”) presented in arguments for a spousal exception front of HPRAC members and the message was simple and clear,

the College believes it is wrong to equate, without exception, the treatment of a spouse by a health care practitioner as equivalent to a situation of sexual abuse… [I]t is beyond common sense to say that all cases of spousal treatment are automatically a situation of abuse and warrant to be judged as professional misconduct.[141]

In addition to the public consultations, the HPRAC also launched a website that was taking submissions from spouses of medical professionals that fall under the RHPA.[142]

Consequently, I would respectfully suggest the one thing that is certain about the zero tolerance provision is that it needs to be updated.  It is hard to argue with the original intent of the legislation, but almost twenty years later, its original purpose has become analogous to a rabid dog, it just seems to be latching on to and biting anything that comes close to it.  I would further recommend an exception, much like the provision in the PEIMA, be created and implemented to allow for doctors to treat their spouses.  Lastly, this exception should be limited to relationships that were initiated prior to the spouse becoming a patient.

Conclusion

“The state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation.”[143]  When the late and former Justice Minister (as he was then) Pierre Elliot Trudeau, voiced this now iconic phrase in 1967, he was saying so in the context of decriminalizing homosexuality.  However, with the enactment of the RHPA the state clearly sent a message to Canadian doctors, by telling them exactly who they could not bring into their bedroom.  For almost twenty years, the RHPA has mandated a zero tolerance policy with respect sexual relations between a doctor and patient.  Should such a relationship develop, the doctor would be subject to professional misconduct charges of sexual abuse, and upon a finding of guilt they would automatically have their licence revoked for a minimum of five years.

Despite the zero tolerance provisions of the RHPA some doctors still engaged in activities that found them facing charges of sexual abuse.  The trilogy of Ontario Court of Appeal decisions in Mussani, Rosenberg, and Leering have further entrenched the rigidity of this rule.  Despite this, there is hope a spousal exception can be enacted.

Through a legislative comparison it has been established that Ontario is the only province in Canada that prescribes to a mandatory licence revocation and a zero tolerance policy.  The majority of Canadian provinces list sexual abuse as a professional misconduct, and many have chosen either not to define its specifics or to use a sliding scale when determining punishment for offending doctors.  I would suggest the model currently being used by the PEIMA is the most effective and fair model in Canada.  The penalties and wording of the legislation are identical to Ontario, yet it has one tremendous difference, they have legislated a spousal exception for doctors.  Should this model be adopted in Ontario, it would not only uphold the principles for which the legislation was created on, but also bring the act into the modern world.

A second way in which a spousal exception can likely be considered is through a statutory interpretation of the RHPA.  Terms such as patient, and sexual abuse are wide open for legal interpretation, and I would submit the inclusion of a spousal exception could make great strides in shoring up the loopholes.  Whether it is by defining who is a patient, when they are not a patient, or the frequency in which they have to be treated to be a patient, there is much room for improvement surrounding the definition of patient.  An examination of the term sexual abuse also raises questions.  As previously indicated, sexual abuse, taken on its face, has a connotation of sexual impropriety, sexual assault, or rape.  However, the RHPA also indicates a consensual and loving spousal relationship between a doctor and patient to be viewed as sexual abuse.  As a result, I would suggest as time has moved forward, it has left the RHPA in 1994.  The living tree approach to statutory interpretation allows for a modern read on old rules in order to read them in context with modern society.  I would suggest including a spousal exception into the act could do this.

The third aspect examined is whether the Leering decision was correct in law.  After completing a substantive review of the principles of administrative law in which Leering was based, I came to the conclusion that deference should be paid to the Panel, and the decision by the Panel was the correct one.  Although Leering did not embark any Charter questions, I put forth questions on whether the decision would stand up to an analysis on s. 2(d) and 7.  As a result, I would suggest a s. 2(d) argument would have failed, but a s. 7 argument based on the right to liberty would have found Dr. Leering’s right to liberty was violated, and the infringement would not have been upheld by s. 1.

Lastly, was an examination of legislative reform for the RHPA.  I suggested the two strongest arguments for legislative reform are, first, the inclusion of a spousal exception rule is rooted in the fact that the original intent of the legislation was no longer applicable; second, that factors such as remoteness can leave a doctor with no other alternative other than to provide treatment to a spouse.

Although I would submit the RHPA is not a bad piece of legislation it is in need of an update.  It is hard to find fault with a statute that aims to protect society’s most vulnerable people, but it does become troublesome when it places titles such as sexual abuser on doctors who may have been acting with clean hands.  In order for the RHPA to continue to achieve its goal of protecting victims and capturing the true abusers, the HPRAC will need to seriously look at the suggestions put forth during the consultation period and recommend the inclusion of a spousal exception to Ontario’s RHPA.


[1] Randy Lang, “Dumb Stupid Laws” OralHealthGroup (01 September 2010), online: Oral Health Group < http://www.oralhealthgroup.com/news/dumb-stupid-laws/1000384416/&gt; [Dumb Stupid Laws].

[2] Ibid.

[3] Health Professions Procedural Code, being Schedule 2 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, SO 1991 c18 [RHPA].

[4] Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario, “Who We Are” Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario, online: Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario < http://www.regulatedhealthprofessions.on.ca/WHOWEARE/default.asp&gt; [FHRCO].

[5] Ontario, Ministry of Health, The Final Report of the Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients, Final Report (Toronto: The Task Force, 1991) [1991 Report].

[6] Although not all of the regulated professions are doctors, for the purposes of this paper, I will use the generic term of doctor to describe the following:  medical professional, regulated health professional, and all other synonyms which may fall under the umbrella which is encompassed by the RHPA; Karen Selick, “A Bad law Waiting to be Ended” National Post (29 June 2011), online: National Post < http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/06/29/karen-selick-a-bad-law-waiting-to-be-ended/&gt; [Selick].

[7] Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Special Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients, Final Report (Toronto: The Task Force, 2000) at xi [2000 Report].

[8] Ibid.

[9] [2010] OJ No 406; 2010 ONCA 87 [Leering].

[10] RSO 1990, c. H.4 [HDA].

[11] 2000 Report, supra note at 7; Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th ed (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders, 1988) at 768 [Hippocratic Oath].

[12] 2000 Report, supra note at 7.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid at 58.

[15] Ibid at 63-70; It should be noted that there was no time frame given, and many historical sexual abuse incidents were reported.  also note that NOT all of the reports were by doctors, some sexual abuses were perpetrated by individuals in other positions of power and trust such as lawyers, judges, teachers, clergy, and hospital administrators

[16] Ibid at 15.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 100, Regulated Health Professions Amendment Act, 1993 (Hansard), (08 December 1993) at 1550 [Hansard Dec 08].

[19] Ibid.

[20] RHPA, supra note at s. 51(1)(b.1).

[21] Ibid at s. 1(3)-(4).

[22] Ibid at s. 51(5).

[23] Ibid at s. 72(1), 72(3), 73(5.1).

[24] Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 100, Regulated Health Professions Amendment Act, 1993 (Hansard), (06 December 1993) at 1710 [Hansard Dec 06].

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 100, Regulated Health Professions Amendment Act, 1993 (Hansard), (30 November 1993) at 1710 [Hansard Nov 30].

[27] [2004] OJ No 5176 [Mussani].

[28] [2006] OJ No 4380 [Rosenberg].

[29] For the purposes of this paper, only the Leering case will be discussed in depth.

[30] Leering was a licenced chiropractor in good standing at the time of their commencement of their relationship.

[31] Leering v College of Chiropractors of Ontario (23 January 2008), online: CCO < http://www.cco.on.ca/English/Chiropractor-Search/Search/Detailed-Chiropractor/?rid=240019&stp=1&sid=63&gt; at 5 [Leering Panel].

[32] Ibid at 5-6.

[33] Ibid at 12.

[34] Ibid at 17; Mussani, supra note 27 at 114; Rosenberg, supra note at 54.

[35] Leering v Chiropractic College of Ontario, [2008] OJ No 4375 at 34 [Leering ONSC].

[36] Ibid at 41.

[37] Leering, supra note 9 at 50-51.

[38] Rosenberg, supra note 28 at 25.

[39] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 58.

[40] RSBC 1996, c183 [BCHPA].

[41] Hay v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (31 December 2010), online: CPSBC < https://www.cpsbc.ca/files/pdf/2011-01-06-Hay.pdf> [Hay].

[42] Fine v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (31 December 2010), online: CPSBC < https://www.cpsbc.ca/files/pdf/2011-01-14-Fine.pdf>  [Fine].

[43] Theocharous v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (15 July 2010), online: CPSBC < https://www.cpsbc.ca/files/pdf/2011-05-26-Theocharous.pdf&gt; [Theocharous].

[44] Hay, supra note 41 at 1; Fine, supra note 42 at 1; Ibid at 1.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Sandra Rodgers, “Sexual Abuse by Health Care Professionals: The Failure of Reform in Ontario” (2004) 12 Health Law Journal 101 [Rodgers 2004].

[47] Dhawan v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (30 July 2010), online: CPSBC < https://www.cpsbc.ca/files/pdf/2010-09-22-Dhawan.pdf&gt; [Dhawan].

[48] Ibid.

[49] British Columbia, The College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, Sexual Boundaries in the Physician/Patient Relationship.

[50] Bell v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta (01 February 2007), online: CPSA < http://www.cpsa.ab.ca/Libraries/Pro_Complaints_Disc/006658-000012453370-1.pdf&gt;; Ali v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta (01 April 2008), online: CPSA < http://www.cpsa.ab.ca/Libraries/Pro_Complaints_Disc/S10793-000012938614-1.pdf&gt;; Korol v College of Physicians & Surgeons of Manitoba (31 August 2010), online: CPSM < http://www.cpsm.mb.ca/20100831KorolIQ.pdf&gt;; Corder v College of Physicians & Surgeons of Manitoba (19 March 2010), online: CPSM < http://www.cpsm.mb.ca/20100319Corder.pdf&gt;; Cowan v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan (2001), online: CPSS <http://www.quadrant.net/cpss/discipline/discipline.html&gt;.

[51] RSQ, chapter C-26 [Quebec Code].

[52] Ibid at s. 59.1-59.2.

[53] SNB 1981, c 87 [NBMA].

[54] Ibid at s. 3.

[55] The case did not describe the incident as sexual, however, wording such as “personal relationships” and “violated patient/physician boundaries” leads me to believe one existed.

[56] Hawes v College of Physicians & Surgeons of Nova Scotia (30 August 2011), online: CPSNS < http://www.cpsns.ns.ca/Portals/0/Hearing-Committee-PDF/hawes.pdf&gt;

[57] RSPEI 1988, c M-5 [PEIMA].

[58] Ibid at s. 38.3(3)-(4).

[59] Ibid at s. 38.3(2).

[60] 1991 Report, supra 5 at 12.

[61] Dumb Stupid Laws, supra note 1.

[62] “Ontario Physician Shortage 2007” Ontario Medical Association, online: Ontario Medical Association <https://www.oma.org/Mediaroom/Backgrounders/Pages/OntarioPhysicianShortage2007.aspx&gt;.

[63] Luisa D’Amato, “OMA Head: Here’s Why There’s a Doctor Shortage” The Toronto Star (02 April 2008), online: thestar.com <http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/article/409140&gt;.

[64] 2000 Report, supra note 7 at xi and xvii.

[65] Tobi Cohen, “Tories’ Omnibus Crime Bill Passes in the House of Commons” National Post (05 December 2011), online: National Post <http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/05/tories-omnibus-crime-bill-passes-in-the-house-of-commons/&gt;.

[66] Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 100, Regulated Health Professions Amendment Act, 1993 (Hansard), (29 November 1993) at 1710 [Hansard Nov 29].

[67] Hansard Nov 30, supra note 26 at 2220.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Mussani, supra note 27 at 66.

[70] Leering, supra note 9 at 27.

[71] 2000 Report, supra note 7 at xxi.

[72] Although the CPSO has policies with respect to discontinuing the doctor/patient relationship, they do not mention discontinuing the relationship to pursue a sexual relationship or if there are any applicable professional misconduct offences; “Ending the Physician-Patient Relationship” The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Februrary 2000), online: The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario <http://www.cpso.on.ca/uploadedFiles/policies/policies/policyitems/ending_rel.pdf&gt;.

[73] Sandra Rodgers, “Zero Tolerance some of the Time?  Doctors, Discipline and Sexual Abuse in Ontario” (2007) 15 Health Law Journal 378 [Rodgers 2007].

[74] Hansard Nov 29, supra note 66 at 2010.

[75] Ibid.

[76] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 12.

[77] Oxford Canadian Dictionary of Current English, sub verbo “client” [Oxford Dictionary].

[78] Oxford Canadian Thesaurus of Current English, sub verbo “client” [Oxford Thesaurus].

[79] Ontario, College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario, Prevention of Sexual Abuse of Clients.

[80] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 12.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on Social Development, Bill 100, Regulated Health Professions Amendment Act, 1993 (Hansard), (23 November 1993) at 1710 [Hansard Nov 23].

[83] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 58.

[84] Ibid at 7.

[85] Ibid at 63-70.

[86] Leering, supra note 9 at 14.

[87] Leering Panel, supra note 31 at 21.

[88] Oxford Dictionary, supra note 77 at sexual abuse.

[89] RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].

[90] Ibid at s. 265(1)-(2).

[91] I am able to suggest this due my experiences as a police officer with the York Regional Police.  I was a police officer from April 2004 until October 2008, during that time I successfully passed the Basic Constable Training Program at the Ontario Police College, and went through yearly requalification with York Regional Police’s in-house education branch.  I am also able to qualify this definition through my experiences investigating at least 15 adult and child sexual assaults.

[92] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 59.

[93] Hansard Nov 30, supra note 26 at 2050.

[94] 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 63-70.

[95] Theresa Boyle, “Dentists Flout ‘Stupid’ Law that Treats them as Sex Abusers” The Toronto Star (20 April 2011), online: The Toronto Star <http://www.healthzone.ca/health/newsfeatures/article/977389–ontario-law-means-dentists-who-treat-their-spouses-are-guilty-of-sex-abuse&gt; [Boyle].

[96] Reference re: British North America Act, 1867 s 24, [1929] JCJ No 2

[97] Mussani, supra note 27 at 21; 1991 Report, supra note 5 at 81.

[98] RSO 1990, c P 15 [PSA].

[99]OReg 268/10 at Code of Conduct s. 2(1)(xi).

[100] Armstrong v Peel Regional Police Service (18 July 2002), 02-06, online: OCPC <http://www.ocpc.ca/files/G7492003540271104X12WE53K244ZF.pdf&gt;.

[101] Ibid at 2.

[102] Ibid at 12.

[103] Cate v Peel Regional Police Service (18 July 1998), 98-10, online: OCPC <http://www.ocpc.ca/files/5914200386090230UA162H2174593J.pdf&gt;.

[104] Ontario, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct [ROPC].

[105] Ibid at 2.04(3).

[106] Ontario, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Policy Statement #7-06: Treating Self and Family Members.

[107] Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2001).

[108] Boyle, supra note 95.

[109] Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; RHPA, supra note 3 at s. 70(1).

[110] Leering ONSC, supra note 35 at 41.

[111] Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748 [Southam].

[112] [1998] 1 SCR 1222 [Pushpanathan].

[113] RHPA, supra note 3 at s. 70(1) & 72(1).

[114] Leering Panel, supra note 31 at 17.

[115] [1996] 3 SCR 854 [Cooper].

[116] Ibid at 70.

[117] [2003] OJ No 1956 [Mussani ONSC].

[118] Ibid at 168.

[119] Ibid.

[120] [1996] BCJ No 2302 [MS].

[121] (1989), 69 OR (2d) 189 [CCA].

[122] Ibid at 204.

[123] Mussani ONSC, supra note 117 at 45-48.

[124] [1989] 2 SCR 530 [Daigle].

[125] Ibid at 29.

[126] [1997] NSJ No 517 [Fancy].

[127] Ibid at 32.

[128] Mussani ONSC, supra note 117 at 52.

[129] Ibid at 53.

[130] Leering, supra note 9 at 42.

[131] Boyle, supra note 95.

[132] Hansard Dec 06, supra note 24 at 1700.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid.

[135] United Kingdom, General Medical Council, Maintaining Boundaries – Guidance for Doctors.

[136] PEIMA, supra note 57 at s. 38.3

[137] RHPA, supra note 3 at s. 1(3), 51(1)(b.1), 51(5).

[138] Dumb Stupid Laws, supra note 1.

[139] “Boundaries Between Health Care Providers and Patients” Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC) (2011) online: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council < http://www.hprac.org/en/&gt;.

[140] Ibid.

[141] “Presentation to HPRAC on Spousal Treatment Referral” Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (11 January 2012) online: Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario.

[142] Note the site was taking the survey submissions was deactivated on 2012 January 19 as the survey was only available for a limited period.

[143] Dumb Stupid Laws, supra note 1.





Bill 133 – A Critical Examination of new Family and Pension Laws

11 01 2012

A Critical Examination of Bill 133

By:  Ryan Venables

2011 December 01

Introduction

Divorce, also known as marriage breakdown, rings out with broken dreams, shattered lives, and unfulfilled promises.  However, it also symbolises a new beginning, and an opportunity for two people to equitably divide the assets of a relationship with an opportunity to look toward the future.

A common misconception within Canadian society is the percentage the average Canadian thinks a marriage ends in divorce.  Many people would answer, quite confidently, 50 per cent.  In reality the answer is much more complicated.  Figures suggest, by a couple’s 30th wedding anniversary, divorce will occur from a low of approximately 17 per cent in Newfoundland and Labrador to a high of approximately 50 per cent in Quebec.[1]  However, nationally the average lies roughly in the middle at 38 per cent.[2]

Divorce is nothing new in Canadian society, and as such, legislation has been enacted to ease a couple through the transition of marriage to divorce and beyond.  The Family Law Act[3] and Pension and Benefits Act[4] are two such pieces of legislation.  These two statutes share a common area in the legal world: pension splitting through spousal separation.

When a marriage breaks down, lines are drawn in the proverbial sand.  Former lovers are now enemy combatants and there are only really two items that are consistently fought over, children and property.  This paper will deal with the latter, and critically analyse portions of the draft legislation known as Bill 133.[5]  Bill 133 deals with a range of topics encompassed in the PBA and FLA, however, for the purposes of this paper, the following issues involving pensions will be addressed:

  1. Immediate settlement methods (ISM) in comparison to deferred settlement methods (DSM).
  2. The exclusion of pension division requirements for common-law spouses.
  3. The new defined calculations for valuating the member’s pension.

Although this paper will only critically analyse the above topics, the breadth of Bill 133 goes well beyond the limited area of pension and benefits.  Additionally, the Ontario Government has indicated that 2012 January 01 will be the date as to when the new legislation and accompanying regulations will come into force and effect.[6]

Summary of Conclusions

Through an analysis of the above areas, this paper will show that Bill 133 both succeeds and fails in its attempt to alleviate some of the problems critics and practitioners have called for.  First, through an examination of the various settlement methods available to members and non-members, the Government has taken a step forward in bringing equality toward former spouses, however, I suggest that by moving away from an immediate settlement method (“ISM”) and delayed settlement method (“DSM”) and embracing a hybrid or credit splitting approach, the new legislation is embracing the spirit of what pensions were intended for.  Second, by not including a presumption for common-law spouses to have access to pensionable credits, I would suggest the legislators missed a valuable opportunity to bring the level of equality up to par with that of traditionally married spouses.  Third, the new method of removing the valuation from actuaries and placing it within a rigid formula to be completed by the plan’s administrator may be problematic due to the rigidity of the new formulas. In the end, with the introduction of Bill 133, the Government of Ontario has aimed at shoring up holes that have long existed in both the PBA and FLA.  While they have succeeded in their goals in some respects, in others they missed the mark and can look toward other provincial legislation to plug the gaps.

Bill 133: ISM v DSM

During court proceedings, which are attempting to sort out the net family property of each spouse of a matrimonial breakdown, a key sticking point can be a member-spouse’s pension.  Additionally, a couple’s largest asset aside from the matrimonial home is generally a spouse’s pension.  As will be discussed, a spouse’s pension is included in the net family property of the individual.  Upon the conclusion of the proceedings, should there be an award of equalization, the non-member spouse will be entitled to a portion of the net family property of the member spouse.  Should the member spouse be unable to pay either with cash or assets, such as property, the court can rightfully award a portion of the pension.

Moving forward, there are two traditional methods of the dividing an employee’s pension when examining the assets in the relationship during divorce proceedings.  These include, an ISM or DSM.  However, with Bill 133 coming into force on the horizon, the new legislation will limit pension splitting to ISM.[7]  Eliminating the availability of DSM entirely.

In order to properly assess whether Bill 133, and the elimination of DSM is the correct method of progression in pension and family law, a historical examination must occur.

ISM

An ISM is the first of two methods in which an equalization payment could be made to the non-member spouse.  Prior to the introduction of Bill 133, in proceedings of marriage breakdown, definition of property is as follows:

“property” means any interest, present or future, vested or contingent, in real or personal property and includes,

(a) property over which a spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power of appointment exercisable in favour of himself or herself,

(b) property disposed of by a spouse but over which the spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to revoke the disposition or a power to consume or dispose of the property, and

(c) in the case of a spouse’s rights under a pension plan that have vested, the spouse’s interest in the plan including contributions made by other persons; (“bien”) (the italics are my own).[8]

As such, the division of family assets, which a pension is considered to be as per subsection (c), was governed by Part I of the FLA.  Looking specifically at s. 9, the courts have indicated,

[o]nce the pension and all other assets have been tallied to produce the appellant’s “net family property”, the appellant is required to pay the respondent an amount equal to one-half of the difference between his and her net family properties. Section 9 of the Family Law Act allows a court to choose among several methods for payment of the equalization amount, including an order of immediate payment, the granting of a security interest, an instalment scheme, postponement of payment, creation of a trust, and the transferral, partition or sale of property.[9]

As such, an ISM is a “method of settlement of equalization obligations, there is an immediate transfer of a share of the value of the member’s pension to a locked-in RRSP or other prescribed vehicle.”[10]  There are obvious advantages and disadvantages of using an ISM method.

The first and arguably most significant advantage, as noted by the court is that “the pension-holding spouse (here the husband) must transfer real assets to the wife to equalize matrimonial property. The wife can use these real assets immediately.”[11]  The thought behind this albeit old-world train of thought, is that the husband was generally the spouse who provided the majority of the equity brought into the home.  Therefore, it was thought an immediate equalization payment to the wife could satisfy any immediate economic need following the dissolution of the marriage.  However, the obvious flipside to this advantage is the potential economic peril the pension-holding spouse is exposed to.  Ari Kaplan outlines such a situation,

If the value of the employee’s pension, as determined by the parties, is equal to $250,000 and all other family property has been otherwise settled, then a direct equalization payment would see the employee pay the spouse $125,000 (either by way of cash payment or by some other tax-effective method).

However, because an employee’s pension money is locked-in until retirement, this approach might involve a substantial degree of financial hardship on the employee.  The direct equalization payment approach presumes, therefore, that an employee will be able to access other assets or sources of revenue in order to satisfy the equalization payment.[12]

A second advantage of the ISM approach revolves around the spousal interest in death benefits payable to a former spouse.  The minimum standards of the PBA indicate quite clearly that unless the spouses were cohabitating and the non-member spouse had not waived their right to a pre-retirement death benefit, then the spouse would not be entitled to their accumulated portion of the pension.[13]  However, the statute has indicated there is an exception.  Section 48(13) states, “[a]n entitlement to a benefit under this section is subject to any right to or interest in the benefit set out in a domestic contract or an order referred to in section 51 (payment on marriage breakdown).”[14]  Therefore, despite the statutory requirement of cohabitating at the time of the member’s death, if a court order is in place, the surviving ex-spouse would still have a vested interest in the pre-retirement death benefit.

Despite subsection (13), there is still a grey area the statute does not address.  It appears as if a spouse would be shutout of any pre-retirement death benefit if a court order were not in place.  Take for example the situation of the spouse who shortly after the family law valuation date[15] learns of the death of the member.  On its face, the PBA would statutorily exclude the spouse from collecting.  However, the issue becomes more complicated depending on whether the member has named a beneficiary to the pre-retirement death benefit.  Section 48(6) “sets out the rules that apply when the member does not have a spouse on the day the member dies or is living separate and apart from his or her spouse on the date of death.  It provides that only in that case is the death benefit paid to a named beneficiary.”[16]  Therefore, if the member does not have a spouse as per the PBA and has not named a beneficiary the pre-retirement death benefit would be payable to the estate of the member.

However, the court in Carrigan indicated that as in the example above,

[t]hat there was no domestic contract or court order in favour of Mrs. Carrigan appears to be the nub of the conflict. The Pension Benefits Act does confer rights with respect to an employee’s pension on spouses, and former spouses. Sadly for Mrs. Carrigan, she no longer qualifies as the spouse entitled to the death benefits under the Pension Benefits Act. Rights as a former spouse depend upon the date of the marriage breakdown. If Mr. Carrigan and Mrs. Carrigan had entered into a domestic contract or there was a court order which identified a portion of the pension to which Mrs. Carrigan would have been entitled, that portion would have been deducted from the total pension and would have affected the value of the death benefit. Also, upon Mr. Carrigan’s death, Mrs. Carrigan had the opportunity to elect to take an equalization payment instead under the will, however, after letting the court extension lapse, she was deemed, pursuant to s. 6(11) of the Family Law Act, to have taken under the will.[17]

As such, if not fully advised of their legal rights, a former spouse may be shut out of a significant portion of a member’s pension, should the appropriate steps, elections, or time frames not be followed.

The third advantage of an ISM scheme is closely related to the second advantage.  By having an ISM, the couple that saw fit to end their marriage are able to walk away with a clean break and will not have to be continually connected through retirement.  The courts have recognized this advantage as well by indicating, “first and foremost, an ‘if and when’ scheme also requires a continued financial association between the ex-spouses that obviates a ‘clean break’ after the divorce.”[18]  In the event that the marriage produced no children, a DSM scheme would bind the couple together indefinitely, ultimately availing the opportunity for further complication that could result in additional legal proceedings.

DSM

A DSM or if and when scheme, is exactly this.  It is designed to provide the ex-spouse of the member with a pensionable income following the retirement of the member.  “By this method of settlement of equalization obligations, pension division occurs at a future point, at which time the non-member spouse receives a separate pension from the member’s plan.”[19]  It should be noted when Bill 133 comes into force, it will eliminate this option of pension splitting.  Despite this, there have been two methods of DSM adopted by the courts.

First is settlement by employee trust.  “This method imposes a trust upon the employee that requires the employee to pay over a portion of the pension payment directly to the spouse, once the employee retires under the pension plan and begins receiving the pension.”[20]  I would suggest that there is an immediate and apparent fatal flaw with the employee trust method.  As Kaplan indicates,

the imposition of a trust on the employee spouse involves minimal involvement of the plan administrator since 100 per cent of the pension is paid to the employee, who is entirely responsible for the division and redirection of payment to the spouse in compliance with the court order or separation agreement.[21]

This raises two significant problems.  First, suppose a court has ordered the member to pay a portion of their pension to their ex-spouse.  Further suppose that the proceedings were particularly charged with emotion, and the member felt as if they were not treated fairly by their ex-spouse.  There is every opportunity for the member to completely disregard the order or agreement simply to financially punish their ex-spouse.  In a perfect world, this would be remedied through court proceedings.  However, the reality is that it is very likely the ex-spouse, in this situation, will not receive their due entitlement when they need it most.  The second problem revolves around the uncertainty of payments.  If the plan holder suddenly dies before payments commence, or if there have been relatively few payments, the spouse will then be shut out from receiving further payments.[22]  Thus, potentially drastically reducing the amount of equity owed to them through the separation agreement or court order.

Second, is settlement by splitting pension payments at source.  Although this method is very similar to the employee trust method, it is differentiated insofar as the pension administrator is responsible for splitting the payment at the source to avoid many of the complications when the onus is on the employee.[23]  Although it alleviates one of the problems of employee trust methods, we are still left with the problem the non-member spouse may face upon of the death of the employee and the potential end of payments before the full amount was paid out.

Bill 133 & Credit Splitting

The final method, settlement by assignment and credit splitting, I would suggest appears to be a hybrid between the ISM and DSM models.  This method,

is one that permits the parties to divide and assign an employee’s pension ‘credits’ to the former spouse, who will then receive a separate pension annuity form the plan attributable to those credits, or, alternatively, be able to transfer an equivalent lump sum amount into a locked-in retirement savings vehicle.[24]

I would further suggest credit splitting is the best overall option moving forward.  “With a pension credit split, the former spouse becomes, conceptually, a limited form of de facto member of the plan who would continue receiving an annuity for the balance of the spouse’s life, even if the employee dies first, and even if the employee dies prior to retirement.”[25]  The courts have also briefly weighed in on this method of pension division,

[b]oth pension splitting and credit splitting are orders directed at the plan administrator and require their involvement. However, credit splitting creates a separately valued annuity from the plan. These are the types of settlements…which enables an eligible spouse to apply for a transfer of a lump sum from the plan to another pension plan, to a prescribed retirement savings arrangement, or to leave the lump sum in the plan to the credit of the eligible spouse; these options are only available if the administrator agrees.[26]

In addition to the comments in Carrigan, it appears as if the Ontario courts have remained relatively neutral as to which method of equalization is preferred, instead offering that each case needs to be analysed on its facts.[27]

With Bill 133 coming into force and effect in a short period of time, it appears legislators have determined the best way for a couple to move forward in their respective lives is to make the break between them clean and clear.  When Bill 133 comes into force, the DSM model of pension splitting will no longer be available.[28]  It appears as if the legislators have heeded the calls for reform by recognizing the clear disadvantages of the DSM model.  However, despite the shortcoming of the DSM model, the credit splitting model has one clear advantage over a straight DSM or ISM model of pension splitting.  This advantage is that credit splitting appears to be the most equitable method of resolving property disputes involving pensions.

For the employee, credit splitting minimizes the potential financial hardship of a direct equalization payment.  For the former spouse, it reduces the risks associated with an if-and-when settlement approach.  For both parties, credit splitting facilitates a clean break from one another.[29]

In this realm, credit splitting is attempting to act in the interest of all parties involved.  The credit splitting model is taking the advantages of both an ISM and DSM model and rolling them into a more efficient way of processing a pension split.  Arguably the most advantageous factor of an ISM model is its ability to bring immediate separation of assets from the spouses.  On the other hand, perhaps the best feature of the DSM model is the ability for the pension to remain in a locked in the pension vehicle.  By not granting immediate access to the pension, and allowing the credits accumulated during the course of the marriage to the valuation date, it is wholly within the spirit of what a pension plan is attempting to achieve by having the credits remain within the plan.  Therefore, by having a credit splitting model which will be encompassed in Bill 133, the non-member spouse will have options as to best proceed with the credits attributed to them.

Section 67.3(1) indicates the criterion that needs to be met prior to any transfer of accumulated pension credits.

A spouse of a member or former member of a pension plan is eligible to apply under this section for an immediate transfer of a lump sum from the plan if all of the following circumstances exist:

1. The spouses are separated and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation.

2. No payment of an installment of the member’s or former member’s pension was due on or before the family law valuation date.

3. A statement of the imputed value, for family law purposes, of the member’s pension benefits or the former member’s deferred pension has been obtained from the administrator under section 67.2.

4. The transfer is provided for by an order made under Part I (Family Property) of the Family Law Act or is authorized under a family arbitration award or domestic contract.

5. In the order, family arbitration award or domestic contract, the amount to be transferred as a lump sum is expressed,

i. as a specified amount, or

ii. as a proportion of the imputed value, for family law purposes, of the member’s pension benefits or the former member’s deferred pension.[30]

Furthermore, s. 67.3(2) places restrictions on where the money can be transferred once it is severed out of the member’s pension.

The eligible spouse may apply, in accordance with the regulations, to the administrator of the plan for any of the following:

1. Transfer of a lump sum from the plan to another pension plan registered under the pension benefits legislation in any jurisdiction in Canada or provided by a government in Canada. This option is available only if the administrator of the other plan agrees to accept the transfer.

2. Transfer of a lump sum from the plan to a prescribed retirement savings arrangement.

3. Transfer of a lump sum to another prescribed arrangement.

4. Implementation of the transfer of a lump sum by leaving it in the plan to the credit of the eligible spouse. This option is available in such circumstances as may be prescribed and only if the administrator agrees to it.[31]

Although the new sections of the PBA have enacted the steps needed to transfer a pension from the member to the non-member spouse.  It appears that all options of transferring out pension credits are to result in them staying in a locked-in retirement savings vehicle.  However, the FLA in conjunction with the PBA has also been updated to reflect a change in pension division.  In instances when an order will be made under s. 67.3 or 67.4, and the non-member spouse is within the criteria listed in s. 10.1(4) of the FLA, the non-member spouse will then be able to have an order granted to unlock the pension credits.  The newly created s. 10.1(4) outlines,

In determining whether to order the immediate transfer of a lump sum out of a pension plan and in determining the amount to be transferred, the court may consider the following matters and such other matters as the court considers appropriate:

1. The nature of the assets available to each spouse at the time of the hearing.

2. The proportion of a spouse’s net family property that consists of the imputed value, for family law purposes, of his or her interest in the pension plan.

3. The liquidity of the lump sum in the hands of the spouse to whom it would be transferred.

4. Any contingent tax liabilities in respect of the lump sum that would be transferred.

5. The resources available to each spouse to meet his or her needs in retirement and the desirability of maintaining those resources.[32]

However, it should be noted when examining the amount that is to be transferred, the PBA clearly limits the amount at a maximum of 50 per cent.[33]  This amount will not change when the new sections come into force.[34]  In addition to the maximum transfer amount of 50 per cent, the Ontario Superior Court held that when a spouse is in arrears for support payments, the non-member spouse may proceed with an action that brings the deficient payments up to date through a transfer of the members remaining pension credits up to a maximum of the remaining 50 per cent.[35]  Despite the availability of 100 per cent of the pensionable credits available to the non-member spouse, it appears as though the member spouse would need to default on their obligation of spousal and or child support payments for an undetermined period of time before the non-member spouse would be able to obtain a order from the court to claim the remaining 50 percent.

Although the option is available for non-member spouses to obtain the member spouse’s full pension, it is quite apparent why a court would hesitate in making such an order.  Pensions are seen as a valuable benefit to employers and employees alike.  The availability of a pension for an employee equates to a safety blanket that will, in many cases, be a person’s primary means of income when they retire.  By ordering the member spouse’s entire pension to be transferred to their former spouse, this could lead to the member spouse becoming destitute upon retirement, or perhaps delay retirement altogether.  In his decision in Bielanski v Bielanski, Justice Gauthier stated,

In Nicholas, the Husband was incarcerated for having attempted to murder the Wife. The Husband had never paid any spousal or child support. As well, the parties had executed Minutes of Settlement which provided that the Husband was to transfer his entire pension for the benefit of his wife, as support and equalization of property.

I am not prepared to deprive him of 100% of what will likely be his only source of income, other than Canada Pension Plan.[36]

It should also be noted that after an order under s. 67.3 or s. 67.4 of the PBA, if the non-member spouse did not meet the criteria as established by s. 10.1(4) of the FLA, the non-member spouse is not without options.  If the non-member spouse was facing financial difficulties, they could apply to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”) to have their pensionable credits unlocked through a financial hardship application.[37]  It should be noted that this application does not give an administrator of a pension the ability to release the pensionable credits to the FSCO.  If the non-member spouse had chosen to create a de novo pension within the member’s pension, they would first need to transfer out their existing credits to a locked-in retirement savings vehicle, then proceed with the application to FSCO.

Through the enactment of Bill 133, it is apparent the Ontario government is sending a clear message that credit splitting as enacted by s. 67.3 and 67.4 of the PBA is the preferred model for pension division in family law matters.  Although this apparent hybrid method of pension equalization has yet to be fully tested by the courts, I would suggest with the availability of the best of both the ISM and DSM models, that the credit splitting approach will deliver the most equitable remedy for both members and non-members alike.

Common-Law Exclusion

The last 25 years have seen many changes that may have once thought to be inconceivable only a few generations ago.  Arguably, some of the changes, such as same-sex marriage rights and shopping on Sunday, have come about as a direct result of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[38]  Despite these steps forward, the changes of Bill 133 is leaving one large gap in the division of assets.  I would suggest the legislators should have made provisions for non-member common-law spouses to have a presumption to transfer pensionable credits accumulated during the course of the relationship following a relationship breakdown.

However, before this could have been added into the possibilities of being added into Bill 133, an examination of the current legislation needs to be undertaken.  Part I of the FLA examines the division of family property.  Looking at s. 1(1) of the FLA, it will be noted that spouse is,

either of two persons who,

(a) are married to each other, or

(b) have together entered into a marriage that is voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any right.[39]

It should be further noted, that Part III of the FLA examines support obligations between spouses.  In s. 29, the definition of spouse as noted in s. 1(1) of the FLA is expanded upon to include, first, continuously for a period of not less than three years, or second, in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.[40]  It is this added portion of the definition “spouse” which give rise to what is known as a common-law marriage.  However, because this definition resides wholly within Part III of the FLA which deals with support obligations, it is inconsistent with Part I, which deals family property issues.  Additionally, an examination of the PBA adds another variable into the foray.  Section 1(1) of the PBA indicates the definition of spouse as,

means either of two persons who,

(a) are married to each other, or

(b) are not married to each other and are living together in a conjugal relationship,

(i) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or

(ii) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child, both as defined in the Family Law Act; (“conjoint”).[41]

It will be noticed that this definition is consistent with s. 29 of the FLA.  Additionally, in the newly created s. 67.1(1), spouse will also be consistent with s. 29 of the FLA.[42]  Therefore, the conflict between common-law spouses and the equalization of net family property remains.  In the defining piece of jurisprudence of Wylie v Leclair,[43] at trial Justice Lafrance-Cardinal stated,

In the Province of Ontario, the Family Law Act does not give equal standing to common law spouses when it comes to property accumulated during the years of cohabitation. The Act does not talk of an equalization of net family properties, common law relationships are not viewed as partnerships as stated in the preamble of the Act.

It is worth noting that our society has evolved drastically in the last decade. We now talk of same sex benefits, of same sex spouses being able to bring a claim for spousal support, of same sex spouses being able to adopt children. The Income Tax Act, a federal statute, treats common law spouses in the same manner as married spouses. They are deemed common law if they have been living together for at least twelve continuous months. Common law spouses are subject to the same income tax rules as married spouses ie: — designation of principal residence, attribution rules, equivalent-to-spouse tax credit.

With respect to spousal support, the law does not treat a common law relationship any differently than a marital relationship except that you must have cohabitated continuously for a period of not less than 3 years before you can bring such a claim. (S. 29 of the Family Law Act)

However, with regards to property issues and long term common law relationships Parliament has not kept up with the times. Common law spouses have been accepted in our society as spouses. Politicians may have a political future even though they may be divorced and now live in a common law relationship. In most cases common law relationships, to the outsider looking in, have the same attributes as those relationships commenced with marital vows. There are two income families, two car garages, PTA meetings, car pooling, mortgages, pooling of incomes. However, at separation, common law spouses do not have the protection of the Family Law Act. The preamble of the Family Law Act does not protect them as it speaks of recognizing marriage as a form of partnership. If the assets are in one spouse’s name, the other spouse must prove their claim, their contribution, their entitlement. Parliament will have to address this lacuna, in the interim however, the trial judges will have to continue interpreting the common law spouses intentions and will have to inspect their investments, their accumulated wealth, their enrichment, their corresponding deprivation with a fine tooth comb.[44]

Despite Justice Lafrance-Cardinal’s strong wording toward equality for common-law spouses, much of what she indicated has been taken as nothing more than obiter.  In hearing the appeal of Wylie, Justice MacPherson for the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, “[a]ccordingly, there is no presumption that the net family property of common law spouses should be equalized upon breakdown of the relationship.”[45]

While there is no presumption of equalization in common-law relationships, there are instances where common-law relationships do qualify for a division of assets.  When common-law spouses separate, the division of their assets is only rendered where it is found that the couple engaged in a joint family venture.[46]  “In undertaking this analysis, it may be helpful to consider the evidence under four main headings: mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent and priority of the family.”[47]  In addition to a joint family venture, it also must be established that one of the spouses was unjustly enriched.  In examining the scope of unjust enrichment, Justice Hourigan in Holloway v Devenish,[48] quoted the seminal case of Peter v Bedlow,[49] “[a]n action for unjust enrichment arises when three elements are satisfied: (1) an enrichment; (2) a correspondent deprivation; and (3) the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.”[50]  If it established that one of the spouses has been unjustly enriched, they may then seek an order to have their interest in the property placed in a constructive trust.  This is opposed to a resulting trust, which is a presumption that the non-titled owner has a share in the property based on that person’s contribution to acquiring or maintaining the property.

Despite the availability of asset equalization by way of a resulting or constructive trust for common-law spouses, the courts have been very hesitant to order interest in the member’s pension.  I would suggest this is where Bill 133 misses an opportunity for equality.  In 2003, the historic case of Halpern v Canada[51] was decided in Ontario’s highest court, granting the right to marry for same-sex couples.  Yet in 2011, the only distinguishing feature between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, versus that of FLA or PBA defined common-law couples appears to be a marriage certificate.  The Ontario Human Rights Code outlines a number of prohibited grounds for discrimination in s. 1 as, “[e]very person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or disability [emphasis is my own].[52]  Going further, the HRC defines services as “not including, a levy, fee, tax or periodic payment imposed by law.”[53]  As such, I would suggest the act of obtaining a marriage license from authorized body is considered a service performed by the government.  In addition to the violation under the HRC, I would further suggest by making the distinction between married spouses and common-law spouses there are further implications with respect to s. 15 of the Charter which would not be upheld by s. 1 of the Charter.

Moving away from the general topic of common-law property rights, and toward the specific topic of pension division, the highlights of Bill 133 in relation to common-law spouses and pension division is summed up by a FSCO publication,

[u]nder the Ontario Family Law Act (FLA), the value of married spouses’ pension assets must be included in family property for purposes of the calculation and division of net family property.  However, there is no requirement under the FLA for common-law spouses to divide net family property (including the value of any pension assets) on breakdown of their spousal relationship. This will not change when the new rules come into effect.[54]

 

This succinctly outlines the inequality in which common-law spouses will continue to face.  Although Bill 133 does bring about a number of advantages to the PBA and FLA, it falls short in addressing property rights for common-law spouses.  In British Columbia, the government is also preparing for a legislative update.  However, I would suggest the update to the Family Relations Act[55] will step much further toward equality for common-law spouses.  The update to the FRA expected to commence on the road to parliamentary approval in 2011,[56] will provide common-law spouses with the same rights to property law and pension division that married couples currently enjoy.[57]  When Bill 133 comes into force it will not change current system, if a common-law spouse wants access to the non-member spouse’s pension during the division of assets, they must have obtained written consent from that member spouse.[58]  In the instance where written consent was not provided, it is likely that the non-member spouse will not be granted access to the pension, however, eligible assets can otherwise be divided up by the courts.  Whereas in British Columbia, “[t]he draft blueprint for reform recommends a raft of measures aimed at improving family law in line with the province’s new overarching philosophy that familial disputes are usually best handled outside court.”[59]  As a result, the draft changes will now include “[m]arital property division will be extended to common-law spouses who have lived together for two years in a marriage-like relationship, or who are in a marriage-like relationship of some permanence and have children together.”[60]

Despite the changes Ontario has made to the FLA, I would suggest, they did not go far enough.  As renowned family law critic and editor of the Reports on Family Law, Phillip Epstein, has indicated, “many other jurisdictions, including Ontario, could learn from British Columbia’s efforts.”[61]  In the end, the choice not to go through the marriage process either in a religious institution or a civil ceremony is a highly personal decision.  It is a decision that could be wrought with many factors, but it should not be a decision, upon meeting the statutory definition of spouse, that prevents the couple from receiving all the rights and benefits that are enjoyed by married spouses both during the marriage and during the marriage breakdown.

Pension Valuation

When Bill 133 comes into force, perhaps one of the most significant changes with respect for pension reform for defined benefit plans will encompass how valuation is conducted.  In an attempt to regulate the valuation of pension credits during a marriage breakdown, the PBA through O.Reg 287/11 given force by s. 67.2 of the draft legislation will provide for a specific set of formulas that the plan administrator will calculate to determine an imputed value for the pension.[62]  In other words, “Bill 133 changes this system in two significant ways.  First, it requires the valuation to be done according to a formula that is prescribed by regulation; second, it requires the valuation to be carried out by the administrator of the pension plan.”[63]  Despite the reforms provided by Bill 133, there is a concern that needs to be addressed.  This concern is whether the new rigid formulas, as prescribed by the regulations, will result in a fair evaluation of pension calculations

In its current state, “an actuarial valuation report prepared by the plan actuary is the key to identifying the employer’s required contributions, both with respect to the normal cost for funding the benefits as well as any special payments required to fund an unfunded liability or solvency deficiency.”[64]  As such, the courts and the Law Commission of Ontario (“LCO”) have identified three methods for valuating a defined benefit pension plan.  The first method, known as the retirement method involves calculating,

the present value of a pension’s future income stream based on the assumption that the employee will continue in employment – and accrue pension credits – until retirement.  The pension’s value is calculated using estimates of the employee’s projected salary, benefits, and service at the assumed retirement date.[65]

In contrast, the termination method,

calculates the value of a pension’s future income stream by deeming the employee to have terminated employment and plan membership on the valuation date…  An employee’s actual salary and years of pensionable service, as of the valuation date, are used to calculate the pension benefit to which the employee would be entitled on retirement.  Future contingencies, such as salary increases, years of service, and plan improvements, are generally not taken into account.[66]

The final valuation method appears to be a hybrid between the termination and retirement.  The hybrid termination-retirement method,

…combines elements of both the termination method (in that termination at the valuation date is assumed in order to determine the amount of the accrued pension benefit) and the retirement method (in that inflation is recognized where the plan is indexed and continued employment is assumed for purposes of eventual eligibility to take early retirement on an unreduced pension).[67]

It appears, when looking at the valuation methods in Ontario courts that “…the termination method seems generally to have found much more favour than the retirement method…”[68] for two main reasons.  First,

by projecting salary levels and service credits that might be earned after the valuation date, the retirement method gives the non-member spouse the “fruits” of the member spouse’s post-separation labours and is therefore in conflict with the FLA requirement that value be determined as of the valuation date.[69]

Second, is

…its highly speculative nature, resulting from the fact that it requires the making of assumptions as to what the member spouse’s salary and service credits will be and what plan improvements will have been made by the time he does retire.[70]

Despite the pension valuation problems the LCO outlines in their analysis of Bill 133, they do not commit to one method to move forward with into the future.  The reforms of Bill 133, and the formulaic methods to valuate pensions are designed, in part, to eliminate the debate between duelling actuarial valuations.  However, I would suggest this method fails for a number of reasons.

First, the reforms of Bill 133 remove the availability to examine individual instances that falls outside the general provisions as accounted for in the Regulations.  Because many defined benefit contribution pensions work similar to RRSP or savings accounts, individual circumstances may effect the date of retirement for the member spouse are not taken into account.  Rather, multiple formulas are provided which give plan administrators varying time ranges as to determine the pension value.  “…[P]ension provisions in Bill 133 include the elimination of flexibility in valuation of pensions.  Currently, lawyers and judges can consider special circumstances such as a plan member’s shortened life expectancy…”[71] when determining the value of the member spouse’s pension.  This falls short for the obvious reason that it ignores the individual circumstances of each member and eliminates discretion within the process.

Second, although the overall aim of Bill 133 is to reduce the amount of litigation in marriage breakdowns,[72] by placing the valuation squarely in the hands of pension administrators, the government has effectively taken the valuation process out of the hands of experts and placed it into those of generalists.  Actuaries in Canada are a regulated profession, overseen by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries.  There are regulations and rules of professional conduct, similar to that of lawyers, and tribunals are conducted in accordance with the principles of administrative law.[73]  There is no such regulating body for pension administrators.  As such, for example, should a non-member spouse commence an action where there are allegations of negligence or professional misconduct, the actuary would be covered by their personal or professional indemnity insurance.  Whereas in the case of the pension administrator, should the same circumstances take place, and an action was launched against the pension administrator, it is ultimately the entire pension, and subsequently, the plan members who may bare the cost of the administrator’s error.

Third, the rigid formulas only provide a pre-tax valuation figure.  Although plan administrators will be able to determine plan figures, their responsibility will end there.  Many assets, such as a house are determined on an after tax basis.  To determine the tax implications, a member or former spouse of the member will still need to contact an actuary to determine the relevant tax implications after the valuation figure has been assessed.

As such, plan members will likely require an outside actuary to estimate a tax rate in each case, which would defeat the simplicity intention of the bill and will entail additional costs.  When combined with the fees charged by plan administrators, the actual cost to the plan member could increase in comparison with current practice.[74]

A final example of how a rigid formula may fail the member and non-member alike arises in the instance where a pension plan becomes or is likely to become insolvent.

If the non-member obtains 50% of the imputed value by a transfer to a retirement vehicle, and if the pension loses 30% of the imputed value, the member will be left with 20% of the imputed value.

If the pension goes down in value after V-Day [valuation day] because it is underfunded or insolvent:

(a) What decline post V-Day is required to trigger section under 5(6) FLA for an unequal division;

(b) How will the court adjust the pension division or EP [equalization payment] as a result;

(c) What if there is an order for a transfer of 50% of the imputed value but the pension has declined to less than 50% of the imputed value?[75]

It is individual circumstances such as these where the rigid calculations of the Regulations can lead to an inequitable result.  Where the value of the member’s pension has decreased by such a dramatic amount after the valuation has been determined, the only recourse for the member is to bring an action under s. 5(6) of the FLA.  In this instance, the member spouse would be seeking a re-equalization of the pension funds to equate for the loss or potential loss that they occurred when the pension’s solvency liabilities outweighed their solvency assets.[76]  Although there is recourse under the FLA, if there was more flexibility in the valuation of the plan, such considerations could be taken into account.

Although there are concerns with placing the valuation of the pension in the hands of pension administrators, I would suggest that despite its shortcoming, improvements have been made.  Section 22 of O/Reg 287/11 is a step in the right direction toward providing a fair and equitable valuation of the pension.  By allowing for two valuation dates, Bill 133 can take steps toward tackling issues when there is a discrepancy between the values on each date.

Conclusion

When, then Attorney General Chris Bentley announced the changes that would encompass Bill 133 many thought it would be a big step into the future.  Pundits have been calling for change since the seminal case of Nantais v Nantais.[77]  In commencing the analysis Justice Brockenshire stated,

I commence my analysis by adding my own voice to the concerns raised by Justice Granger, Professor McLeod, and Catherine Aitken, that this whole very difficult area could and should be dealt with by Parliament and the provincial legislatures passing comprehensive pension legislation providing for the actual division of pensions on the breakdown of family relationships.[78]

Although the scope of changes for Bill 133 goes far beyond the realm of marriage breakdown and pension law, I would suggest that Bill 133 could have gone further to eliminate some of the issues addressed in this paper.

First, the traditional use of an ISM or DSM method for dividing a pension during a marriage breakdown can prove to be problematic.  Although, on its face, an ISM does have an immediate result by allowing the non-member spouse access to the pension credits immediately, there can be valuation issues that can lead to an inequitable result.  By transferring the result out of the member spouse’s plan immediately, there is a significant amount of built up credit that will be lost when the credits are transferred to another locked-in savings vehicle.  As with any plan where interest in accrued, the more money that is invested in the vehicle, the higher the return will be.  By allowing a non-member spouse to take from the plan, it will reduce the overall amount they otherwise would have obtained.  Oppositely, in a DSM model, by forcing the non-member spouse to wait and see, the courts have bound the couple together when the very thing that brought them before the courts is a desire to separate.  Thus, I would suggest a credit splitting or hybrid model between an ISM and DSM model is the most appropriate method to proceed with pension splitting.  By having the pension remain in its original location, yet completely controlled by the plan administrators allow the necessary autonomy for them should they require access to the funds in the future.

Second, Bill 133 had the opportunity to bring equality in an area that is far overdue for such treatment.  By not having the same equality rights for common-law spouses that married couples enjoy, I would suggest strikes to the very heart of the HRC and s. 15 of the Charter.  Coincidentally enough, the British Columbia government is planning on updating its FRA and in its intended changes, will be an inclusive set of property rights for common-law spouses.

Third, much of the debate surrounding Bill 133 appears to be stemming from the formulaic valuation the Regulations are providing to the PBA.  Although there are numerous actuarial interest groups pushing their message, I would suggest a rigid formula to calculate certain pensions is problematic.  By not taking into account individual circumstances and potential insolvency issues of plans, the strict formula may lead to inequitable results for members and non-members alike.

Consequently, although there are numerous arguments to be had on either side of the debate surrounding Bill 133 coming into force, I would suggest the improvement made to streamline the amount of litigation involving pensions in family breakdowns does not go far enough and will ultimately lead to inequitable results for both member and non-member spouses.

 


[1] Ben Hovius & Mary-Jo Maur, Hovius On Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2009) [Hovius].

[2] Ibid.

[3] RSO 1990, Chapter F3 [FLA].

[4] RSO 1990, Chapter P8 [PBA].

[5] Bill 133, An Act to amend various Acts in relation to certain family law matters and to repeal the Domestic Violence Protection Act, 2000, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, Ontario, 2009 (assented to 14 May 2009), SO 2009 C11 [Bill 133].

[6] George Carson & Vanessa Lam, “Payment Issues: How Equalization Will Be Effected”, (05 October 2011) 2 online: Ontario Bar Association <http://www.oba.org/en/pdf/sec_news_fam_nov11_a2_Carson&Lam_Tab5.pdf&gt;

[7] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 67.3(1).

[8] FLA, supra note 3 at s. 4.

[9] Best v Best, [1999] 2 SCR 868 at 107 [Best].

[10] John D. Gregory, “A New Era in Pension Division: Bill 133 and its Draft Regulation”, Legislative Comment on Bill 133 (2011) Law Society of Upper Canada [Gregory].

[11] Boston v Boston, [2001] 2 SCR 413 at 50 (Boston).

[12] Ari N. Kaplan, Pension Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) at 306-307 [Kaplan].

[13] Ibid at 295; PBA, supra note 4 at s. 48(3), 48(14), 48(14.2).

[14] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 48(13).

[15] The valuation date is the date where the decision, made either by one or both spouses, that there was no hope of reconciliation for the marriage.  This is a critical date for determining the net family property of each spouse.

[16] Carrigan v Quinn, [2011] OJ No 559 at 69 [Carrigan].

[17] Ibid at 72.

[18] Best, supra note 9 at 111.

[19] Gregory, supra note 10 at 25.

[20] Kaplan, supra note 12 at 307.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid; Boston, supra note 11 at 49; Best, supra note 9 at 113.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid at 308.

[25] Ibid at 309.

[26] Carrigan, supra note 14 at 77.

[27] Boston, supra note 11 at 108.

[28] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 67.1-67.6.

[29] Kaplan, supra note 12 at 309.

[30] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 67.3(1)

[31] Ibid at s. 67.3(2).

[32] FLA, supra note 3 at s. 10.1(4)

[33] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 51(1)-(2).

[34] Ibid at s. 67.3(6).

[35] Ibid at s. 66(4); Nicholas v Nicholas, (1998) 37 RFL (4th) 13 at 15 [Nicholas]; Gauthier v Gauthier, [2003] OC No 2098 at 17 [Gauthier].

[36] [2005] OJ No 2171 at 23,25; Nicholas, supra 34 at 15.

[37] Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Pension Unlocking, online: Financial Services Commission of Ontario <http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/financial_hardship/Pages/default.aspx&gt;.

 

[38] Part I of the constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

[39] FLA, supra note 3 at s. 1(1).

[40] Ibid at s. 29.

[41] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 1(1).

[42] Ibid at s. 67.1(1).

[43] [2003] OJ No 1560 [Wylie].

[44] Ibid at 21-24.

[45] Ibid at 18.

[46] Kerr v Baranow, [2011] 1 SCR 269 at 87 [Kerr].

[47] Ibid at 89.

[48] [2009] OJ No 5008 [Holloway].

[49] 1993 CanLII 126 [Peter].

[50] Kerr, supra note 46 at 50.

[51] [2003] OJ No 2268 [Halpern].

[52] RSO 1990, Chapter H 19 [HRC].

[53] Ibid at s. 10(1).

[54] Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Marriage Breakdown FAQs, online: Financial Services Commission of Ontario <http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/Family-Law/Pages/marriage_breakdown_faqs.aspx&gt;.

[55] [RSBC 1996] Chapter 128 [FRA].

[56] Cristin Schmitz, “B.C. Poised for a Major Family Law Overhaul”, The Lawyer’s Weekly (10 September 2010) online: The Lawyer’s Weekly <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1243&gt; [Schmitz].

[57] Ibid.

[58] FLA, supra note 3 at s. 53(1).

[59] Schmitz, supra note 56.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] PBA, supra note 4 at s. 67.2; O Reg 287/11.

[63] Gregory, supra note 10 at 7-5.

[64] Kaplan, supra note 12 at 411.

[65] Ibid at 305.

[66] Hovius, supra note 1 at 368.

[67] Law Commission of Ontario, “Division of Pensions Upon Marriage Breakdown Final Paper – January 2009”, Legislative Comment on Bill 133, online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/pensions-final-paper-sectionIV subsection C>.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Hovius, supra note 1 at 368.

[72] David Wolgelerenter, “Pension Valuation & Bill 133”, Legislative Comment on Bill 133 (2011) [Wolgelerenter].

[73] Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “Discipline”, online: Canadian Institute of Actuaries <http://www.actuaries.ca/about/discipline/discipline_e.cfm&gt;; Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “What We Do”, online: Canadian Institute of Actuaries <http://www.actuaries.ca/about/what_we_do_e.cfm&gt;.

[74] Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “What We Do”, online: Canadian Institute of Actuaries <http://www.actuaries.ca/about/what_we_do_e.cfm&gt;.

[75] Law Society of Upper Canada, “Six-Minute Family Lawyer 2009”, Legislative Comment on Bill 133, (2009) 4-3.

[76] Kaplan, supra note 12 at 412.

[77] [1995] OJ No 3272.

[78] Ibid at 24.





M E M O R A N D U M – Drug Testing in the Workplace

10 10 2011

M E M O R A N D U M – Drug Testing in the Workplace

By: Ryan Venables

2011 April 01

Introduction

As technology advances, so do the risks associated with operating ever-growing technological workplaces.  Whether it is operating heavy machinery on a construction site, acting in the course of your duties as a police officer or firefighter, or operating Canada’s largest and busiest airport, one thing remains the same; the risks associated with all of these jobs are only compounded by the consumption of alcohol and drugs.

In Ontario there are a number of statutes that oversee occupational health and safety of the worker with an aim of protecting the worker against various sorts of wrongs.  These include the Occupational Health and Safety Act,[1] the Employment Standards Act,[2] the Labour Relations Act,[3] and the Human Rights Code.[4]  These acts all deal with complicated workplace matters for both employer and employees.  Additionally, the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Act[5] provides guidance if a worker has been injured on the job, in addition to ensuring compliance by the employer.

As indicated, as technology has become more advanced, as to have the risks of workplace injury and death.  Combining these risks with the careless and at times flagrant use drugs and alcohol has prompted many employers to enact policy surrounding drug and alcohol testing.  Since the pivotal case of Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2537 v KVP Co. Ltd.,[6] drug and alcohol policy and its implementation has constituted a reasonable exercise of management rights.  This has progressed from a mere right of the employer, to an entrenched collective agreement standard, where often refusal to submit to drug and alcohol testing post-accident, results in a reverse onus situation for the employee to prove otherwise to show they were not under the influence of drugs and or alcohol.[7]

As a result of such testing protocol, there are often a number of issues that need to be analysed following an accident in a safety-sensitive workplace.  This paper will examine the post accident scenario from four angles.  First, does post-accident drug testing in safety-sensitive workplaces violate the HRC?  Second, what is the standard to demand a worker submit to drug and or alcohol testing?  Third, following a positive test result of a drug and or alcohol test, what is the standard the employer held to in order to accommodate any disability the employee may have pursuant to s. 5 of the HRC?  Fourth, following an accident, the effectiveness of the various methods of drug and or alcohol testing to determine current impairment and their potential implications on any proceedings against an accused worker.

Summary of Conclusions

Through an analysis of the above areas, this paper will show drug and or alcohol testing in safety-sensitive workplaces is a necessary requirement for four reasons.  First, post-accident drug testing does not violate the HRC provided it is in accordance with the principles of the established jurisprudence.  Second, the standard to demand a worker to submit to a drug and or alcohol test is reasonable and probable grounds or analogous wording.  Third, following a positive test, an employer has a duty to accommodate an employee to a level that falls shy of undue hardship on the employer.  Fourth, following an accident, the most effective testing methods to detect impairment for alcohol are visual cues or a breathalyser test, and for drugs, it is through a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”).

Analysis

1. Does post-accident testing violate the Ontario HRC?

Accidents occur every day in Ontario workplaces.  The difference between many of them lies in the risk of another accident occurring, the severity of the accident, the injuries to employees or others, and the nature of the position.  However, for some workplaces, it has become established following an accident of a specified severity, when certain factors are met, the worker who caused the accident may be required to submit to a drug and or alcohol test to rule out impairment as a cause of the accident.  I am in agreement with the current state of the law, insofar as testing a worker in a post-accident situation, so long as it is in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, and is not prima facie discriminatory.

In order to determine whether a post-accident test would violate the HRC, a number of conditions need to be ascertained.  Although many tribunals and courts have upheld the legitimacy of drug and alcohol testing on workers in a post-accident situation, this only transpires after the accident has occurred and has met certain criteria.  We must examine a number of key factors before any post-accident testing analysis can proceed.  First, what is an accident?  In Sterling Cranes, Arbitrator Jesin outlined “an accident or incident that has occurred and where such accident either had resulted in, or has had the potential to result in serious injury or death, or in serious and extensive harm to property…”[8]  In Sterling Cranes, although there was no serious injury or death, an accident did occur when the operator of a large crane came into contact with power lines causing a power outage to the surrounding areas for a period of time.[9]  The second area that needs to be looked at is whether the accident was in a safety-sensitive area?  In Greater Toronto Airports Authority v Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 0004,[10] a safety-sensitive area was defined as,

…those in which individuals, who may work independently for varying or extended periods of time, have a key and direct role in an operation where impaired performance could result in (i) a significant accident or incident affecting the health or safety of employees, others working at the airport, customers, the public or the environment, or (ii) an inadequate response to an emergency or operational situation.[11]

The Canadian Human Rights Commission policy on alcohol and drug testing also defines safety-sensitive as,

one in which incapacity due to drug or alcohol impairment could result in direct and significant risk of injury to the employee, others or the environment. Whether a job can be categorized as safety-sensitive must be considered within the context of the industry, the particular workplace, and an employee’s direct involvement in a high-risk operation. Any definition must take into account the role of properly trained supervisors and the checks and balances present in the workplace.[12]

Moving forward from these two definitions, we can begin to understand whether post-accident testing violates any Ontario statutes.  Often the most contentious statute is the HRC.  Employees who have been issued a demand for an alcohol and or drug test often use s. 5(1) of the HRC as a shield to the test claiming a disability.[13]  A drug and or alcohol test is prima facie a violation of a person’s human right’s as defined by the HRC.[14]  It is noted in s. 5(1) that “every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.”[15]  In order to determine whether a drug and or alcohol addiction fits within the definition of s. 5(1), we can examine the meaning of disability more in depth.  A handicap or disability has been defined in Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd.[16] as “an illness, injury or disfigurement that creates a physical or mental impairment and thereby interferes with a person’s physical, psychological and/or social functioning.”[17] The disability or impairment can be temporary, long lasting, or permanent.  It may be an actual disability or something that is only perceived as a disability in the eyes of others, or even an impairment that no longer exists.[18] Alcoholism or drug addictions, for example, are viewed as disabilities.[19]  As such, they fall under the protection of the HRC.

 

The court in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union[20] (Meiorin Grievance), looked at the protection given under the British Columbia Human Rights Code[21] and outlined principles on when discrimination is acceptable through employment.  The Supreme Court of Canada clarified and limited the amount that both the employer and employee could rely on the HRC as a sword or shied.[22]  In the decision, the court outlined a three-part test to justify whether discriminating against a person can be held as reasonable.  If the discriminatory behaviour is able to pass all three parts of the test, it will be held that it is a bona fide occupational requirement, and the discriminatory behaviour will stand.[23]  The test outlined the following,

  1. That the standard was adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;

 

  1. That the standard was adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and

 

  1. That the standard was reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that legitimate work-related purpose.  In order to fulfil this last criterion, an employer would also be required to show that it was impossible to accommodate the individual employee(s) without imposing undue hardship on the employer.[24]

When evaluating Ms. Meiorin’s complaint through the application of the three-part test, they were able to conclude that the rule establishing a set standard for cardiovascular exercise for fire fighters was prima facie discriminatory.  As a result, they reinstated her to her former position.

Like Meiorin, in other recent cases, the union launches a grievance on behalf of an employee because of a policy enacted by the employer.  In Entrop, the court held not promoting or hiring an employee to a safety-sensitive position is not prima facie discriminatory if certain criteria are met.[25]  In his decision Laskin, J.A. (as he was then) indicated,

I would set aside the Board’s conclusion that random alcohol testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions violates the Code, and in its place I would hold that such testing is a BFOR provided the sanction for an employee testing positive is tailored to the employee’s circumstances.”[26]

However, the more recent decision in GTAA went against the Court of Appeal finding in Entrop.  In her decision, Arbitrator Devlin indicated,

under the GTAA’s policy, a positive drug test results in automatic denial of a safety-sensitive position and, in this respect, the provision is overly broad and cannot be regarded as a BFOR. Denying a safety-sensitive position to any employee who tests positive is inconsistent with the GTAA’s duty to accommodate.[27]

Although the consensus with the courts is not perfect, there are various factual issues which differentiate the cases and can be the cause for dissenting decisions.

In order to delve further into whether there is a potential violation, we turn to KVP to determine whether a worker’s refusal to submit to a post-accident drug and or alcohol test is considered a violation of the collective agreement.  According to the ruling in KVP, the breach of a rule introduced unilaterally by the employer can only be acted upon and give just cause for discipline if the rule meets the following criteria:

1. It must not be inconsistent with the collective agreement.

2. It must not be unreasonable.

3. It must be clear and unequivocal.

4. It must be brought to the attention of the employee affected before the company can act on it.

5. The employee concerned must have been notified that a breach of such rule could result in his discharge if the rule is used as a foundation for discharge.

6. Such rule should have been consistently enforced by the company from the time it was introduced.[28]

Furthermore,

although the employer must satisfy all of these requirements, many awards turn on the arbitrator’s assessment of the reasonableness of the rule in question. Whether or not a rule is found to be reasonable generally depends on whether the employer is able to establish that it promotes health and safety in the workplace or advances legitimate business interests.[29]

Through an examination of the factors that make up a potential s. 5(1) claim under the HRC, what is clear, is any potential grievances by a worker or union will be fact driven, and the grievance will need to be tested against the policy of the employer, collective agreement, and corresponding jurisprudence.  This was the case in Trimac Transportation Services - Bulk Systems v Transportation Communications Union Crane,[30] where Arbitrator Burkett indicated,

it is accepted that management will make rules and issue policies that are necessary to the achievement of its business objectives, subject to the right of the union to challenge these rules as not meeting the test of just cause if they are not reasonably related to the achievement of legitimate business objectives or as otherwise contrary to the terms of the collective agreement. There is not a single case of which I am aware that has found that rules relating to the safe operation of the workplace are not within the authority of management under its general right to manage. Indeed, in all cases dealing with drug and alcohol testing cited herein, this is taken as a given.[31]

As a result of the current jurisprudence in this area, taken in conjunction with the relevant facts and policies, I would submit an employer’s demand for analysis to determine whether an employee is impaired post-accident is in compliance with the HRC.  When there is an accident in a prescribed safety-sensitive area, and the criteria is met that warrants a drug and or alcohol test, I am in agreement with the courts in Entrop who have spoken clearly by outlining an employer’s right to test post-accident is intra vires the HRC.

2. What are reasonable and probable grounds post-accident?

In a post-accident situation in a designated safety-sensitive workplace, the courts have permitted the employer to demand that an employee submit to a drug and or alcohol test where the accident is of a certain level.[32]  The Criminal Code of Canada[33] demands officers have reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest or to demand a sample of an accused’s alcohol in instances when impairment is suspected.[34]  At times in unionized environments, employees are told to “obey now and grieve later”[35] in order to avoid immediate sanction by the employer.  However, I would submit those who are seeking to have the employee consent to the testing at the time, and grieve later need to have evidence to support the demand on a scale analogous to reasonable and probable grounds.

Although current jurisprudence permits testing of employees in post-accident situations, I struggle with the identification of grounds needed and who can demand a test of an employee in such a situation.  In United Transportation Union v Canadian National Railway Co. (Keeping Grievance),[36] Aribitrator Picher, commenting on post-accident testing by the employer he stated,

…the right that an employer may have to demand that its employees be subjected to a drug test is a singular and limited exception to the right of freedom from physical intrusion to which employees are generally entitled by law. As such it must be used judiciously, and only with demonstrable justification, based on reasonable and probable grounds.[37]

In another case, Arbitrator Brent in Re: Provincial-American Truck Transporters and Teamsters Union, Loc. 880[38] outlined a two-part test for drug and or alcohol testing following an accident that was reiterated in Sterling Crane.

She concluded that drug testing would be within management’s rights if reasonable cause to demand the test existed. But for universal testing to be sustained, an employer would have to first prove that there was a drug and alcohol problem in the workplace and then prove that lesser non-invasive tests were not effective in solving the problem.[39]

In a third case, Arbitrator Jolliffe in United Assn. of Journeyman and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 663 v Mechanical Contractors Assn. of Sarnia (Drug and Alcohol Policy Grievance)[40] commented on the policy of testing simply on the basis the accident occurred with no other reason gives rise to the suspicion of drug and or alcohol use.  “[The policies] are acceptable where an incident/accident has occurred where there is cause to suspect alcohol or drug use by reason of the occurrence itself, observations and surrounding circumstances, and in such case testing should be done as soon as possible.”[41]  I would respectfully disagree with the beginning part of this statement, and would suggest conducting a test because the accident has occurred is fundamentally contradictory to other decisions where it has been held there needs to be reasonable and probable grounds, or grounds analogous in order to make a demand.

 

In addition to the reasonable grounds needed in order to conduct a test, the Mechanical Contractors case lacks a clear definition of what grounds are considered reasonable in order to test, and it does not outline who can evaluate the potential symptoms needed in order to make a decision to order an employee to submit to a test.  Further to this, in Sterling Crane, the company stated, “a supervisor of an employee must request an employee to submit to an alcohol and drug test if the supervisor and the next level of management at the company cannot reasonably eliminate alcohol or drugs as a contributing factor.”[42]  Looking further at the policy, reasonable grounds is defined as but not limited to,

  1. Odour of alcohol;
  2. Slurred speech;
  3. “Groggy” or disoriented behaviour;
  4. Glassy eyes,
  5. Flushed face;
  6. Unsteadiness in standing, walking, etc.;
  7. Acting in a suspicious or unusual manner;
  8. Explained inability to correct a chronic job performance or behaviour problem;
  9. Excessive sick leave or suspicious patterns of sick leaves;
  10. Involvement in a post rehabilitation program.***26

 

I would suggest that many of these signs and symptoms of intoxication are what would be considered as classic symptoms, however, what I fail to note, is how an employee can be forced to submit to a test if none of these signs or symptoms are present in a post-accident situation.  Again, in Sterling Crane the facts of the case indicate the employer had no grounds to believe the worker was impaired other than the fact the incident occurred.  After a worker, who had a clean accident record and 19 years experience refused to submit for a drug and or alcohol test he was suspended.  I would submit the employer did not have a right to enforce such a suspension and Arbitrator Jesin agreed.  In his decision, the Arbitrator reaffirmed the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Imperial Oil Ltd. v CEP Local 900[43] by indicating a policy, which purports to test an employee in a post-accident situation, must be bound by reasonable cause.[44]

Although reasonable cause or reasonable and probable grounds are an extremely important aspect of the testing procedure, I submit, the most important part of the process in determining whether to demand a sample from an employee comes from the observations of the person who makes the demand.  If a person happened to be involved in a motor vehicle collision and it is suspected that alcohol may be involved, the only person who can demand a sample of your breath and or blood is a police officer.[45]  This however, is not the case following a workplace accident.  As outlined in the employer’s policy in Sterling Crane in order to receive permission for a demand for sample, the worker’s immediate supervisor needs to have formed reasonable grounds and this needs to be cleared with their immediate supervisor.[46]  Although this was obtained, the employer conceded in cross-examination that the grievor did not exhibit any noticeable signs of impairment during the investigation.  It was also established that the employer was not trained to observe signs of impairment.[47]  Furthermore, the tribunal heard,

the evidence also confirmed that individuals can be trained to observe signs of impairment. Studies dealing with police officers were referenced showing that officers were able to assess impairment with an accuracy rate of between 75% and 95%, depending on the number of factors that were observed.[48]

I would suggest these percentages are extremely important in a post-accident situation.  Police officers in Ontario (not RCMP members) attend the Ontario Police College and receive specific training with respect to observing signs of impairment in people who are operating a motor vehicle as well as in other situations.[49]  I would argue most supervisors in safety-sensitive workplaces do not have the same level knowledge or skill to recognize physical symptoms of impairment to the standard necessary to intrude on a person’s rights. Furthermore, police officers deal with people who are under the influence and have consumed alcohol on a daily basis, and often use this knowledge in a proactive manner to prevent further incident from occurring.  Whereas supervisors may only become aware there is an employee under the influence once an accident has occurred.  Furthermore, because workplace supervisors are not specifically trained to recognize very minute signs of impairment, in addition with their lack of regular contact with the signs and symptoms of impairment, I would suggest they are not qualified to make a determination on reasonable and probable grounds that an employee may be under the influence.  Moreover, in Entrop, it was a medical opinion that “properly trained supervisors had a ‘very high likelihood of being able to detect impairment’ on the job.  His opinion fails to appreciate that Imperial Oil does not use trained supervisors to detect impairment, but in conjunction with breathalyser testing.”[50]  I would suggest that this type of testing is exactly the sort the unions are consistently fighting against.  A supervisor, who is not trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of impairment, especially drug impairment, cannot in theory then use a breathalyser result in order to back up credence to the legitimacy and need for the test in the first place.  It is this sort of circular logic that leads to HRC and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms[51] violations.

In the end, although I see value in the ability to test workers immediately in a post-accident situation, I do believe there are other routes an employer can undertake.  If it is suspected an employee is impaired following a severe accident, I would further suggest the most efficient route to determine if impairment was a root of the accident would be to contact the police.

3. Is there a duty to accommodate a worker with a drug and or alcohol dependency?

In Ontario, there are specific cases that have ruled on how employers are to treat employees who are suffering from alcohol and drug addiction or dependence.  However, courts have not yet firmly determined how to deal with drug problems that exist prior to employment with a company.  The HRC adopts an expansive definition of the term “handicap” from s. 5(1) that encompasses physical, psychological, and mental conditions or disabilities.[52]  Severe substance abuse is classified as a form of substance dependence, which has been recognized as a disability.[53]  Examples include alcoholism and the abuse of drugs, both over the counter drugs and illicit drugs.  The Ontario Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) has found that “alcoholism is a handicap within the meaning of the Code [HRC], in that it is ‘an illness or disease creating physical disability or mental impairment, and interfering with physical, psychological and social functioning.’”[54]

As mentioned above, s. 5(1) of the HRC stipulates that employers, except in limited circumstances, cannot discriminate based on disability.  Moreover, employers are obligated to accommodate their employee’s disabilities except to the degree of causing undue hardship to the company or employer.  While no precise definition of “undue hardship” has been given, I would suggest case law has provided guidelines for this interpretation. The effort on behalf of the employer to accommodate must be “serious” and “conscientious.” [55]  The steps taken to accommodate must be “genuine” and demonstrative of the employer’s “best efforts.” [56]

The duty to accommodate must be a central feature in the workplace.[57] Cases have articulated how much duty is to be imposed on an employer and several principles have been extracted from these cases.  Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montreal (City) held employers and unions must be sensitive to the various ways in which individual capabilities may be accommodated.[58]  Grismer v British Columbia (A.G.) stated workplace standards that unintentionally distinguished among employees (i.e. lifting requirements) on a protected human rights ground (i.e. disability) may be struck down or amended.[59]

Currently, Meiorin is the most comprehensive decision on the duty to accommodate.  It held accommodation measures must be taken to the point of undue hardship, and a strict approach must be taken with respect to exemptions from the duty to accommodate. This case outlines a variety of considerations for employers with respect to employees with disabilities.  A list of questions was stipulated for determining whether there is a duty to accommodate:

  1. Have alternative approaches been investigated that do not have a discriminatory effect, such as individual testing?

 

  1. If alternative standards have been investigated and found to be capable of fulfilling the employer’s purpose, why were they not implemented?

 

  1. Is it necessary to have all employees meet the single standard for the employer to meet its legitimate purpose? As well, could standards reflective of group or individual differences and capabilities be established?

 

 

  1. Is there a way to do the job that is less discriminatory while still accomplishing the employer’s business objectives?

 

  1. Is the standard properly designed to ensure that the desired qualification is met without placing an undue burden on those to whom the standard applies?

 

  1. Have other parties in the workplace – the union and the individual employee seeking accommodation – fully assisted in the search for a solution?[60]

As mentioned above in a previous section, Meiorin also postulated a three-step test to determine if the discrimination can be justified as a bona fide occupational requirement under human rights law.  Although the tests in Meiorin are helpful for determining whether discrimination is justified, some of the terms used in the test were not so clear. For example, what is meant by “undue hardship”? Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission)[61] held “undue hardship” could be determined by considering a variety of factors including financial cost, impact on a collective agreement, employee morale, interchangeability of the work force and facilities, size of the employer’s operations, and safety.[62]  A certain degree of hardship is acceptable in accommodation requests, and the employer only has a defense if the inconvenience or hardship was undue.[63]  The employer must demonstrate a real and substantial effort was made to accommodate. [64]

If an employee’s drug dependency alters his or her performance at work, an employer is obligated to provide the employee with the opportunity to address his or her problem through rehabilitation and abstention programs.[65]  However, an employer is not mandated to coerce a worker to attend a rehabilitation program or monitor the employee’s progress.  The employer’s accommodation duty is satisfied when an employer has extended several chances to an employee to address his or her drinking even if the employee drops out of the rehabilitation program.[66]  If an employer accommodates an employee to the point of undue hardship, particularly if the employee’s addiction continues to disrupt productivity and threatens the safety of other workers, an employer is justified in terminating the employment contract.[67]

Furthermore, in terms of disability, when an employee has a disability that requires accommodation, there is a duty on the employee to provide the employer with enough information so the employee may be assisted.[68]  In particular, the employee should supply the employer with information from a qualified professional confirming a disability exists and outlining what assistance would be needed for the employment.  The letter from the qualified professional does not need to outline the disability in detail, but should just give enough information so the employee can be properly accommodated.[69]  It is the responsibility of the employee to make his or her need known, to give the employer information about restrictions or limitations, to discuss with the employer possible accommodation solutions, and to continue to update the employer with regards to the status and success of the accommodation.[70]

It is the employer’s responsibility to accept accommodation requests (unless there are valid reasons not to),[71] to get expert opinions where it is required, to facilitate the accommodation process and to take an active role in arranging the accommodation.[72]  Any costs associated with medical documentation are for the employer to bear.[73]  The information provided to the employer must be kept confidential.

The courts have also indicated many employers are bound by a duty to accommodate once it is learned an employee has a substance abuse problem; and where a program does not exist, one should be created.[74]  In Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union , Local 707 v Suncor Energy Inc.,[75] the employee had been with the company for almost twenty-seven years[76] and throughout his employment he had suffered through both drug and alcohol abuse.  Suncor made available a substance abuse program for its employees, and the policy specifically outlined that Suncor “encouraged employees to seek treatment before their job performance was affected.”[77]  The employee did not take advantage of the program and as a result, a number of workplace incidents occurred which were directly attributed to his substance abuse problem.  He was terminated for this and other incidents directly relating to his addictions.  He appealed the decision and the board indicated Suncor had made sufficient efforts to accommodate the employee; the termination was found to be appropriate.

In the end, the duty to accommodate an employee who is suffering from a drug and or alcohol disability appears to be a very fact driven issue with numerous variables that can account for whether an employer has done too little or the accommodation can be seen as to the point of undue hardship.

4. Effectiveness of the drug/alcohol testing methods

In a post-accident scenario where there is reason to believe the accident was caused by drug and or alcohol consumption, the goal of the investigator is simply to prove whether consumption of a drug was present, and secondly, to determine if the presence of the drug caused impairment.  However, as rights have been more clearly defined through the HRC and jurisprudence, and technology has developed alternative testing methods, debate has risen surrounding the various forms.  There has been focus on whether new methods of testing can prove impairment as opposed to simply presence of a substance in the worker.  Despite the availability of new tests, the traditional test methods including urinalysis to test for the presence of drugs and a breathalyser for alcohol are still the most reliable.[78]  I would submit although technology has improved, there is difficulty-proving impairment of drugs other than through visual observations.  Additionally, I would also suggest that the traditional means of a breathalyser is the most effective and established test to determine impairment from alcohol.

In a post-accident investigation where it is suspected on reasonable grounds that alcohol has played a role in the accident, the courts have firmly indicated an oral breathalyser test performed by the employer can adequately prove impairment.[79]  In an evaluation of a breathalyser, Arbitrator Devlin outlined,

alcohol testing under the GTAA’s drug and alcohol policy involves the use of a calibrated breathalyzer which can accurately detect impairment…  [T]he use of a breathalyzer is described as minimally intrusive, and there was no dispute that it provides an immediate result.  In other words, it is not a situation in which an employee is tested, returns to work in a safety-sensitive position and the test result is provided at a later date.[80]

Decision makers have universally accepted this view of determining alcohol impairment through a breathalyser as the most effective testing method.  For further evidence, one needs not look any further than your local RIDE (Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere) program.  When police officers have grounds to believe a motorist is over the legal limit of 0.08 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, they can arrest the motorist and demand they submit a breath sample into a Intoxilyzer 5000C.[81]  This device will give a numeric reading of the motorist’s blood alcohol concentration.  As a result of the numeric value, if it is over 0.08, it is considered conclusive that the operator of the motor vehicle was impaired at the time of operation.  It should be noted, the numeric value of 0.08 is the Criminal Code standard.  Employers in safety-sensitive workplaces often have a zero-tolerance or thresholds that are lower than the legal limit.[82]

A second method to test for impairment of alcohol is through a buccal swab.  In Imperial Oil Ltd. v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 900 (Policy Grievance),[83] it was held that,

oral fluid testing is no more intrusive than taking a breath sample. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated in a different context that a “buccal swab is quick and not terribly intrusive” (R. v. S.A.B., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, at para. 44)… Oral fluid testing is reliable and minimally intrusive. A positive oral fluid test shows impairment. Although there is a delay in allowing the Company to be informed of a positive test, the company still becomes aware that an employee was impaired while at work and can take measures to prevent a recurrence.[84]

As the court correctly pointed out, although it is minimally invasive, and it will return the same results, a breathalyser is an immediate test without the enhanced risk of contamination and other complications through delay.

Moving forward, methods of testing that determine whether there is impairment through drugs is not as straightforward as alcohol.  The traditional method to test for drug impairment is through urinalysis.  In Sterling Crane,

all of the witnesses agreed that urinalysis testing of the sort requested by the Responding Party in this case cannot confirm impairment of any individual. Indeed, the evidence suggested that some of the substances tested for, such as marijuana, may stay in one’s system for days and even weeks – long after any impairment would have dissipated. The evidence did indicate that any urinalysis test should be conducted within a short period of time after the incident, two to four hours later at most, in order to have any probative value.[85]

Furthermore in GTAA, an expert in the field of substance abuse in the workplace[86] outlined that “urinalysis testing cannot establish that an individual was suffering from impairment at the time of testing. Such testing is therefore not probative in and of itself.”  Although it is extremely difficult if not impossible to prove impairment through chemical tests alone, physical tests akin to tradition field sobriety tests used in policing are effective in determining impairment by drug.[87]  A DRE officer is able to determine impairment through a series of physical tests as well as the type of drug the person has consumed.[88]  However, it should be noted in order to testify in court as to the qualifications as a DRE, the officer has to qualify as an expert as per the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in R v Mohan.[89]

In addition to urinalysis, blood samples have also been used to determine impairment.  It has been concluded that a blood test is an accurate measure of one’s impairment, particularity with cannabis.  In his findings, Dr. Scott MacDonald, an Epidemiologist with a specialization in addiction and substance abuse,[90] outlined “studies involving blood tests, which measure recent use and, therefore, impairment, have found an increased crash risk among drivers who tested positive for cannabis.”[91]  Although there is a correlation between cannabis and motor vehicle accidents, what a blood test does not conclusively indicate is the level of impairment.  Thus, I would suggest, this carries a diminished evidentiary weight when attempting to determine impairment.

A final test for drug impairment is hair follicle testing.  Although the procedure to test hair follicles does not appear to be new, it does not appear to be utilized in the field of post-accident in a safety-sensitive workplace.  In fact, the only relevant case discussing hair samples is Imperial Oil 2.[92]  In this case, the discussion centres around the legality of obtaining a hair sample from an individual without their consent and not on impairment.[93]  Although this type of testing is not being utilized in post-accident workplace investigations, hair follicle testing is being utilized in Family Court to enforce orders.  Despite follicle testing not being utilized at the moment, there is an opportunity in the future.  The Family Court has commented on the reliability of hair follicle testing in comparison with urinalysis as,

…hair follicle drug testing witness conceded that, although any drug testing is subject to human error, urine testing is less reliable than hair follicle testing, because of:

1. the timeliness of the testing; and,

2. the assessment of the randomness of the testing must be considered as marijuana dissipates in the urine within 3-5 days.[94]

Despite the availability of tests to determine impairment by drug and alcohol, I would submit that the most effective tests are not performed in a laboratory, but performed by a trained expert in the recognition of the signs and symptoms of alcohol and or drug impairment.  The courts have recognized “that supervisors may be trained to observe signs of impairment and that a positive test coupled with…observations may result in a reasonable inference of impairment.”[95]  In addition, and perhaps most conclusively, the court found in Entrop that there was no evidence to show any current test available could accurately determine the effects of drugs on an employee.[96]  Consequently, if the results could not be accurately determined, the test on the whole could potentially lead to a violation of the HRC.

Conclusion

In any workplace that has been designated as safety-sensitive, there is an overriding theme of safety and accident prevention.  In the event where an accident does occur, there are a number of steps that need to be followed to ensure it does not occur again in the future.  One of these steps is ensuring the sobriety of the workers on the site.  This is done through drug and or alcohol testing when there are reasonable grounds to believe an employee who has been involved in an accident is under the influence of drugs and or alcohol.  Although objections can be made as to invasion of privacy, jurisprudence in this area has concluded this sort of testing is within the scope of safety for all parties involved and is necessary in a post-accident investigation.

This paper has examined a number of areas in post-accident drug testing in a safety-sensitive workplace including, first, whether post-accident testing violates the HRC; second, what are reasonable and probable grounds in a post-accident situation; third, whether there is a duty to accommodate a worker with a drug and or alcohol disability; and fourth, an examination of the various methods used to determine intoxication in a post-accident scenario.  I would submit the following conclusions could be made.  First, drug and or alcohol testing in a post-accident, safety-sensitive workplace is not a violation of the HRC so long as the principles of cases such as Meiorin and KVP are followed.  Second, I would submit reasonable and probable grounds following an accident amount to actual physical indicators, and do not apply to testing as a means of ruling out impairment.  Although an accident free workplace is an utmost priority in all safety-sensitive industries, jurisprudence, the HRC, and Canadian Human Rights Act[97] have all indicated an individual’s fundamental rights trump mere suspicion.[98]  Third, if it is presented that an employee has a drug and or alcohol problem that qualifies as a disability by the HRC, an employer must accommodate the employee.  However, it should be noted although there is an onus of accommodation placed on the employer, this only extends to such an extent where it would otherwise be considered unduly hard.  Should it exceed this level, the employer may terminate the employment contract.[99]  Fourth, I would submit the most effective methods for determining current impairment in post-accident investigation for alcohol is either a visual test performed by a trained individual or a breathalyser.  However, the ability to test for drug impairment is more complicated.  Many of the current methods, including urinalysis, swabs, hair follicle samples, and blood can only detect the presence and level of a drug in a person’s system, and cannot conclusively determine impairment.  It should also be pointed out that medical professionals have indicated there is a strong correlation between higher levels of a drug in the body and higher levels of impairment.[100]  However, the only conclusively proven method to determine impairment by drug in a person is through a series of physical tests and measurements.

In the end, despite the various arguments on either side, the very least a worker can ask of his employer is to prove a safe workplace, and I would suggest the overwhelming consensus is that drug testing in the workplace is an appropriate method to enhance safety of the public and workers.


[1] RSO 1990, C O 1 [OHSA].

[2] 2000, SO 2000, c 41 [ESA].

 

[3] SO 1995, C 1
SCHEDULE A [LRA].

[4] RSO 1990, c H.19 [HRC].

 

[5] SO 1997, C 16
SCHEDULE A [WSIA].

[6] [1965] OLAA No 2, (1965), 16 LAC 73 [KVP].

[7] International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793 v Sterling Crane – A Division of Procrane Inc., [2009] OLRD No 4623 at 6 [Sterling Crane].

[8] Ibid at 76.

[9] Ibid at 10.

[10] [2007] CLAD No 243 [GTAA].

[11] Ibid at 6.

[12] Canada, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Human Rights Commission Policy on Alcohol and Drug Testing, (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2002).

[13] Kelly v Toronto Police Service (20 April 2005), OCCPS #05-03, online: Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services <http://www.ocpc.ca/files/J78U2005R405X1175X130E0352221F.pdf>  at p. 22 [Kelly].

[14] HRC, supra 4 at s. 5(1).

[15] Ibid.

[16] [2000] OJ No 2689, (2000) 50 OR (3d) 18 [Entrop].

[17] Ibid at 196.

[18] Michael Lynk, “Disability and the Duty to Accommodate in the Canadian Workplace” online: Ontario Labour Federation <http://www.ofl.ca/uploads/library/disability_issues/ACCOMMODATION.pdf&gt;.

[19] Ibid at 6.

[20] [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin].

[21] RSBC 1996, c 210 [BC HRC].

[22] Meiorin, supra 20 at 42.

[23] Randall Scott Echlin & Christine M. Thomlinson, For Better or For Worse:  A Practical Guide to Canadian Employment Law, 2d ed (Aurora: Aurora Professional Press, 2003) at 127.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Entrop, supra 16 at 128-129.

[26] Ibid at 138.

[27] GTAA, supra 10 at 303.

[28] KVP, supra 6 at 34.

[29] Mort Mitchnick & Brian Etherington, “13.3 Failure to Comply with Employer Rules”, online: Lancaster House:  Labour Law on-line <http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/index.asp?navid=37&layid=73&csid=1732&csid1=23&csid2=1031&fid1=23&gt;.

[30] [1999] CLAD No 750 [Trimac].

[31] Ibid at 59.

[32] GTAA, supra 10 at 6.

[33] RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].

[34] Ibid at s. 254(2).

[35] KVP, supra 6 at 85.

[36] [1989] CLAD No 4 at 23 [Keeping].

[37] Ibid at 23.

[38] [1991] OLAA No 16 [Provincial-American Truck].

[39] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 53.

[40] [2008] OLAA No 621 [Mechanical Contractors].

[41] Ibid at 151.

[42] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 19.

[43] [2009] OJ No 2037 [Imperial Oil].

[44] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 61.

[45] Criminal Code, supra 33 at s. 254(2).

[46] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 19.

[47] Ibid at 7.

[48] Ibid at 26.

[49] This and all information in this paper related to knowledge obtained by police officers in the course of their education and or training is the author’s experience through his career from 2004 – 2008 as a Police Constable with the York Regional Police.

[50] Entrop, supra 16 at 108.

[51] Part I of the Constitution Act, 198, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].

[52] HRC, supra 4 at s. 5(1).

[53] Ibid at s. 1.

[54] Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd., [1996] OHRBID No 30 [Entrop 2] at 17.

[55] Krznaric v Timmins Police Services Board, (1997), 98 CLLC 230-004 [Krznaric].

[56] CUPW v Canada Post Corp, (1997), 6 Lancaster’s Equity and Accommodation Reporter 5 (May/June) [CUPW]; Holmes v Attorney-General of Canada, (1997), 97 CLLC 230-022 [Holmes].

[57] Lynk, supra 18 at 3.

[58] [2000] 1 SCR 665 [Quebec].

[59] [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer].

[60] KVP, supra 6 at 34.

[61] [1990] 2 SCR 489 [Central Alberta Dairy].

[62] Ibid at 42.

[63] Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 26 [Central Okanagan].

[64] Ibid.

[65] Lynk, supra 18 at 29.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Kelly, supra 13 at p. 24.

[68] Ontario Human Rights Commission: “Policy and guidelines on disability and the duty to accommodate” (2000) at 19 [Policy].

[69] Ontario Human Rights Commission: Guide to Your Rights and Responsibilities under the Human Rights Code (2009) at 21 [Rights].

[70] Re GSW Heating Products Ltd, [1996] OLAA No 106, (1996), 56 LAC (4th) 249 at 5 [GSW].

[71] Toronto (City) Police Service v Kelly, [2006] OJ No 1758 at 22 [Kelly 2].

[72] GSW, supra 70 at 5.

[73] Policy, supra 68 at 19.

[74] Kelly 2, supra 71 at 22.

[75] [2005] AJ No 871 [Suncor].

[76] Ibid at 2.

[77] Ibid at 13.

[78] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 5.

[79] GTAA, supra 10 at 186.

[80] Ibid at 265.

[81] Criminal Code, supra 33 s. 254(3)(i)(a).

[82] GTAA, supra 10 at 9-10.

[83] [2006] OLAA No 721 [Imperial Oil 2].

[84] Ibid at 152-153.

[85] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 25.

[86] GTAA, supra 10 at 44.

[87] R v Jurcevic, 2010 ONCJ 577, [2010] OJ No 5231 at 14-18 [Jurcevic].

[88] Ibid.

[89] [1994] 2 SCR 9 [Mohan].

[90] GTAA, supra 10 at 178.

[91] Ibid at 181.

[92] Imperial Oil 2, supra 83 at 68.

[93] Ibid; R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607 [Stillman].

[94] Children and Family Services for York Region v T.B., 2010 ONSC, [2010] OJ No 5501 at 16 [T.B.].

[95] Sterling Crane, supra 7 at 43.

[96] Entrop, supra 16 at 99.

[97] RSC 1985, c H-6 [HRA].

[98] GTAA, supra 10 at 115.

[99] Suncor, supra 75 at 115.

[100] GTAA, supra 10 at 281.





M E M O R A N D U M: Addiction & Accommodation in Policing – A Comprehensive look at Constables Kelly, Hall, & Vaughan-Evans

10 10 2011

M E M O R A N D U M:

Addiction & Accommodation in Policing – A Comprehensive look at Constables Kelly, Hall, & Vaughan-Evans

By: Ryan Venables, B.A., J.D. (Candidate 2012 – UWO Faculty of Law)

2011 April 15

Introduction

Policing is a career of many hats.  Officers primarily enforce federal, provincial, and municipal laws of Canada, but they also act as psychologists, social workers, rescuers, teachers, and shoulders to lean on in times of need.  It is without a doubt that policing, and all first responder jobs, including fire fighting and paramedics, are among the most stressful jobs a person could perform.[1]  In fact, a study published in 2007 indicated police officers and firefighters were two occupations where a person who was suffering from high levels of stress at the workplace was least likely to report it.[2]  In light of this study, it begs the question to be asked, where does the law stand when it is the police officer that is in need?  It is this general question I intend to answer throughout this paper as I examine accommodation and addiction issues in the workplace.

In Ontario there are a number of statutes that oversee the employment contract, but the main legislative area when dealing with accommodation is the Human Rights Code.[3]  This paper will focus on accommodation issues surrounding police officers and their addictions, with a special focus being on the trilogy of recent Ontario cases.  The trilogy includes, Toronto (City) Police Service v Kelly,[4] Hall v Ottawa Police Service,[5] and Vaughan-Evans v Toronto Police Service.[6]  These cases examined a number of issues surrounding accommodation in policing when it is the officer who is the subject to addiction.  This paper will go further to examine four points,

  1. Is the level of accommodation equal when it is a job-induced addiction as opposed to one that was pre-existing?
  2. Who is required to initiate the accommodation?
  3. What is considered “undue hardship”?[7]
  4. Accommodation versus the power to discipline?

When the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (“OCCPS”) resolved the cases, Constable Kelly had been accommodated, but Constable Hall and Constable Vaughan-Evans had not.  I would submit it is through the analysis this paper aims to undertake, that will clarify why the court accommodated one but not the other two.

Jurisprudence

1. Constable Robert Kelly – Toronto Police Service

Constable Kelly joined the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”) in 1989.  At the time of the incidents in 2001, which led to the case at bar, he was a member of the Northwest Field Command Drug Squad (“Drug Squad”) where duties included surveillance, preparing search warrants, executing search warrants, intelligence gathering, developing informants, working with agents, case preparation and undercover work.[8]  Like many positions in policing, the workload was heavy, and the “average week involved approximately seventy hours of work. Like members of other specialized units, members of the Drug Squad were required to carry pagers and be “on call” twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.”[9]  Constable Kelly was also used in an undercover capacity on a routine basis for mid-level drug operations.  Between 1998 and 2001 Constable Kelly experienced a number of traumatic events, which include,

  1. The passing of his father.  Constable Kelly was particularly close with his father.
  2. The shooting of his partner.
  3. The apprehension of a suspect who attempted to murder him with a shotgun.
  4. The breakup of his common law marriage.
  5. Not being promoted because of a disciplinary issue for which he was later acquitted of.
  6. An on-duty motor vehicle accident where he and another officer were almost killed.[10]

In the fall of 2001, Constable Kelly began to use cocaine as a self-remedy for the on going emotional pain and psychological issues he was suffering from.  Because of his knowledge, and position in the Drug Squad, he had immediate access to people who could provide him with drugs.  He became involved with a civilian who had previous supplied him with information.  The two began to share small amounts of cocaine.  On two occasions, Constable Kelly purchased cocaine for them to share.  At the time of these purchases, the civilian was acting as a police agent.[11]  As a result, Constable Kelly was charged and pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance contrary to s. 4(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.[12]  He received a suspended sentence.  Constable Kelly also pled guilty to two counts of discreditable conduct contrary to s. 2(1)(a)(xi) of the Schedule Code of Conduct of Ontario Regulation 123 for 1998 amended to 328/2004 [13] and therefore contrary to s. 74(1)(a) of the Ontario Police Services Act.[14]

There was an agreed disposition between Constable Kelly’s lawyer and the prosecutor, but the Hearing Officer decided it was an unacceptable disposition, and ordered Constable Kelly to resign within seven days or be fired.  Constable Kelly appealed the disposition as per s. 87(1) of the PSA to OCCPS (OCCPS is now known as the Ontario Civilian Police Commission or “OCPC”) on a number of issues that surround accommodation and the reasonableness of the decision.[15]  After looking at the issues, OCCPS found in favour of Constable Kelly and disagreed with the reasoning of the Hearing Officer.  TPS then proceeded to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by way of a judicial review.  The judicial review centred on similar issues as the appeal to OCCPS did, eventually determining the decision in OCCPS was sound.  The end result is that Constable Kelly’s addiction was accommodated.

2. Constable Kevin Hall – Ottawa Police Service

Constable Hall joined the Ottawa Police Service (“OPS”) in 1999, and was placed in a general patrol capacity.  Prior to his hire, Constable Hall began using marijuana at the age of 15 and continued to do so until he was 33.  He only decided to stop using because he wanted to pursue a career in policing.[16]  During the application to OPS, he deliberately lied about his past usage and indicated he only tried marijuana over a short period in 1980.

In 2001, Constable Hall’s wife lost her job, which led to financial issues.  Also in 2001, Constable Hall had an affair, which caused serious strain on their marriage.  This resulted in Constable Hall smoking marijuana again to escape from his personal problems.  Between 2001 and 2004, he used increasing amounts as it started to become less effective.  In 2004, he began using cocaine following a traffic stop in which he seized the drug off a motorist and used it for his own personal consumption.[17]  Between 2004 and 2005, Constable Hall purchased cocaine for his own use on several occasions.  On 05 August 2005, Constable Hall removed some cocaine from a drug envelope for personal consumption.  On 30 September 2005, Constable Hall once again seized cocaine on a traffic stop and used it for his own personal use.  Between 01 September 2005 and 01 October 2005, Constable Hall took drugs from the drug depository box for his personal use.[18]

It was agreed that Constable Hall never used cocaine or was intoxicated by any substances while in the course of his duties as a police officer.  As a result of the above-mentioned incidents, he was charged with numerous PSA offences.  Following a PSA trial,

Constable Hall was found guilty of the following offences contrary to O.Reg. 123/98, Schedule, Code of Conduct, which constitutes misconduct pursuant to the PSA: five counts of discreditable conduct under s. 2(1)(a)(xi); two counts of corrupt practice under s. 2(1)(f)(ii); and, one count of neglect of duty under s. 2(1)(c)(v). Hall was not charged with any criminal offences in relation to these acts of misconduct.[19]

He was ordered to resign within seven days or be fired.

Constable Hall appealed his decision to OCCPS who reviewed the Hearing Officer’s decision and paid particular focus to accommodation issues and the standard of review in a PSA appeal.  After looking at all of the issues, OCCPS determined that despite the need to accommodate as per the HRC, the Hearing Officer’s decision was within the realm of reasonableness.  Constable Hall sought a judicial review of the OCCPS decision to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  In the decision, the court looked at the standard of review for OCCPS and looked at the law on the duty to accommodate an officer in Constable Hall’s position.  Again the decision was upheld.

3. Constable James Vaughan-Evans – Toronto Police Service

Constable Vaughan-Evans was hired as a police officer by TPS in 1987 at the age of 19.  Prior to his policing career he used marijuana from the age of 12 until 18.  After a number of years on the job, he obtained position in the 12 Division Youth Bureau investigating youth crimes and child abuse.[20]  Shortly thereafter, he investigated two very horrific murders of infants.  This caused Constable Vaughan-Evans to suffer from “negative feelings and emotions, nightmares, cold sweats and could not get the two incidents out of his mind. He lost his appetite, he isolated himself from others and his marriage deteriorated.”[21]  As a result, he started using marijuana again and became a heavy user.  He sought treatment, and it was reported that he was smoking between 10 and 12 joints a day.  His consumption became so great that he started to hallucinate and he exhibited an inability to cut down his usage.  In 1994, in an attempt to pay for the marijuana, he stole a number of cheques from fellow police officers totalling $5800.[22]  As a result, he was charged and pled guilty to one count of fraud under $5000 contrary to s. 380(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.[23]  He received a two-year conditional discharge.  In addition, he was charged under the PSA.  He pled guilty to one count of discreditable conduct and was ordered to resign within seven days or be terminated.[24]  He appealed this decision to the Toronto Police Services Board and was reinstated pending a number of conditions, all of which he accepted.

As a result, he was placed on modified duties.  Constable Vaughan-Evans began using marijuana again in January 2003 after he began singing in a bar.  His consumption escalated and he admits to purchasing marijuana on at least 50 occasions.  In the summer of 2003, it was suggested to him that he should assume the role of a Child Abuse Coordinator.  A co-worker called his former Staff Sergeant and suggested this may not be an appropriate role considering his history.  Constable Vaughan-Evans was removed as a Child Abuse Coordinator and transferred to a position as the Civilian Police College Coordinator.  “He was upset by this move and was unsuccessful in his attempts to have it reversed.”[25]

On 19 December 2003, Constable Vaughan-Evans went to the staff washroom, and upon his exit he walked by an Acting Sergeant who noticed a strong smell of marijuana emanating from his person.  It was reported to the Staff Sergeant, and together they found the remains of a marijuana cigarette in the washroom.  Upon confronting Constable Vaughan-Evans, he denied smoking in the washroom, but said he did smoke marijuana in the morning.  He was then suspended from his duties as a police officer.[26]

On 02 June 2004, in an attempt to link the DNA from the cigarette, police were conducting surveillance when they observed him rolling a marijuana cigarette in a parking lot.  He was charged and pled guilty to one count contrary to s. 4(5) of the CDSA.  Constable Vaughan-Evans pled guilty to one count of discreditable conduct contrary to s. 2(1)(a)(ix) of the Code of Conduct on 03 November 2006.  As a result of the PSA hearing, he was ordered to resign within seven days or be terminated.  Constable Vaughan-Evans appealed the decision to OCCPS, on issues that the punishment was too severe and TPS had not properly accommodated his addiction.  OCCPS held the Hearing Officer’s decision was not outside the realm of normal for these types of cases, and TPS had gone to great lengths to accommodate Constable Vaughan-Evans.  As a result, the punishment was upheld.[27]

Summary of Conclusions

Through an analysis of disability accommodation of drug and or alcohol problems in policing, this paper aims to draw the following conclusions.  First, that there is a distinction between a pre-existing disability and one that was developed through the course of an officer’s duty.  I would suggest this distinction draws a clear difference insofar as a pre-existing disability in the form of a drug and or alcohol addiction precludes the officer from properly fulfilling their role as a police officer as defined by the PSA.

Second, despite the onus on an employer to accommodate an employee who has an established disability, I would suggest the word established is of particular concern.  An employer cannot provide assistance to an employee who deceives, or by other means prevents an employer from accommodating them if the disability is not known.  As such, I would suggest by preventing the employer from learning about the disability, it mitigates the duty to accommodate an employer would owe to an employee.

Third, although undue hardship has never been defined through the courts or legislation, the courts have established criteria as to what fits into undue hardship.  In policing, I would suggest undue hardship cannot be properly defined in any given case unless an analysis of mixed fact and law is applied in the given circumstances.  As a result, the employee’s continued employment will be considered irreconcilable if the employer’s accommodation efforts in combination with the duties outlined in s. 42(1) of the PSA; thus resulting in a situation of undue hardship.

Fourth, in many PSA hearings where accommodation through a drug and or alcohol disability is an issue, there are two competing sides; the officer who is attempting to have his disability mitigated in order to achieve accommodation, and the police service that is attempting to draw light on the officer’s actions in order to achieve discipline.  It is through this struggle that a determination will be made.  It is also through the desire to achieve accommodation and the power to enforce discipline in combination with jurisprudence of a similar nature that will assist in determining the outcome.  But in the end, it will be the facts of the case that will govern the nature of the proceeding.

Analysis

1. Is the level of accommodation equal when it is a job-induced addiction as opposed to one that was pre-existing?

Accommodation of an employee’s disability has been deemed such an important part of the employment contract that it has been built into the HRC and PSA in order to force employers to recognize the need to assist their employees.  But are there differences in a pre-existing disability as opposed to a disability that the employee obtained through the course of their duties?  Before we can examine this, we must look first at some of the basics of disability and accommodation.

A handicap or disability has been defined in Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd.[28] as “an illness, injury or disfigurement that creates a physical or mental impairment and thereby interferes with a person’s physical, psychological and/or social functioning.”[29] The disability or impairment can be temporary, long lasting, or permanent.  It may be an actual disability or something that is only perceived as a disability in the eyes of others, or even an impairment that no longer exists.[30] Alcoholism and or drug addiction, are for example, viewed as disabilities.[31]

 

Courts have also held the following scenarios constitute disability and may need to be accommodated by the employer.  Whether these disabilities need to be accommodated depends on the employee’s degree of impairment and the workplace requirements.  A non-exhaustive list of disabilities includes:

 

  1. Obesity[32]
  2. Height[33]
  3. HIV and AIDs[34]
  4. Depression[35]
  5. Heart attack/heart condition[36]
  6. Alcoholism[37]
  7. Hypertension[38]
  8. Drug dependence[39]
  9. Hysterectomy[40]
  10. Colour blindness[41]
  11. Speech impediment[42]
  12. Broken foot[43]
  13. Knee pain[44]
  14. Panic attacks[45]
  15. Dyslexia[46]
  16. Stress[47]
  17. Tobacco addiction[48]
  18. Fear of flying[49]

 

In addition to this list, it should be noted the courts have also rejected the claim of disability when there is no established record of disability.

In my opinion, Mr. Middlemiss has not established that he was perceived to have a disability by Mr. Edwards, who made the decision to ban him from the site. Nor am I persuaded that the policy itself contains evidence that Norske perceived those who violated the policy to be addicted to alcohol or drugs and, therefore, disabled.

I find that Mr. Middlemiss has not established a prima facie case that Norske discriminated against him on the basis of disability contrary to s. 13 of the Code.[50]

 

Furthermore, the HRC has also adopted an expansive definition of the term “handicap” from s. 5(1), which encompasses physical, psychological and mental conditions or disabilities.[51]  Severe substance abuse is classified as a form of substance dependence, which has been recognized as a disability.[52]  Examples include alcoholism and the abuse of drugs, both over the counter drugs and illicit drugs.  The Ontario Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) has found “alcoholism is a handicap within the meaning of the Code, in that it is ‘an illness or disease creating physical disability or mental impairment, and interfering with physical, psychological and social functioning.’”[53]

 

Additionally, s. 47(1) of the PSA outlines “if an employee of a municipal police force becomes mentally or physically disabled and as a result is incapable of performing the essential duties of the position, the board shall accommodate his or her needs in accordance with the Human Rights Code.”[54]  Moreover, employers are obligated to accommodate their employees’ disabilities except to the degree of causing undue hardship to the company or employer.  The duty to accommodate must be a central feature in the workplace.[55]  Cases have articulated how much duty is to be imposed on an employer and several principles have been extracted from these cases.

 

In Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montreal (City),[56] the court held employers and unions must be sensitive to the various ways in which individual capabilities may be accommodated.[57]  Grismer v British Columbia (A.G.)[58] stated workplace standards that unintentionally distinguished among employees (i.e. lifting requirements) on a protected human rights ground (i.e. disability) may be struck down or amended.[59]

 

Currently, British Columbia (PSERC) v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union[60] is the most comprehensive decision on the duty to accommodate.[61] It held that accommodation measures must be taken to the point of undue hardship, and that a strict approach must be taken with respect to exemptions from the duty to accommodate.  Meiorin outlines a variety of considerations for employers with respect to employees with disabilities.  A list of questions was stipulated for determining whether there is a duty to accommodate:

 

  1. Have alternative approaches been investigated that do not have a discriminatory effect, such as individual testing?
  2. If alternative standards have been investigated and found to be capable of fulfilling the employer’s purpose, why were they not implemented?
  3. Is it necessary to have all employees meet the single standard for the employer to meet its legitimate purpose? As well, could standards reflective of group or individual differences and capabilities be established?
  4. Is there a way to do the job that is less discriminatory while still accomplishing the

employer’s business objectives?

  1. Is the standard properly designed to ensure that the desired qualification is met without placing an undue burden on those to whom the standard applies?
  2. Have other parties in the workplace – the union and the individual employee seeking

accommodation – fully assisted in the search for a solution?[62]

 

Additionally, Meiorin also postulated a three-step test to determine if the discrimination can be justified under human rights law as a bona fide occupational requirement.

 

  1. That the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
  2. That the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and
  3. That the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.[63]

 

Moving forward, we can now ask the question of whether there is a difference between a pre-existing disability and one that was acquired through a job related performance?  In Ontario, there are specific cases that have ruled on how employers are to treat employees who are suffering from alcohol and drug addiction or dependence.  However, courts have not yet firmly determined how to deal with drug problems that exist prior to employment with a company.  However in looking at the trilogy of police addiction cases in Ontario we can see subtle differences that help to establish a conclusion.

 

It was clearly established in the facts of Kelly OSC that Constable Kelly’s disability occurred after he became a police officer.[64]  Where as the disabilities of Constables Hall and Vaughan-Evans followed them to their policing careers.[65]  In his appeal to OCCPS, Constable Hall, relied in large part on the decision in Kelly OSC.  “He argued that there were compelling similarities between the cases of Constable Kelly and Constable Hall and the Hearing Officer should have applied the same reasoning to formulate a penalty that did not entail loss of employment.”[66]  In both Hall v Ottawa Police Service[67] and Hall OSC, the decision makers found factual differences between the two cases.  Despite pointing out 12 differences between the two cases, the most obvious was that Constable Hall joined OPS with the disability, and hid it from his future employers.

 

Part of the Service’s selection process required Kevin Hall to complete a Good Moral Character and Habits Questionnaire. It contained a series of questions directed at alcohol and drug use. In his answers Kevin Hall acknowledged consuming “1 to 2 beers a week during the summer months”. As well, he acknowledged trying marijuana “over a period of 2 weeks” in 1980. He attested that he stopped using marijuana at that time. No mention was made of his time at Rideauwood.[68]

 

I would suggest this is a fundamental difference in the way he was eventually treated as opposed to Constables Kelly and Vaughan-Evans.  Although there is little case law which specifically references an employer’s obligation based on whether the employee’s disability was job-induced or if it was pre-existing, the courts are clear about an analogous area.  I would suggest that drug testing prior to employment is an immediate family member to pre-employment disability in policing.  I draw this link because I believe the job of policing can be considered a safety-sensitive workplace.  In Greater Toronto Airports Authority v Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 0004,[69] a safety-sensitive area was defined as,

…those in which individuals, who may work independently for varying or extended periods of time, have a key and direct role in an operation where impaired performance could result in (i) a significant accident or incident affecting the health or safety of employees, others working at the airport, customers, the public or the environment, or (ii) an inadequate response to an emergency or operational situation.[70]

In addition, the Canadian Human Rights Commission policy on alcohol and drug testing also defines safety-sensitive as,

one in which incapacity due to drug or alcohol impairment could result in direct and significant risk of injury to the employee, others or the environment. Whether a job can be categorized as safety-sensitive must be considered within the context of the industry, the particular workplace, and an employee’s direct involvement in a high-risk operation. Any definition must take into account the role of properly trained supervisors and the checks and balances present in the workplace.[71]

As such, I believe policing falls within the scope of this definition.  As a result, had Constables Hall and Vaughan-Evans been subjected to pre-employment drug testing because of the safety-sensitive nature of their employment, it may have prevented their employment as suitable candidates.

Moving forward we know from Meiorin that denying employment based on a disability is prima facie discriminatory as per the HRC.  Meiorin also points out the discriminatory practice can stand so long as it passes the three-part bona fide occupational requirement test.[72]  At this point, I believe it would be beneficial to run through the test to determine if discriminating against a drug and or alcohol addiction would pass the test to determine if a police candidate who is free from drugs and or alcohol is a bona fide occupational requirement.

The first part of the test asks, “if the standard was adopted for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job?”[73]  I would suggest when looking at candidates, police recruiters spend a great deal of time to ensure those who they consider calling colleagues are of the variety that will be able to represent the service with honour and dignity.  Additionally, policing can be a very stressful job, one that carries many risks with it including, driving at high speeds, making life or death split decisions, saving lives, and carrying and potentially using a firearm.  I would suggest that a person who has a disability in the form of addiction may not be able to perform some of the key roles of a police officer as outlined by the PSA.  These include,

(a) preserving the peace;

(b) preventing crimes and other offences and providing assistance and encouragement to other persons in their prevention;

(c) assisting victims of crime;

(d) apprehending criminals and other offenders and others who may lawfully be taken into custody;

(e) laying charges and participating in prosecutions;

(f) executing warrants that are to be executed by police officers and performing related duties;

(g) performing the lawful duties that the chief of police assigns;

(h) in the case of a municipal police force and in the case of an agreement under section 10 (agreement for provision of police services by O.P.P.), enforcing municipal by-laws;

(i) completing the prescribed training.[74]

A person who has a dependency to drugs and or alcohol may not be able to fulfill some of these criteria, and more likely, their addiction may cause harm to themselves, other officers, or the general public.  In addition in Vaughan-Evans, the Hearing Officer correctly pointed out,

[t]his Police Service has dedicated many officers and effort into educating the public on illegal drugs. More than anyone, police officers are witness to the devastation that illegal drugs can bring to a community and individuals. It has long been the policy of this Tribunal that zero tolerance with respect to illegal drugs is the only message to be sent to all members and the community at large. There can be no exceptions, otherwise the impact and credibility of the many drug programs directed at the public in general, and for the school population in particular, will be seriously compromised. For a police officer to become involved as a participant in a drug scene is totally unacceptable.[75]

I believe this passage speaks volumes as to why it is appropriate for police officers to be free and clear of a dependence on drugs and or alcohol despite its recognition as a disability under the HRC.

The second part of the test states, “that the standard was adopted in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfillment of that legitimate work-related purpose.”[76]  I would submit the standard to have police officer candidates free from a drug and or alcohol disability was adopted in good faith.  I believe it is critical for police services to maintain a higher level of accountability among the population they serve, and for a police service to hire a person who is potentially addicted to illicit drugs would be quite frankly hypocritical.  In disciplinary cases one of the criteria Hearing Officers often use to establish punishment is whether the reputation of the service has been damaged by the actions of the officer.  In Kelly OSC, Hall OSC, and Vaughan-Evans, this was mentioned as an aggravating factor with respect to the individual officer’s drug use.[77]

The third step in the Meiorin test is,

that the standard was reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that legitimate work-related purpose.  In order to fulfill this last criterion, and employer would also be required to show that is was impossible to accommodate the individual employee(s) without imposing undue hardship on the employer.[78]

I would suggest this step is the quickest step to determine.  When hiring a potential employee as a police officer, if they have an addiction that could bring harm to the public, themselves, or other officers, it would be imperative for the police service to ensure they were not in a uniform.  Furthermore, if they were hired, I would suggest the need for accommodation would be required immediately.  When police officers are hired in Ontario, they attend the Ontario Police College Basic Constable Training Program in Aylmer, Ontario.  During their time at the Ontario Police College (“OPC”) future constables are trained in firearms, police vehicle operations, defensive tactics, and situation based training.  As a result, I would suggest it would be an enormous liability for any police agency to send a new member to OPC aware of their drug and or alcohol disability.  It goes contrary to everything that is taught at OPC, and as such, I would submit police agencies prima facie discriminatory behaviour of not hiring those with a drug and or alcohol disability is within the scope of a bona fide occupational requirement.

In contrast, I would suggest accommodation is required if a police officer develops a disability through the course of their employment.  As such, attempts by the employer to accommodate a disability must be serious,[79] conscientious,[80] genuine,[81] and demonstrated to be “best efforts.”[82]  Employers in Canada are required to make every reasonable effort to accommodate an employee who is disabled, short of experiencing undue hardship.  The employer bears the legal responsibility to initiate the process of accommodation. [83]  The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has stated, at the very least, this involves “an examination of the employee’s medical condition, the prognosis for recovery and the employee’s capabilities for alternative work.”[84]  In Kelly OSC, the court correctly noted the Hearing Officer wrongfully ignored the two provisioning statutes,

 

In deciding the appropriate disposition, the Hearing Officer must consider not only the conduct of the police officer, but also the employer’s duty to a disabled officer under the Ontario Human Rights Code. This duty to “accommodate” flows from a combination of two statutes:

47.(1) Subject to subsection (2), if a member of a municipal police force becomes mentally or physically disabled and as a result is incapable of performing the essential duties of the position, the board shall accommodate his or her needs in accordance with the Human Rights Code.

Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15. s. 47(1) …

5.(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of … disability.

Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19, s. 5(1).[85]

As a result of the above analysis, I would come to the conclusion that despite the lack of case law specifically dealing with accommodation of a pre-existing drug and or alcohol disability, police services do not have the show the same level of accommodation because of the jurisprudence established from the three-part Meiorin test and accompanying PSA and HRC statutes.

2. Who is required to initiate the accommodation?

When it has been discovered an employee has a disability, there can be confusion as to where the responsibility lies in terms of getting help to that employee.  Some employers have Employee Assistance Plans (“EAP”), while other employers may utilize a change in the employee’s position, schedule, or hours of work.  If an employee’s drug dependency alters his or her performance at work, an employer is obligated to provide that employee with the opportunity to address his or her problem through rehabilitation and abstention programs.[86]  As such, when it is discovered that an employee is in need of accommodation, who is required to initiate the accommodation?

Current jurisprudence suggests the primary responsibility for accommodation is on the employer; once an employee has made it clear that he or she has a disability that requires accommodation, the employer must make every reasonable effort to assist the employee.[87]  It has also been suggested the employee is expected to participate in the accommodation process and cannot refuse a reasonable accommodation offer.[88]  Looking at Vaughan-Evans, I would suggest he did refuse an accommodation offer.  By all account, Constable Vaughan-Evans was making real progress in his recovery, and in 2003, it was suggested to him that his skills could better be used in an investigative capacity.[89]  When he was appointed back to the area of investigation that triggered the initial heavy marijuana use, a Detective contacted Constable Vaughan-Evans’ Staff Sergeant and outlined some concerns about these types of investigations potentially triggering the same feelings as before.[90]  Although it should be pointed out the Detective who made this call was a victim of Constable Vaughan-Evans previous frauds, the motive for the call is unknown.  Despite this, the Staff Sergeant agreed and transferred him to a less stressful position as Civilian Police College Coordinator.[91]  I would suggest this was an attempt to accommodate Constable Vaughan-Evans.  I would further suggest this type of proactive accommodation is exactly what is required of employers.  In Hall OCCPS, it was pointed out “on December 15, 2005 Constable Hall was charged with nine disciplinary offences.  Prior to this, Constable Hall was unaware that the Service suspected he had been using cocaine.”[92]  I would suggest when OPS became suspicious of Constable Hall’s drug use and growing addiction, instead of offering him assistance, they were motivated only by an attempt to add addition evidence to proceed with PSA charges.

Although an employer is not mandated to coerce a worker to attend a rehabilitation program or monitor the employee’s progress. The employer’s accommodation duty is satisfied when an employer has extended several chances to an employee to address his or her drinking even if the employee drops out of the rehabilitation program.[93]  It was this rationale that OCCPS noted when examining the arguments from the PSA hearing in Vaughan-Evans,

 

Mr. Meagher pointed out that the Hearing Officer found that the Appellant had had many opportunities to reform or rehabilitate himself, and that he had failed to do so… In our view the Hearing Officer’s finding that Constable Vaughan-Evans’ actions taken in context, amounted to serious misconduct, is amply supported by the record. As the Hearing Officer noted a number of times in his decision, the Appellant’s misconduct in 2003 and 2004 was strikingly similar to his misconduct in 1994 and 1995. During both periods the Appellant’s conduct was criminal in nature and a breach of his sworn duties as a police officer.[94]

In his own words, the Hearing Officer, indicated,

How does Constable Vaughan-Evans respond to the various modifications made to tailor his integration into the Toronto Police Service? He smokes a marijuana cigarette in the washroom of Police Headquarters.  This act of December 19th, 2003, leads to his suspension and some 6 months later he is again arrested in his car in possession of marijuana.[95]

Although Constable Vaughan-Evans appears to be the author of his own fate, TPS did attempt to accommodate him on a number of occasions.

Oppositely, what is an employer to do when the employee hides the disability from them?  This was the case with Constable Hall’s plight with addiction.  Unlike Constables Kelly and Vaughan-Evans, Constable Hall did everything in his power to deceive and hide his disability from OPS.  When attempting to ask the question on who is responsible for accommodating a disability, I would suggest a significant weight should be given to the employer who makes the decision to terminate based on the fact the employee hides and deceives his disability in a safety-sensitive workplace rather than seek help.  Unlike Constable Kelly’s situation with TPS, OPS did have programs in place to assist officers who were battling addiction.[96]  In Hall OCCPS, the decision makers paid particular attention the fact that Constable Hall lied on his initial application to OPS.

Part of the Service’s selection process required Kevin Hall to complete a Good Moral Character and Habits Questionnaire. It contained a series of questions directed at alcohol and drug use. In his answers Kevin Hall acknowledged consuming “1 to 2 beers a week during the summer months”. As well, he acknowledged trying marijuana “over a period of 2 weeks” in 1980. He attested that he stopped using marijuana at that time. No mention was made of his time at Rideauwood.[97]

Furthermore, OPS’ position was stated through the prosecutor as,

this was not fundamentally a Human Rights case, but rather a case of gross abuse of authority. He acknowledged that the Service had a duty to accommodate, but suggested that there was a corresponding responsibility on the employee. On this point he observed Constable Hall’s efforts to hide his situation and failure to take advantage of the Service’s confidential employee assistance programs.

 

Mr. Houston argued that the law cannot be interpreted to mean that an employee is entitled to be excused from repeated egregious breaches of his or her duty. Further, he noted the evidence of Superintendent Erfle that to accommodate Constable Hall would impose an undue hardship to the Service.[98]

 

I would suggest Constable Hall already knew he had difficulties with substance abuse and it was for this reason that he lied on his application.  I would further suggest, the lie was also compounded by a fear he had that if he had admitted to the amount of drug use in the past, he would not have been a successful candidate with OPS.  Although drug use in the past is not an automatic disqualification for the position of police constable, many police services include a good character requirement or specifically state a time frame for when an applicant should have refrained from drug use.[99]  In addition, Constable Hall kept his addiction and treatment to himself, thus preventing any opportunity for OPS to accommodate him until after he was already committing serious breaches of trust.[100]  In Re: Ottawa Civic Hospital and O.N.A. (Hodgins),[101] it was held that

knowledge of a disability has been held to be an essential part of a breach of human rights legislation. This conclusion was reached by a panel of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Re Worobetz and Canada Post Corp. (1995), 95 C.L.L.C. [para] 230-036 (at pp. 14,097-8):

However, when the disability underlying inadequate job performance is unknown until after the termination and such lack of knowledge is not due to such things as late blindness or neglect on the part of the employer … the dismissal is not at all based upon a discriminatory ground and no prima facie case exists. To find otherwise would lead to impractical and unreasonable consequences for employers who are legitimately not aware of an employee’s existing disability and may also lead to additional and unrealistic rights for such employees.[102]

Although OPS had become aware of Constable Hall’s disability, I would suggest they did not see it as a disability, but rather as a character flaw to a rogue officer who was looking to obtain drugs either for personal use or sale.  In the 2010, Constable Peter Hodson of the Vancouver Police Service was fired following an unprecedented investigation into street-level trafficking of marijuana.[103]  In his address of the media, Chief Constable Jim Chu flatly stated,

While I can’t discuss many of the details because they are before the courts, I can tell you that we observed behaviour that suggested Hodson was trafficking street level amounts of marijuana both on and off duty.

There will be no discussion here of discipline or suspension.

I have taken the step of firing Hodson as of today.

He is no longer a member of this Department.[104]

Chief Chu did not wait for a disciplinary hearing to determine if there was any need for accommodation, and I believe his decision is indicative of the position many police services take with respect to their officers consuming or being involved with the drug trade.  Shifting the focus back to Constable Hall, I also believe although his practices were arguably equally corrupt, he had a long established history of addiction, something that was not presented in Constable Hodson’s case.

Furthermore, had OPS been aware there was a need for accommodation prior to the commencement of disciplinary actions against Constable Hall, I would suggest the Hearing Officer may have given more weight to his argument of disability.  However, after Constable Hall faced charges under the PSA, one could suggest now that OPS was fully aware of Constable Hall’s disability he should be entitled to receive accommodation.  In a letter to the court, Dr. Morissette, stated, “I think the police force could accommodate him relatively easily. Kevin could be assigned to investigative work where there would be little or no risk to his being exposed to cocaine. This of course precluded his ever working in the ‘drug squad.’”[105]  However, in Hall OCCPS, the tribunal stated,

[t]here is a duty to accommodate. However, it is not bottomless or a license to breach statutory duties. Given Constable Hall’s history, the nature of his misconduct and the evidence of Superintendent Erfle it was certainly open to the Hearing Officer to conclude that accommodation in this situation would cause undue hardship on the Service.[106]

As a result, of Constable Hall’s actions by not coming forward and seeking some assistance from OPS, they in turn believed that Constable Hall had breached the employment contract to such an extent that it vitiated any duty they had to accommodate his disability.

The way Constable Hall dealt with his disability is in stark contrast with Constable Kelly’s efforts to obtain a new position because of his troubles.  This was one of the key issues brought forward by Constable Kelly.  “Constable Kelly spoke to his supervisors on more than one occasion about transferring to a unit where his duties would be less stressful.  However, he did not make a formal application for transfer and no transfer took place.”[107]  I would submit after Constable Kelly brought this to the attention of his supervisors, it was their responsibility to either accommodate the transfer, or to offer him the assistance he required as a preventative measure.  Although it is unknown what the result of the transfer may have been, the only thing that is for certain is his transfer request fell on deaf ears.  This is also previously indicated in the 1998 decision of St. Catharines General Hospital v Ontario Nurses’ Assn. (Bowman Grievance),[108] when Chair Charney stated,

[t]his law does not support the Hospital’s view that it is the grievor who has the primary responsibility to initiate accommodation proposals. What is clear is that the grievor must co-operate with reasonable requests by the Hospital in its efforts to seek out a reasonable accommodation for the grievor.[109]

Consequently, the jurisprudence is clear, the responsibility to accommodate a worker is on the employer.  Despite this, I would suggest, there is also an onus on an employee who is suffering from a disability to report this to their employer.  I would further suggest, by having an employee not report a disability, this lessens the duty owed to that employee if and when it is discovered they have a disability.

3. What is considered “undue hardship”?

While no precise definition of “undue hardship” has been given, case law has provided guidelines for interpretation.  The effort on behalf of the employer to accommodate must be “serious” and “conscientious.”[110]  The steps taken to accommodate must be “genuine” and demonstrative of the employer’s “best efforts.”[111]  The employer’s duty to accommodate requires more than simply investigating whether any existing job might be suitable for a disabled employee.  The law requires an employer to determine whether existing positions can be adjusted or modified for the employee, or whether there are other positions in the workplace that might be suitable for the employee.[112]  An employer is required to look at all other reasonable alternatives for employment within the organization or business.  To demonstrate the employer’s accommodation efforts were serious and conscientious, an employer is required to engage in a four-step process:

 

  1. Can the employee perform his/her job as is?
  2. If no, can the employee perform his/her job in a modified/ “re-bundled” form?
  3. If no, can he/she perform another job in its existing form?
  4. If no, can he/she perform another job in a modified/ “re-bundled” form?[113]

 

The ability to re-bundle depends on the size of the organization. Sometimes a court will find it will be unduly harsh for an organization to modify the tasks performed by its employees because the business or company is too small.  This is not the case in larger organizations that have the space and resources to accommodate disabled employees,[114] as in the case of TPS and OPS.  Notwithstanding the size of the organization, an employer’s obligation to accommodate extends to training, provided the costs of training do not amount to undue hardship.[115]  If there were no full-time, permanent positions (either existing or restructured) that would provide an accommodation for the employee within her or his limitations short of undue hardship, the duty to accommodate will have been deemed to be fulfilled.[116]

Moving forward, despite the need to accommodate, employers must balance an employee’s right to equal treatment with their own right to operate a productive workplace.  In Holmes a pay clerk developed numbness and pain in her right shoulder, making it difficult to perform her duties.[117] Other assignments as a receptionist or a special project clerk proved to be too demanding and all of the other positions within her skill level required the use of the same, damaged muscles. It was eventually determined she could not perform the essential components of her job duties and the employer released her.  She filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission, which found the employer had taken reasonable steps to accommodate her.  The rationale used in Holmes is the same rationale used in Hall OCCPS and Vaughan-Evans.[118]  In Vaughan-Evans specifically, Chair Chitra stated,

In our view the Hearing Officer’s findings that the Constable underwent repeated relapses are supported in the record. This speaks directly to the question of Constable Vaughan- Evans’ potential for rehabilitation and usefulness to the Service. As the Hearing Officer stated at page 87 of his reasons: “I find that Constable Vaughan-Evans has had more than ample opportunity to reform and he seems consistently to be unsuccessful regarding this test.”[119]

Although the tests in Meiorin are helpful for determining whether discrimination is justified, some of the terms used in the test were ambiguous.  For example, what is meant by “undue hardship?” Central Alberta held “undue hardship” could be determined by considering a variety of factors including financial cost, impact on a collective agreement, employee morale, interchangeability of the work force and facilities, size of the employer’s operations, and safety.[120]  A certain degree of hardship is acceptable in accommodation requests, and the employer only has a defence if the inconvenience or hardship was undue.[121]  The employer must demonstrate a real and substantial effort was made to accommodate.[122]  As a result, it could be argued that TPS accommodated Constable Vaughan-Evans to the point where if they accommodated him any further it would be considered as an undue hardship.  In furthering this notion it was stated in Hamilton Police Assn. v Hamilton (City) Police Services Board,[123]

[u]nder the Code and the Police Services Act, an employee of a police services board can only be dismissed from employment as a result of a disability that makes the employee incapable of fulfilling the essential duties of the position if the decision maker is satisfied that “the needs of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any” (Code, s. 17; Act, s. 47).[124]

Following this, it can be concluded if an employer accommodates an employee to the point of undue hardship, particularly if the employee’s addiction continues to disrupt productivity and threatens the safety of other workers, then an employer is justified in terminating the employment contract.[125]

In the context of policing, undue hardship is covered under s. 47(2) of the PSA, which indicates,

The board may discharge the employee, or retire him or her if entitled to retire, if, after holding a hearing at which the evidence of two legally qualified medical practitioners is received, the board,

(a) determines, on the basis of that evidence, that the employee is mentally or physically disabled and as a result incapable of performing the essential duties of the position, and what duties the employee is capable of performing; and

(b) concludes that the employee’s needs cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the board.[126]

In support of this in Hall OSC, Superintendent Ralph Erfle of OPS stated “[i]t would be an unprecedented challenge to place Hall in a position within the OPS, given that Hall’s violation of trust was serious.  Superintendent Erfle was concerned about the image of the OPS.  To attempt to reintroduce Hall into the OPS would constitute an undue hardship.”[127]  In addition, in Hall OCCPS, the Chair Chitra stated,

There is a duty to accommodate. However, it is not bottomless or a license to breach statutory duties. Given Constable Hall’s history, the nature of his misconduct and the evidence of Superintendent Erfle it was certainly open to the Hearing Officer to conclude that accommodation in this situation would cause undue hardship on the Service.[128]

Oppositely, in Kelly OCCPS, it was held,

We do not excuse Constable Kelly’s actions. They were reprehensible. However, he appears to have done everything in his power to make things right. He pled guilty to both his criminal and disciplinary charges. He has accepted responsibility for his actions and taken meaningful steps to address his problems. There is undisputed medical evidence that there is low risk of relapse. His potential for rehabilitation has been recognized by his employer. Accommodation without undue hardship is possible.[129]

Thus it appears from the trilogy of cases examined, that undue hardship will result from a question of mixed fact and law.

Despite the statutory provision in the PSA, it has been argued the decisions from Hearing Officers and OCCPS are producing diminished standards for police services and their employees.[130]  “Rather than starting with the presumption that a disability must be accommodated to the point of undue hardship, adjudicators in the police discipline realm, have recently been treating disabilities as a ‘mitigating factor’ in determining the appropriate sentence.”[131]  Notwithstanding this assertion, the Hearing Officer in Vaughan-Evans did agree,

it is “a shared responsibility which must take into account the essential requirements of the employment in question.”  OCCPS concluded that the Service had fulfilled their duty, and concluded that the Appellant failed to take full advantage of the treatments and services extended to him, medical and otherwise, on and off the job. Further, OCCPS held that he did not make a concerted effort to reform himself and overcome the addiction, which led him to persistent criminal behaviour.[132]

Therefore, although jurisprudence has not specifically indicated what undue hardship requires for an employer to fulfil, they have given a solid foundation.  I would argue, in policing undue hardship has occurred when an employer has attempted to accommodate a police officer but police officer’s disability has compromised his ability to fulfil the general duties of a police officer as defined by s. 42 of the PSA.  However, for a firm decision of an employee, it will need to be examined through an analysis of mixed fact and law.

4. Accommodation versus the power to discipline?

In the trilogy of cases examined thus far, all of the constables have all argued for accommodation.  Whereas the police services have all approached the disabilities from the view that there was a need to discipline.  It is this struggle that can lead to appeals and judicial reviews by both the police service and the subject officer.

In Canadian Postmasters and Assistants Assn. v Canada Post Corp. (MacMillan Grievance, CPAA NS 00-00004, Arb.Christie),[133] Arbitrator Christie held the existence of an illness or disorder should result in reinstatement only if the following criteria are satisfied:

  1. The grievor was experiencing an illness or condition at the time of the misconduct.
  2. A causal linkage or nexus between the illness or condition and the aberrant conduct has been established.
  3. If a causal linkage is found, the arbitrator must be persuaded that there was a sufficient displacement of responsibility from the grievor to render the conduct less culpable. In other words, even if it is found that the misconduct would not have occurred but for the illness or condition, the arbitrator may nevertheless conclude that the grievor was sufficiently responsible for his or her actions to make modification of the penalty inappropriate.
  4. Even where the above criteria are met, the arbitrator must be satisfied that the grievor has been rehabilitated, and that the risk of a recurrence of the aberrant behaviour is minimal.[134]

Additionally,

[a]rbitrator Christie noted, even in cases where it is established that the grievor was suffering from a disability within the meaning of human rights legislation, and the disability was causally connected to the misconduct, it may amount to undue hardship to require that the employer reinstate the grievor. In such instances, he observed, evidence of rehabilitation and the risk of recurrence will be of great importance.[135]

I would suggest the above paragraph is instrumental in the minds of Hearing Officers and those alike who are considering what level of discipline to afford to the subject police officer.  In addition, in policing many cases involving serious discipline under the PSA cites the key case of Williams v Ontario Provincial Police.[136]  Through this case, OCCPS established three key elements to be considered when disciplining a police officer.  “These include the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the ability to reform or rehabilitate the officer and the damage to the reputation of the police force that would occur if the officer remained on the force.”[137]

In each of the trilogy cases, these along with other factors were examined in depth.  First, in Kelly OSC, Justice Carnwath spoke of the joint submission presented to the Hearing Officer at Constable Kelly’s PSA hearing.  In a joint submission the prosecutor and Constable Kelly’s lawyer, had agreed to 13 terms he would need to abide by in order for TPS to accommodate him.  If he violated any of these terms, TPS would seek his dismissal.[138]  In Kelly OCCPS, in correcting the Hearing Officer’s unreasonable decision, OCCPS dismissed claims that Constable Kelly could not be accommodated, or “Kelly’s own deliberate acts that amount to criminal behaviour led to his addiction and, accordingly, the need for the employer to accommodate Kelly is lessened.”[139]  Rather they correctly looked at punishment as:

  1. The nature and seriousness of the misconduct;
  2. The ability to reform or rehabilitate the officer;
  3. The damage to the reputation of the Police Force were the officer to remain on the Force;
  4. Employment history and experience;
  5. Recognition of the seriousness of the transgression;
  6. Handicap or other relevant personal consideration;
  7. Prior disciplinary cases dealing with similar types of misconduct.[140]

After analyzing these factors, a determination was made through the standard of review process that the Hearing Officer’s decision was unreasonable and therefore could not stand.

Second, in Hall OCCPS, Chair Chitra drew particular attention to two of the prosecution’s witnesses who spoke of Constable Hall’s ability to continue his duties as a police officer.

They were Mr. David McKercher, a federal Crown prosecutor and Superintendent Ralph Erfle of the Service. Mr. McKercher testified to the question of the credibility of police witnesses in criminal proceedings. Superintendent Erfle testified concerning the duties of police officers, Service values, public trust, community confidence, the impact of the conduct in question, employee assistance programs, accommodation and the potential for Constable Hall’s reintegration.[141]

Additionally in Hall OSC, Justice Cunningham indicated,

[a]fter acknowledging the principles and factors that ought to be taken into account by a Hearing Officer in assessing the appropriate penalty, the OCCPS properly stated its role:

… It is not to second-guess the hearing officer’s decision, even if we may have imposed a different penalty. Rather, it is to assess whether or not the hearing officer considered and appropriately weighed these principles in a fair and impartial manner. We may vary a penalty that is unreasonable, fails to consider all relevant matters, demonstrates a manifest error in principle or would amount of an injustice. This is not done lightly.[142]

 Through the duty to accommodate and power to discipline process it became clear, perhaps by Constable Hall’s own actions of not reporting his disability in order to seek accommodation that the original disposition at his PSA hearing was upheld.

Third, in Vaughan-Evans, Chair Chitra pointed out that in relation to all of the incidents involving Constable Vaughan-Evans,

[t]he Hearing Officer stated at pages 80 and 81 of his decision that Constable Vaughan- Evans’ conduct “has to be assessed as a whole and not in microscopic sections. A common series of events and repetitive misconduct may be considered as more serious than a single isolated incident.”[143]

Additionally OCCPS also paid attention to the Hearing Officer when he stated, “[i]t was not lost on the Tribunal that Constable Vaughan-Evans had been fired and reinstated just a few short years earlier in relation to his use of marijuana, yet here he is again, a serving police officer, purchasing marijuana again, this time in public drinking establishments.”[144]  They continued by outlining,

[t]he duty to accommodate must be considered in light of an individual employee and his or her employer. This is a shared responsibility which must take into account the essential requirements of the employment in question. The analysis to determine if the duty to accommodate has been met presents particular challenges in the disciplinary context where there is often a mix of culpable and non-culpable factors. This is the case here.[145]

As a result of this analysis OCCPS outlined that it was not their job to second-guess the Hearing Officer, but rather to decide whether the punishment in comparison with the circumstances would be considered unreasonable.  In this instance, they opined, “in our view the penalty imposed by the Hearing Officer is severe but, given the circumstances, not disproportionate or outside of the range available to him.”[146]

As such, the trilogy of cases outlines through their individual analysis that there is a comparison between the duty to accommodate, power to discipline, and applicable case law.  It is unquestionable that every case will have distinctions and similarities, but at the conclusion of the analysis, it will be the comparison of these three factors that will determine the outcome of the subject officer.

Conclusion

Policing is a job filled with various stressors.  Some police officers are able to handler stress through positive outlets, such as exercise.  In other instances some police officers turn to negative coping methods, such as drugs and or alcohol.  The determination of the path of the officer’s career is often decided when the officer or the police service realizes they have a disability and the whole of the circumstances is looked at to determine if accommodation is appropriate.  In examining this, four key areas will be explored.  First, whether the officer had a pre-existing disability prior to their commencement as a police officer, like Constables Hall and Vaughan-Evans.  Or alternatively, if the disability was created in part because of the nature of the job like Constable Kelly.  I would suggest a pre-existing disability related from alcohol or drugs is not on the same level as a disability acquired after commencement as a police officer for the simple reason that if a person commences a career in policing with this type of disability, it will be very difficult for them to meet the demands required of a police officer; and they will be unable to fulfil the requirements of s. 42 of the PSA which outline the duties of a police officer.  Additionally, in a situation where job-related illness or disability has developed is a long established requirement of the employer to accommodate and or assist the employee.

Second, although jurisprudence has established there is a strong onus on an employer to initiate accommodation of an employee, I would submit the onus is also on police officers suffering from a disability to come forward so they do not suffer in silence.  Policing is a strong knit community with EAP programs that are very beneficial.  If officers do not seek to inform their police service, the onus cannot then be placed on the employer to accommodate an employee they did not know had a disability.  In the end, if an officer struggles in silence, they risk becoming like Constable Hall.

Third, through an examination of undue hardship in the workplace, it has been established that no precise definition of undue hardship exists.  Despite this, the courts and tribunals have established a clear road to travel when attempting to ascertain when undue hardship may exist.  I would submit, in policing, undue hardship is established when a police officer, who is the subject to accommodation, cannot be accommodated because it would violate a number of the officer’s duties as per s. 42 of the PSA.

Fourth, a PSA hearing is an adversarial process.  When the above trilogy of police officers faced disciplinary proceedings based on their drug and or alcohol addictions, it placed the duty to accommodate against the power to discipline.  Cases like Williams act as roadmaps for how Hearing Officers are to decide cases that feature similar characteristics.  But in the end, it will be a factual determination that pilots the duty to accommodate, the power to discipline, and the established case law through the course of the proceedings.

Unfortunately, addiction and policing go hand and hand.  They are known as odd bedfellows, and new police officers are routinely warned against the dangers of drugs and alcohol.[147]  Additionally, EAP services, mentoring programs, and continuing education help prevent cases like Constable Kelly, Constable Hall, and Constable Vaughan-Evans.  Fortunately, they are the exception rather than the rule.  However, when similar cases come before a Hearing Officer, there will be onus on the police officer and the police service as to how a bright career was snuffed out by addiction.  Consequently, although accommodation is a key principle of the employment contract, in the end, recognizing disability is everybody’s responsibility.


[1] National Post, “Study Ranks Most Dangerous Jobs” online: National Post  <http://www.canada.com/topics/bodyandhealth/story.html?id=dc7da623-c273-48c0-99f1-ff9daad70bf5&gt;.

[2] Ibid.

[3] RSO 1990, C H19 [HRC].

 

[4] [2006] O.J. No. 1758 [Kelly OSC].

[5] [2008] O.J. No. 5061 [Hall OSC].

[6] Vaughan-Evans v Toronto Police Service (02 April 2008), OCCPS #08-03, online: Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services <http://www.ocpc.ca/files/M4172008U109Z7227N08C834PY182W.pdf&gt; [Vaughan-Evans].

[7] HRC, supra note 3 at s 17(2).

[8] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 5.

[9] Ibid at 8.

[10] Ibid at 10.

[11] Ibid at 15.

[12] SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].

[13] RRO 2004, Reg 328 [Code of Conduct].

[14] RSO 1990, C P 15 [PSA].

 

[15] Kelly v Toronto Police Service (20 April 2005), OCCPS #05-03, online: Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services <http://www.ocpc.ca/files/J78U2005R405X1175X130E0352221F.pdf>  [Kelly OCCPS].

[16] Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 9.

[17] Ibid at 14.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid at 13.

[20] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 1.

[21] Ibid at 2.

[22] Ibid.

[23] RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].

[24] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 2.

[25] Ibid at 3.

[26] Ibid at 4.

[27] Ibid at 19.

[28] [1996] OHRBID No 30 [Entrop]

[29] Ibid at 17.

[30] Michael Lynk, “Disability and the Duty to Accommodate in the Canadian Workplace” online: Ontario Labour Federation <http://www.ofl.ca/uploads/library/disability_issues/ACCOMMODATION.pdf&gt;.

[31] Ibid. at 6.

[32] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Rogal v Dalgliesh, (2000), 37 CHRR D/178 (BCHRT); Hamlyn v Cominco Ltd., (1989), 11 CHRR

D/333 (BCCHR).

[33] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Fiset v Gamble (1992), 18 CHRR D/81 (BCCHR).

[34] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Thwaites v Canada (Armed Forces), (1993), 19 CHRR D/259, uph’d (19940, 21 CHRR D/224 (FC, TD).

[35] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; University of British Columbia v Berg, [1993] 2 SCR 353.

[36] Re Mains Ouvertes-Open Hands Inc., (2000), 86 LAC (4th) 175 (Weatherill); Berry v Farm Meats Canada Ltd., (1999), 38 CHRR D/271 (Alta. HRP).

[37] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Handfield v Board of School Trustees, School District # 26, (1995), 25 CHRR D/452 (BCHRC).

[38] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Horton v Niagara (Regional Municipality), (1987), 9 CHRR D/4611 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).

[39] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Toronto Dominion Bank, (1998), 32 CHRR D/373 (FCA).

[40] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Wilson v Douglas Care Manor Ltd., (1992), 21 CHRR D/74 (BCCHR).

[41] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Bicknell v Air Canada (1984), 5 CHRR D/1992 (Can. Trib.).

[42] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; O’Connor v Town Taxi (1987) Ltd. (2000), BCHRT 9; Matthews v Memorial University of Newfoundland, (1991), 15 CHRR D/399 (Nfld. Bd. Inq.), uph’d 22 C.H.R.R. D/384 (Nfld. S.C.).

[43] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Clarke v Country Garden Florists, (1996), 26 CHRR D/24 (Nfld. Bd. Inq.).

[44] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Boyce v City of Westminister, (1994), 24 CHRR D/441 (BCCHR).

[45] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Cameron v Fletcher Challenge Canada Ltd., (1995), 24 CHRR D/506 (BCCHR).

[46] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Green v Public Service Commission of Canada, (1998), 34 CHRR D/166 (C.H.R.T.), upheld (2000), 38 CHRR D/1 (FCTD); Bigonesse v Ecole Secondaire du Mont-Bruno, (1996), 30 CHRR D/61 (Que. Trib.).

[47] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Re Sault Area Hospitals (2001), 94 LAC (4th) 230 (Whitaker).

[48] Lynk, supra note 30 at 7-8; Cominco Ltd. v U.S.W.A., Local 9705 [2000] BCCAAA No 62 (Larson).

[49] NAV Canada v I.B.E.W., [2001] CLAD No 497 (Chertkow).

[50] Middlemiss v Norske Canada Ltd., [2002] BCHRTD No 5 at 30-31.

[51] HRC, supra note 3 at s 5(1).

[52] Ibid at s 1.

[53] Entrop, supra note 28 at 18.

[54] PSA, supra note 14 at s 47(1).

[55] Lynk, supra note 30 at 3.

[56] [2000] 1 SCR 665.

[57] Ibid at 79-83.

[58] [1999] 3 SCR 868.

[59] Ibid at 15.

[60] [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin].

[61] Lynk, supra note 30 at 4.

[62] Meiorin, supra note 60 at 65.

[63] Ibid at 54.

[64] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 12.

[65] Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 9; Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 2.

[66] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 9.

[67] Hall v Ottawa Police Service (26 April 2007), OCCPS # 07-17, online: Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services  <http://www.ocpc.ca/english/DecisionInformation/Disciplinary/index.asp?tpl=search_disciplinary_detail.asp&tid=980620073O125E05FY14QG29D338T2&gt; [Hall OCCPS].

[68] Ibid at 2.

[69] [2007] CLAD No 243 [GTAA].

[70] Ibid at 6.

[71] Canada, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Human Rights Commission Policy on Alcohol and Drug Testing, (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2002).

[72] Randall Scott Echlin & Christine M. Thomlinson, For Better or For Worse:  A Practical Guide to Canadian Employment Law, 2d ed (Aurora: Aurora Professional Press, 2003) at 127 [Echlin & Thomlinson].

[73] Ibid.

[74] PSA, supra note 14 at s 41(1)(a)-(i).

[75] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 19.

[76] Echlin & Thomlinson, supra note 72 at 127.

[77] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 56; Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 24; Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 7.

[78] Echlin & Thomlinson, supra note 72 at 127.

[79] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2; Krznaric v Timmins Police Services Board (1997), 98 C.L.L.C. 230-004 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

[80] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2; CUPW v Canada Post Corp. (1997), 6 Lancaster’s Equity and Accommodation Reporter 5 (May/June)

(Ponak).

[81] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2; Holmes v Attorney-General of Canada (1997), 97 CLLC 230-022 (FCTD), upheld on appeal, A-430-97 (QL 1999 FCJ #598), (29 April 1999) [Holmes].

[82] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2; CAW, Local 3204 v. Royal Oak Mines (1997), 6 Lancaster’s Equity and Accommodation Reporter 3 (May/June) (R. Bird).

[83] Lynk, supra note 30 at 17.

[84] Conte v. Rogers Cablesystems (1999), 00 C.L.L.C. 230-005 (CHRT).

[85] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 74.

[86] Lynk, supra 30 at 29.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 [Central Okanagan]; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489 [Central Alberta]; O’Malley v Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536.

[89] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 3.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid; Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union , Local 707 v Suncor Energy Inc., [2005] AJ No 871 at 2 & 13.

[94] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 11 & 15.

[95] Ibid at 17.

[96] Hall OCCPS, supra note 67 at 16.

[97] Ibid at 2.

[98] Ibid at 10.

[99] Calgary Police, “Minimum Standards” online: Calgary Police Service   <http://calgarypolicenews.typepad.com/cps_recruiting/minimum_standards/&gt;.

[100] Hall OCCPS, supra note 67 at 10.

[101] [1995] OLAA No 60.

[102] Ibid at 43.

[103] The Vancouver Sun, “Vancouver Police Chief Jim Chu’s statement on the arrest” online: The Vancouver Sun  <http://www.vancouversun.com/Vancouver+Police+Chief+statement+arrest/2935346/story.html&gt;.

 

[104] Ibid.

[105] Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 28.

[106] Hall OCCPS, supra note 67 at 19.

[107] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 14

[108] [1998] OLAA No 257.

[109] Ibid at 260.

[110] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2.

[111] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2

[112] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2.

[113] Lynk, supra note 30 at 2.

[114] Re T.T.C. Bottling Ltd. (1993), 32 L.A.C. (4th) 73 (Christie).

[115] Lynk, supra note 30 at 20.

[116] Edgell v Board of School Trustees, District No. 11., (1996), 97 CLLC 230-009 (BCCHR).

[117] Holmes, supra note 81 at 3.

[118] Hall OCCPS, supra note at 18; Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 18.

[119] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 18.

[120] Central Alberta, supra note 89 at 13.

[121] Central Okanagan, supra note 89 at 26.

[122] Ibid.

[123] [2005] OJ No 2357 [Hamilton Police].

[124] Ibid at 25.

[125] Suncor, supra note 93 at 2 & 13.

[126] PSA, supra note 14 at s 47(2)

[127] Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 24.

[128] Hall OCCPS, supra note 67 at 16.

[129] Kelly OCCPS, supra note 15 at 16.

[130] Ian Johnstone & Matthew Carroll, “Section 47 of the Police Services Act, A Well-Known Problem” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police Labour Conference 2009, 11-12 March 2009), [unpublished].

[131] Ibid.

[132] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 16.

[133] [2001] CLAD No 589.

[134] Ibid at 60; Mort Mitchnick & Brian Etherington, “13.3 Failure to Comply with Employer Rules”, online: Lancaster House:  Labour Law on-line <http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/index.asp?navid=37&layid=73&csid=1732&csid1=23&csid2=1031&fid1=23&gt;.

[135] Mort Mitchnick & Brian Etherington, “10.9.2 Illness or Disorder as a Mitigating Factor”, online: Lancaster House: Labour Law on-line <http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/index.asp?navid=37&layid=73&csid=1731&csid1=23&csid2=8217&advsearch=2&hiss=1&gt;.

[136] (1995), 2 OPR 1047 (OCCPS) [Williams].

[137] Ibid; Kelly OCCPS, supra note 15 at 24.

[138] Kelly OSC, supra note 4 at 29.

[139] Ibid at 33.

[140] Kelly OCCPS, supra note 15 at 9-10.

[141] Hall OCCPS, supra note 67 at 5.

[142] Hall OSC, supra note 5 at 72.

[143] Vaughan-Evans, supra note 6 at 14.

[144] Ibid at 15.

[145] Ibid at 16.

[146] Ibid at 19.

[147] This and all information in this paper related to knowledge obtained by police officers in the course of their education and or training is the author’s experience through his career from 2004 – 2008 as a Police Constable with the York Regional Police.





Radio Interview Re: PC Garrett Styles on Jeff McArthur on AM980

30 06 2011

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Here is a radio interview I did with Jeff McArthur on London’s most popular talk-show “McArthur in the Morning” on AM980.  These are my opinions grounded in my experiences as a York Regional Police Officer and as a Law Student at the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Ontario.  The interview was conducted on June 29th, 2011 – the day after PC Styles #1405 was murdered.

For my take on what I think of what an accused should face when an officer is murdered – see this page on the murder of PC Vu Pham

You can listen to the audio interview here and go to June 29, 2011








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